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Ab.B t
In this essay I examine the notion of moral objectivity of moral properties. Moral objectivity seems to be able to resist the arguments of subjectivists. There seem to be true moral sentences and moral facts can explain actions and occurrences in the world. Values seem best accounted for in objective terms and persons can have interests or good independently of their desires. It seems to be reasonable to think of the nature of moral value in terms of consequences. Knowledge requires truth so the objectivity of moral properties makes moral knowledge possible. Moral knowledge should be accounted for in similar terms as other kinds of knowledge. The major requirement on moral knowledge is coherence. Moral expertise is both possible and plausible and so are moral experts. Paternalism is possible because our values can conflict; autonomy can conflict with general welfare. Paternalism is making someone do what is in his own interest. This seems best thought of in terms of the consequences for his good. The justification of paternalistic interventions seems best based on the weighing of the consequences of the intervention and the decision of the agent. One thing which must be taken into this weighing is the rationality of the decision of the agent. Rationality is basically thought of as the maximization of good. Autonomy is part of everyone's good. It can conflict with the agent's general or overall welfare. But the importance of autonomy for every agent creates a presumption against paternalism. But paternalism can maximize autonomy and paternalism can be justified to secure some minimal autonomy. So paternalism and autonoiry seem to be compatible.
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Introduction
The basic idea in this essay is, hopefully, simple.
It seems to be true that we can make mistakes about our
own interests and about moral rightness and wrongness. We 
are sometimes plain wrong about our best interests and we 
sometimes neglect to help people in need. It may also 
seem plausible to explore the idea that it may be right, 
at least sometimes, to make an agent do what is in his
own interest if he was about to do something harmful. In
this essay I attempt to work on the idea of objectivity 
of moral values and the truth conditions of moral 
propositions to explain what is involved in this idea of 
something being in our interest or something being 
morally right independently of our awareness and 
knowledge.
The connection between making someone do what is in 
his own interest or preventing him from committing a 
major mistake and objectivity is not quite 
straightforward. It seems that in addition to objectivity 
we need a substantive notion of moral values. It also 
seems to require that we can say that there is knowledge 
of what is morally right and good and that there are some 
agents who are in possession of this knowledge. With this 
on board it seems to be possible to make out a case for 
having an agent sometimes do what is in his own best
interest and at the same time accepting that in general
he is the best judge of his own interest.
This view of objectivity is certainly not 
unchallenged. Subjectivists of any sort have tried to 
challenge this view of moral properties. They are not 
willing to accept that moral properties are objective or 
that moral propositions can have truth value. This seems 
to have the consequence that no moral mistakes are 
possible. This would be an unacceptable consequence. But 
subjectivism can be a subtle doctrine and subjectivists 
have wanted to avoid this consequence.
In the first chapter I consider two subjectivist 
theories. The first is R. M. Hare's distinction between
descriptive and evaluative meaning. This distinction is 
fundamental to Hare's whole theory. If it can be 
rejected, then many other claims of his theory seem to
follow. It seems to me that this distinction is not 
tenable. It does not seem to be possible to weed out the 
evaluative meaning from the other parts of the meaning of 
terms like 'good' or 'murder'.
Simon Blackburn has developed a robust theory of 
morality assuming subjectivism but at the same time 
taking moral language at face value, i.e. accepting that 
moral propositions can have truth value and can play a 
proper role in inferences in conditionals. This account 
seems to be objectionable on basically two grounds. 
First, it assumes a strong distinction between first- and 
second-order questions, between ethics and metaethics. 
This distinction is useful but it does not seem to hold
in the strong version required by Blackburn. Second, it 
seems that some elements of his theory cannot succeed on 
their own terms.
In the second chapter I look at four theories which 
can broadly be called moral realist. It seems to me that 
they all must be rejected. It is not that everything is 
wrong in them but they seem to have various 
unsatisfactory features. The view of moral qualities I 
come to is broadly realist and that moral propositions 
can have truth value. I also argue for two more 
conclusions in this chapter. The first is that we should 
accept consequential ism as a substantive account of the 
nature moral value. The second is that moral values are 
objective.
Knowledge requires truth. Moral propositions have 
truth values and it seems reasonable to accept that some 
of them are true. Hence, moral knowledge seems to be 
possible. On the best possible justification of a claim 
to knowledge there is always the possibility that the 
claim might be false. So justification does not guarantee 
knowledge. Neither seem there to be any good candidates 
for self-evidently true foundations for knowledge. So 
fallibilism seems inevitable and a coherence theory of 
justification for knowledge. The same applies to moral 
knowledge. The way to acquire moral knowledge is through 
critical reflection.
The fourth chapter explores the possibility of moral 
expertise and moral experts. The notion of moral 
expertise has not been thoroughly researched by
philosophers but it is strongly resisted. The main reason 
for the resistance, it seems, is that morality requires 
the rational agent to be responsible for his own actions. 
It has been widely believed that moral expertise 
undermines responsibility. This seems false. A rational 
moral agent requires knowledge for his actions. Under 
some circumstances he might require moral expertise from 
others. Moral experts are competent judges in morality 
and they should be able to formulate opinions and 
theories about morality, especially the part of morality 
which can be usefully considered new.
' Paternalism is the subject of the fifth chapter. 
Paternalism is to be made to do something in one's own 
best interest. There are varieties of ways of making 
agents do or accept what is in their own interest. Some 
ways are not paternalistic. Rational persuasion without 
any untoward pressure is not paternalistic. But coercing 
someone to wear seatbelts or to take physical exercise is 
paternalism if the reason for the coercion is the agent's 
own interest. Whether an intervention is paternalistic or 
not is independent of its justification. In the 
justification of a paternalistic act it is necessary to 
weigh the consequences of allowing the agent to decide 
against the consequences of interfering. The rationality 
of the agent's decision must also be taken into account. 
The aim of the interference is to maximize the agent's 
good.
In the last chapter I discuss autonomy. Autonomy is 
the agent's ability to see and act on good reasons. This
requires knowledge of everything concerning the agent's 
own interest and the agent must have control over his 
life. It seems reasonable to believe that autonomy could 
exclude paternalism altogether. One way of arguing for 
this might be in terms of the notion of side constraints. 
Side constraints may be taken to exclude all undue 
interference. But it does not seem to be the right 
conclusion to exclude interference come what may. 
Autonomy puts a limit on paternalism. Paternalism can 
only be accepted as a prevention against great harm and 
when the agent does not reach a certain minimum of 
rationality. Paternalism seems also to be justified to 
maximize autonomy.
One thing needs to be cleared up at the start. The 
notion of objectivity is obviously central to the whole 
essay. It appears in three contexts which might be 
thought to be contradictory. In the first instance moral 
properties are said to be objective in the sense of 
corresponding to true moral propositions. This is most 
prominent in the first two chapters. In this sense moral 
properties are independent of minds. The second context 
is when I discuss desires and value in 2.3. I argue for 
an objectivist conception of value as against a desire- 
satisfaction theory of value. The basic idea is that our 
values cannot be explained by the satisfaction of our 
desires. This idea is analogous to the notion of moral 
properties argued for earlier. But in 6.4. I say that 
autonoiry is valuable not as a Platonic Form, discoverable 
in a reality independent of human desires and
10
consciousness, but it is valuable because if rational 
agents were subjected to the experiences of autonomy they 
would desire it. This seems to clash with what had been 
said earlier about moral properties and values.
Is there a contradiction here? To answer that 
question we must first say what the contradiction in 
question is supposed to be. The contradiction is this: in 
discussing moral properties they are said to be 
independent of human minds or independent of being 
recognized. When talking about autonoiry as a part of 
human welfare I seem to accept that its value can be 
interpreted as dependent on count erf actual or informed 
desire.
This contradiction depends on how we understand the 
notion of a moral property. How is it related to moral 
values? One answer to this question might be: moral value 
is a subset of moral properties and nothing is implied 
about moral properties in general by saying that some 
part of moral value should be explained by counterfactual 
desires. Another answer might be this: moral value in
this essay is used in a loose sense to cover both typical 
values like goodness and requirements like rightness. It 
coincides roughly with the notion of a moral property. 
Explaining moral value is explaining moral properties. It 
is an argument for this interpretation that right actions 
are considered to be a subset of good actions. This 
second interpretation seems to be the correct one. But as 
should be clear by now, this interpretation seems to have
11
the immediate consequence that what I said about autonomy 
and moral properties is contradictory.
Yet, when looked at more closely there is no 
contradiction. The reason is this. When I argue that 
autonomy is such that it would be desired were it 
experienced by rational agents I do not mean to imply 
that autonomy is valuable because it would be desired if 
this condition were fulfilled. It is because rational 
agents are as they are that they would desire autonomy 
were they to experience it. And I think it is a fact that 
they do desire it. But if, for some reason, rational 
agents were to change and stop desiring autonomy if they 
experienced it then autonomy would not stop being a part 
of objective welfare. This welfare seems to be a 
necessary part of a good life. It is fortunate that 
rational agents are so constituted that they do desire 
autonomy if they get the chance to experience it. We can 
say that rational agents ought to desire autonomy as a 
part of their welfare but there can be circumstances 
where this ought is defeasible. Autonomy is not the 
supreme value. I do not have a theory of a unified order 
of values. So even though rational agents changed 
autonomy would continue to be a part of their objective 
welfare. It is therefore true of autonomy as it is true 
of moral values in general that they can transcend our 
recognition of them. So there is no contradiction between 
my views on the status of autonomy and the nature of 
moral properties.
12
These are the main lines of argument in this essay. 
Moral mistakes are possible. It is not only individuals 
who make them. Whole communities can systematically make 
moral mistakes. If a community changes and starts taking 
the torturing of children as acceptable behaviour, then 
it has become corrupted. This intuition is respected by 
what I argue in this essay. If there were moral experts 
in such a society and they accepted this conduct they 
would be wrong. There is no guaranteeing the truth of our 
considered beliefs.
13
Cbapteg .1
In this first chapter I start by drawing some 
important distinctions for discussing moral realism and 
give a rough description of it. Then I go on to consider 
two challenges to moral realism. The first is Hare's 
theory of prescriptive and descriptive meaning. The 
second is Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism. I try to argue 
that we have reason to reject these two theories.
1.1. Some Distinctions
Goodness is a value. It seems that there can be 
three kinds of goodness. First, there can be goodness of 
a kind. This means that if we talk about a good knife we 
mean that the knife is a good example of a knife. What is 
a good example of a knife is determined by standards and 
the purpose we are using it for. This notion could be 
analyzed further and we could certainly find other kinds 
of goodness similar to this one.^ Second, there is 
prudential goodness. This is goodness of things which can 
satisfy our self-regarding needs or fulfill our self- 
regarding desires. Yet, not all things which can fulfill 
those needs and desires are prudentially good. Only those
1. G.H. von Wright: The Varieties of Goodneaa, London,Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, see esp. the first, 5 chapters, pp.1-113
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things which can be said to be in our own interest can be 
counted as prudentially good. All decisions based on 
prudence are aimed at enhancing or promoting our own 
interests. Thirdly, there is moral goodness. What is 
moral is determined by what can be sanctioned. It is an 
instance of moral goodness when we promote the interest 
of others. If someone is in distress and we can alleviate 
his distress without undue effort, we ought to do it. If 
we do not do it we feel guilty and guilt is a sanction.
Sometimes 'value' is used to cover various different 
things like aesthetic value, duty etc. beside goodness.^ 
If used in this sense requirements like rightness become 
a type of value. But usually a distinction between 
goodness and rightness is drawn in terms of deontology 
and axiology: the former deals with requirements like
rightness, the latter with values like goodness. However 
we distinguish between these two it is important to 
realize how goodness and rightness are related.. We can 
describe a moral agent as an agent that is concerned with 
the right kind of thing for the right kind of reason. Now 
how should the meaning of 'right' be explained? One 
suggestion might be that the right thing to do is what is 
our duty to do. But 'duty' has no clearer meaning than 
'right'. So it would be reasonable to expect an 
explanation of the meaning of 'duty'. How should we 
explain its meaning? I suggest that its meaning should be 
explained as the best action out of the set of actions
2. See Frankena, W.K. : "Value and Valuation" in P.Edwards (ed.): The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York, Macmillan Publisher, 1963, vol. 8, p. 229
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available to the agent at any particular time. This has 
the obvious consequence that right actions become a 
subset of good actions. Now this may not be thought to be 
very illuminating and it is possible to point to 
differences between these two concepts which emerge, for 
example, in contract theory of justice.^ But this 
difference is not important for this essay.
The bearers of moral goodness are agents and 
actions. If we talk about a good man, this is usually 
taken to involve a virtuous man. It does not exclude that 
he does no evil or bad in his whole life, but only that 
there are reasons explaining it when he does and on the 
whole he does more good than bad.
Actions can be done for prudential reasons or moral 
ones; this distinction is not exhaustive. It seems to 
follow from the distinction drawn earlier that no moral 
actions can only or primarily concern the agent. The 
distinction is that prudential reasons primarily concern 
the agent himself but moral reasons concern other people. 
The obvious first suggestion for moral goodness of an 
action is when it benefits another person and moral 
badness when it harms him.^ But there are two problems 
with this suggestion as it stands. Moral goodness is not 
relative to persons. It is either good or bad 
simpliciter, not good for me or bad for me or good or bad 
for somebody. But the relations of harming and 
benefitting are obviously relative to persons. The other
3. J. Rawls: A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp.446-4524. G.H. von Wright: op. cit. p. 119-130
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problem is that my action can benefit another person 
without it being an instance of moral goodness. The same 
applies to moral badness. Let us assume that I encourage 
somebody to drink liquid in a glass to cure his coughing, 
believing it to contain cyanide and that it will really 
kill him. But to my surprise it turns out that it 
contains lemon tea which does wonders for his coughing. 
My action is not an instance of a morally good action, 
even though it benef itted him. It is actually an instance 
of a morally evil action because I intended to kill him. 
The notion of intention is obviously crucial in this 
field. So some account of intention is needed to give a 
full description of a good action. But it will have to 
suffice to say that the basic sense of 'good intention' 
is doing good.
This is where the notion of sanctions comes in. Only 
those actions that can be sanctioned can be moral. 
Sanctions can be either internal, like guilt, or 
external, like being put into prison or social 
disapproval. This, obviously, puts no limit on what type 
of actions can be moral, given that they can be 
sanctioned. This applies both to harming and benef itting. 
If we omit to benefit someone out of negligence then we 
ought to feel guilty. If we harm someone intentionally, 
then we ought to feel guilty and we ought to be punished. 
This possibility of sanction explains why we found 
problems with the suggestion above that moral goodness 
consisted in benef itting someone and why the notion of 
intention plays a central role in a moral action. Another
17
consequence of making sanctions central to morality is 
that the other-regardingness of moral actions is not a 
necessary feature of them, as may have been thought from 
what I said above. It is still true that other-regarding 
actions are a primary example of moral actions, but
sanctions do not exclude the possibility of self- 
regarding actions as being moral. This has, at least, the 
virtue of historical ancestry because many moral
theorists have considered actions regarding oneself as 
morally good or bad. Suicide has been thought to be 
morally blameworthy.
Using the notion of sanction in this way goes along 
well with many of the traditional Christian moral rules 
which are prohibitions on doing wrong: do not commit
adultery, do not kill, do not covet. Other instances of 
moral conduct fit in with this as well: "wreaking
vengeance; responding hubristically to being elevated to 
power; responding cantankerously to authority; responding 
to another's achievement by detraction, slander or other 
behaviour expressive of envy."  ^ Refraining from this 
type of conduct is clearly an instance of moral goodness. 
Indulging in all these types of conduct should invite
guilt. So sanctions seem to be necessary for the moral.
It might be objected to this that it is not the 
possibility of sanctions that is necessary for the moral 
but the possibility of being rightly sanctioned. And if 
this be so, then I seem to be assuming what I am trying
5. Holland, R.F.: "Good and Evil in Action" in AgainstEmpiricism. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980, p. 112
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to explain. In response it is fair to point out that I 
did not claim that the possibility of sanctions was 
sufficient. The reason was that I am sceptical about the 
possibility of defining morality. It seems to me to be 
true that something along similar lines to those 
suggested in the objection would have to come in a full 
definition. But I shall not examine this possibility any 
further.
Another objection to using the notion of sanction in 
this way could be this: if sanctions are necessary for 
morality then moral realism is thrown in doubt. The 
reason is that the moral does not seem to be independent 
of the mental if sanctions are necessary. As I indicate 
below it seems to be one feature of moral realism that 
moral facts are believed to be independent of mental 
states. How should this be handled? There is an analogy 
between the moral and the semantic in this respect at 
least : the community of speakers seems to be a necessary 
condition for the semantic but this in no way implies 
that the semantic depends on the existence of a community 
of speakers. The same thing could be said about sanctions 
and the moral. Sanctions make the moral possible but the 
moral does not depend on sanctions but is independent of 
them.
Moral requirements seem to be such that they apply 
to all agents in relevantly identical situations. This 
can be taken to mean two things. First, it can mean that 
moral rules are universal in character, there are no 
references to particular individuals. Second, it can mean
19
that moral rules are agent neutral; "if it is a reason 
for anyone to do or want something that it would reduce 
the amount of wretchedness in the world, then that is a 
neutral r e a s o n . The difference between these two can be 
illustrated by the principle of rational egoism; Everyone 
has a reason to promote his own interest. This principle 
is universal, but it is not agent neutral because it 
involves reference to the interest of every agent, it is 
agent-relative. An agent-neutral principle would say that 
if X is a part of A's good, then everyone has a reason to 
promote it.^ It seems to me that the moral includes 
generality in both these senses.
Moral realism is a particular view about the nature 
of moral and non-moral goodness. It is not quite obvious 
how it should be formulated. One natural suggestion is 
that the moral is objective. But this is really no 
clarification unless we have some account of objectivity. 
One idea for such an account might be that moral 
statements have truth values, can either be true or 
false. But there are at least two reasons for not 
accepting this as sufficient. First, all moral statements 
might be false. This would invalidate moral realism. We 
must have a reason for thinking that some moral 
statements are true, if we are to accept this suggestion 
about moral realism. Second, the truth of some moral 
statements might be dependent on some facts about the
6. Nagel, T.: The View from Nowhere, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 152-1537. Skorupski, J. : John Stuart Mill, London, Routledge, 1989, p. 309
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mental. We could hold, for example, that relieving
wretchedness in the world is a moral reason for everyone 
to act because every rational agent actually has a desire 
to relieve wretchedness in the world. So this is a moral 
truth because everyone has this desire. This is certainly 
a possible version of moral realism. But I think it is 
true to say that moral realism is often taken to imply
that the moral is independent of the mental. So I do not
think this is a satisfactory account of moral realism.
Let us try another formulation of moral realism.
Moral realism must include two claims: One is that there 
are moral truths in the sense that there are true moral 
propositions, and two, these truths are independent of 
our beliefs or evidence for them. These two claims are 
certainly important parts of any moral realism but they 
are not sufficient to exclude some views that have not 
been generally accepted as moral realism. Moral realism 
of this sort excludes moral constructivism which accepts 
moral truth but claims that it is constituted by the 
evidence for the truth and it excludes moral 
noncognitivism which does not accept that moral 
statements can have truth value. But moral realism, as 
described here, does not exclude a theory like rational 
egoism and would have to accept it as morally realistic. 
The reason is that propositions about the psychological 
can have truth value. Therefore, moral values might be 
subjective in an important sense according to this moral 
realism.
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It follows from this that there is a difference 
between objectivism about values and moral realism. Moral 
realism is compatible with some subjectivity about 
values. In so far as this value-subj activity does not 
involve the claim that the value of x is constituted by 
the belief that x is valuable, it is compatible with 
moral realism. It would take some time to work out where 
the line between an acceptable form of value-subjectivity 
and an unacceptable form lies but I do not intend to 
attempt to find it. But in 2.3. I will try to argue for 
an objective view of moral values.
There seem to be two major considerations that 
motivate arguments for moral realism. The first is that 
moral realism can accept moral statements as literally
true if true. Moral terms enter statements of all sorts 
and among them are indicative statements. Moral realism 
accepts such statements and thinks that they refer to 
moral properties. It does not need to resort to some 
subtle explanations of moral terms as not really 
referring to anything or having some other kind of 
meaning or explaining them away in some other fashion. I 
will have a look at two such attempts later in this
chapter. But this fact about moral realism that it
accepts ordinary language at face value, so to speak, 
gives it the initial advantage of putting the onus of
proof on other theories. The other major consideration 
for moral realism is that it accords well with realism 
about other kinds of discourse like scientific discourse. 
The force of this .argument obviously depends on how
22
plausible one finds realism generally. I do not want to 
enter into arguments about scientific realism, but I only 
want to indicate that many of those who have been willing 
to accept realism about science have been very critical 
of such a view about moral discourse. Yet if one accepts 
scientific realism, then moral realism becomes more 
plausible and if one thinks that moral realism cannot be 
accepted but scientific realism can, then one needs 
specific arguments for this view on moral realism.
Scientific realism accepts that scientific 
propositions are true independently of our evidence for 
them or our perceptions of the relevant states of 
affairs. Both moral and scientific realism are objective 
in this sense. This indication, and the reasoning above, 
about the connection between objectivism and moral 
realism seem to me to be sensible. But there is another 
question about moral properties that should be discussed 
at this stage. It is whether moral properties should be 
understood naturally, nonnatural ly or supernaturally. 
According to the last the moral property of being good 
would consist in being willed by God or some other 
supernatural being. The merits of this conception I will 
not discuss, not because it is without any merit but. 
because it is more plausible to think that God wills what 
is good rather than that what is good is good because it 
is willed by Him. Discussion of this issue is outside the 
scope of this essay. This leaves us with the other two 
possibilities.
23
Many modern moral philosophers have argued that a 
moral property could not be a natural property. The 
argument for thinking that was basically simple. If moral 
properties were natural properties the relation of 
synonymy between 'good' and some name of a natural 
property ought to obtain. But the problem is that no such 
term seems to be synonymous with 'good* . We can always 
ask about any natural property; is it good? The 
conclusion is that goodness is a sui generis property or 
a nonnatural property. But this view carries with it 
problems. One is how we are supposed to know nonnatural 
moral properties. Proposing a special moral faculty 
enabling rational agents to know what is morally good and 
right is implausible. This seems to make moral realism a 
very difficult or nearly an impossible position.
One way out of this is to realize that moral 
properties can be natural properties without the relation 
of synonymy obtaining between the terms referring to 
them. Notwithstanding this possibility however, one may 
prefer to argue that moral properties can be constituted 
by natural properties. This does not mean that moral 
properties are identical with natural properties. The 
relation between them will be the relation of 
supervenience. To hold that moral properties supervene on 
natural properties is to say that if the natural 
properties of two things are identical, then the moral 
properties cannot differ. There is much more to be said 
about this conception of natural properties and I will 
try to say some of those things in this and the next
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chapter. But, given that what I have to say against 
Blackburn's theory of quasi-realism is reasonably 
successful, I think it is true to say that any of these 
three construals of moral properties, as natural, 
nonnatural or supernatural, would be realistic.
I shall attempt to say something more about the form 
that moral realism should take in the next chapter. But 
before I do that I want to consider two important 
challenges to moral realism. In trying to answer some of 
the criticisms in these two views, I hope to clarify 
important features of moral realism.
s .Challenge
Hare argues for noncognitivism in the sense that he 
denies that evaluative terms or propositions including 
evaluative terms can have truth value in virtue of the 
evaluative element in them. He is not a straightforward 
noncognitivist because he believes that value terms can 
have descriptive meaning. In so far as they have 
descriptive meaning they can have truth values. But the 
crucial point is that nothing can be inferred about 
evaluation from description. I want to have a look at his 
argument for this theory.
We can distinguish between three things concerning 
sentences. The first is force. A sentence can have 
assertoric force, imperative force and so on. But the 
same sentence can be used as an assertion, an imperative, 
a question. So force cannot be a property of sentences.
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It is a property of speech acts. An utterance of a 
sentence for a purpose is a speech act. Examples are 
assertions, questions and commands. The second is mood. 
The mood of a sentence can be indicative, imperative or 
subjunctive. Sentences in the indicative mood (or to be 
exact containing verbs in the indicative mood) usually
state facts, in the imperative they usually express 
orders. An indicative uttered by an actor on stage is not 
taken to be an assertion of anything. Yet it is an
indicative. So mood is a property of sentences. The third 
thing is sense. The sense of a sentence is the way of
determining its reference. The importance of making these 
distinctions is to realize that only mood and sense can 
be a part of what is usually called the meaning of a 
sentence.
It is natural say about descriptive sentences that 
they are indicatives. Indicative sentences which are not 
descriptive would seem to be a very peculiar type of 
sentences. We assume that only properly descriptive 
sentences can have truth value.® The argument for taking 
some indicative sentences as not being descriptive can be 
that otherwise we would be confusing logical form with 
grammatical form. When we considered evaluative terms we 
would come to the conclusion that it is seriously
misleading to think that sentences including evaluative
8. McGinn, C .: "Semantics for Non-Indicatives" inPhilosophical Studies 32, 1977, p. 303 where he says:" . . .and if the mood of the sentence is not indicative it still cannot, without impropriety, be said to possess truth-value"
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terms should be categorized along with other indicative 
sentences.
Let us spell out the argument for this in some 
detail. The first thing to realize is that the question 
is not about the terms themselves but their meaning 
according to Hare. Value terms have two kinds of meaning: 
descriptive and evaluative. And there is a sharp 
distinction to be drawn between these two. You cannot 
draw any evaluative conclusion based on descriptive 
premisses. This argument implies that all indicative 
sentences have descriptive meaning but some have 
evaluative meaning as well. The obvious question is: How 
do we know which ones have evaluative meaning? The answer 
cannot be: we know which ones have evaluative terms
because we cannot characterize those terms without 
recourse to their meaning. The answer to this question 
implied by Hare's argument is that we do things with 
sentences having evaluative meaning which we cannot do 
with descriptive meaning. This needs some explaining.
It seems to be unproblematic to distinguish between 
describing and evaluating. These are two kinds of 
activities we engage in with language and someone who 
knows how to speak must know how to engage in these two 
kinds of activities. So knowing the language entails 
being able to distinguish between describing and 
evaluating. But this is not the same as accepting the 
sharp distinction here described between descriptive
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meaning and evaluative meaning. To see that we need to go 
through the argument for the distinction.^
When we say that a certain wine is good, Hare calls 
it Colombey-les-deux-églises 1972, the reason we give for 
thinking a wine good is that it has a particular taste, 
bouquet, body, strength etc. His idea is to try to 
isolate the evaluative meaning of a term from the
descriptive meaning and show that the distinction is 
valid.
"Let us invent a word, '4>', to stand for that 
quality of the wine which makes us call it a good 
wine. The quality is, as I have explained, a complex 
one. Will you allow me to suppose, also, that (as is 
not improbable) by the time 1972 wines of this sort 
begin to be good, the science of aromatics (if that 
is the right name) will have advanced enough to put 
the wine snobs out of business; that is to say, that
it will have become possible to manufacture by
chemical means additives which, put into cheap 
wines, will give to them tastes indistinguishable by 
any human palate from those of expensive wines. We 
should then have a chemical recipe for producing 
liquid tasting <j). This would make it easy (though 
even without such scientific advance it would be
3. Hare, R.M. : "Descriptivism", in Hudson ed. : The Is-Ouqht Question. London, Macmillan, 1969, pp. 241-247. Further arguments for Hare's position are to be found in R.M. Hare: Freedom and Reason. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 26-29, 152-156; R.M. Hare: The Language ofMorals. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1952, p. Ill, 118-125, 146-150.
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perfectly possible) to teach somebody to recognize 
the <}) taste by lining up samples of liquids tasting 
<|), and others having different tastes, and getting
him to taste them, telling him in each case whether
the sample tasted <|> or not. It is worth noticing 
that I could do this whether or not he was himself 
disposed to think that these liquids tasted good, or 
that, if they were wines, they were good wines. He 
could, that is to say, learn the meaning of '<})' 
quite independently of his own estimation of the 
merit of wines having that taste.
...*I want you to understand that, in calling a 
wine <j), I am not thereby commending it or praising
it in any way, any more than it is commending it or 
praising it to say that it is produced by this 
chemical recipe; I am indeed (for such is my 
preference) disposed to commend wines which have 
this taste; but in simply saying that wine is I am 
not thereby commending it any more than I should be 
if I said that it tasted like vinegar or like water. 
If my preference (and for that matter everybody 
else's) changed in such a way that a wine tasting
like this was no longer thought any good, and we 
could do nothing with it but pour it down the drain, 
we could still go on describing it as
Hare claims that someone who does not accept the 
distinction between descriptive and evaluative meaning
10. Hare, R.M.: op. cit. p. 242-243
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cannot understand the argument above. The example he 
chose, he claims, was perfectly natural and valid and we 
could not do without the distinction in trying to 
understand- it. Hence it makes no sense to refuse to 
accept it. As the example showed it is perfectly possible 
for two people to agree about whether Colombey 1972 
tastes <j> and disagree about whether it is a good wine. 
This would not be possible on the premise that there was 
no distinction between descriptive and evaluative 
meaning. He rejects the charge that he has assumed what 
he wanted to prove by introducing a distinction between 
commendation and description in the argument. He had only 
put into it the premise that the distinction was 
intelligible. And because it was intelligible and the 
argument went through it was valid.
This is an important argument, if true. I think it 
can be seriously doubted. To see why we should take a 
careful look at the assumptions. There seem to be three 
key assumptions here;
1.' To call X good is to commend it.
2. Being good is directly related to our preferences.
3. There is an unbridgeable gap between the sentence "x 
is good" and "x has a certain taste, bouquet, body, 
strength etc."
Let us first look at the third assumption. What Hare 
does in effect in the example and the argument is to coin 
the name .<{) for the latter sentence in the third
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assumption and say it does not mean the same as the
former sentence, i.e. "x is good" does not mean the same 
as "X has certain taste, bouquet, body, strength etc.". 
It is perfectly true that there is no analytic connection 
between these two sentences. Yet there is a connection.
The qualities described in the conjunctive sentence are 
criteria for the goodness of wine. If all of the 
qualities mentioned were absent, the wine couldn't 
possibly be good. But if they are all present, it 
certainly is. This shows that it is the presence of those 
qualities which makes the wine good. The goodness of the 
wine consists in the presence of these qualities. So 
there is a relation between these two sentences but it is 
not analytic.
This is the real is-ought gap that is sometimes 
believed to be fatal to moral realism. The gap between 
is-ought propositions is similar to gaps between is-is 
propositions. There is no analytic relation between 
biological propositions and propositions in chemistry. 
This does not exclude the possibility of propositions in 
chemistry being evidence for the truth of a proposition
in biology. So even though we accepted that there were an
is-ought gap, it should not be taken to exclude the 
possibility of an evidential relation between 
propositions of these two types. So moral realism could 
accept the is-ought gap. But as has been described, we 
can also think that the goodness consists in the presence 
of these other properties relevant to the goodness of 
wines. It is at least clear that the synthetic-analytic
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distinction does not provide noncognitivism with any good 
arguments for denying such relations.
But the goodness of the wine can also refer to the 
pleasure to our palate a good wine gives. This goodness 
is obviously directly related to our preferences. But in 
so far as there is something for a good wine to be, some 
conditions to fulfill, then this goodness is not 
necessarily related to our preferences. It seems to me 
that wine can both be pleasant and have goodness of the 
kind explained above. Assumption 2 seems to be valid for 
one kind of goodness but not for another. It seems to me 
that Hare thinks that all goodness is similar to pleasure 
in the respect that all goodness is somehow consequent 
upon our preferences. I think this ultimately is based on 
his belief that to understand good is to pursue it. This 
is a a belief which says that there is an internal link 
between goodness, preference and choice. I will not 
inquire into whether internalism is the right theory 
about motives and reasons for action or externalism. 
Both these theories have been taken to be compatible with 
moral realism.
I have not attempted to argue that assumption 2 is 
false but I have given some reason to think that it is 
implausible as a general account of goodness but leaving 
it open whether it is a good account of moral goodness. 
Assumption 3 seems to me to be false. The first
11. Brink, D.O.: Moral Realrsm. and The Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 38-4312. See Brink, D.O. op. cit. ch. 3, and D. McNaughton: Moral Vision. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988, pp. 46-50
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assumption is left. What should be said about it. The 
first thing to be noticed is that it seems to be 
literally true: To call x good is to commend it. But we 
should be careful about words here. We are talking about 
calling x good and commending x. These are both speech 
acts and hence concern only the force of the sentence, 
not its sense or mood or in other words its meaning. It
is simply a fallacy that good means commending. To
commend x is to do something with respect to x, i.e. to 
perform a speech act. Because it is a speech act its 
assertibility conditions are derived from the point of 
the act. If I assert p, I might want to induce the belief 
that p in another speaker, or I might want to distance 
myself from some other belief or whatever. A particular 
speech act can serve a number of purposes and a 
particular sentence can be the content of different types 
of speech acts. Usually indicative sentences are used for 
asserting. There are certain conventional relations 
between speech acts and mood. Yet it does not follow that 
the meaning of the sentence can be analyzed in terms of
the speech act. What is the relation between the meaning
of a sentence and a speech act? The relation is only 
conventional: indicatives are ordinarily used to assert. 
The meaning of a sentence or parts of a sentence cannot 
be explained in terms of the speech act.
The upshot of this is that this argument at least 
does not prove that there is a distinction between 
descriptive and evaluative meaning. All the three
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assumptions are either implausible or can be accommodated 
within moral realism.
This does not necessarily mean that there is no 
valid distinction between descriptive and evaluative 
meaning. We need a positive argument for the idea that 
there is no sharp distinction to be drawn between 
descriptive and evaluative meaning. I shall mention two 
things neither of which is conclusive. The first is a 
comparable example. The word "valid" as used in logic is 
an evaluative word. It indicates what are good arguments. 
It can be defined in terms which are not evaluative such 
as coherent, when premisses are true false conclusions do 
not follow, the conclusions follow from the premisses. 
When these conditions are fulfilled, an argument is 
valid. It is at least arguable that none of the defining 
terms can be considered an evaluative term. So this can 
be considered an example of defining an evaluative term 
without recourse to other evaluative terms.
The second is that it seems to be impossible with 
many evaluative terms to distinguish descriptive from 
evaluative meaning. What is the evaluative term in this 
sentence: he only thinks about himself. There does not
seem to be any. But it is certainly a derogatory 
statement about anybody. What about the sentence: She is 
a very inconsiderate woman? "Inconsiderate" is a good 
candidate for a value term. But how should we weed out 
the descriptive component? The idea must be that there is 
a conjunctive sentence similar to the one we used in 
defining valid or the conjunctive in the third assumption
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above. It might go something like this: She is rude
generally, never takes other people's feelings into 
consideration when deciding something and so on. But here 
we should notice one thing. The conjunctive statement 
could just as well serve as an explanation of the 
evaluative meaning. Not to take other people's feelings 
into account is, after all, a defect of character. And it 
seems to me to be an appropriate candidate for the 
evaluative meaning. But how should the factual meaning 
then be explained? One plausible suggestion might be 
thought to be the language of physical science. But I 
will be brief about this suggestion: it is simply false
that the sentence "x is considerate" can be translated 
into the terms of physical theory. Hence there is reason 
to be doubtful about the distinction between descriptive 
and evaluative meaning.
It needs to be pointed out that I have only 
discussed the distinction between evaluative and 
descriptive meaning and the example from Hare was 
distinctly non-moral. It is possible to say that the 
story might be different, if we discussed moral value 
rather than non-moral value and the distinction between 
morally evaluative statements and descriptive ones. On 
Hare's theory moral values have distinctive 
characteristics: prescriptivity, overridingness and
universality. I do not want to deny that moral values 
have distinctive characteristics and I have already made ' 
that clear. But I do not think moving on to moral values 
would make any difference to what has been said here. The
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distinction between the two kinds of meanings gains no 
obvious plausibility by narrowing it down to moral values 
rather than taking values generally.
1,3, Quasi-Realism
Quasi-real ism is a theory developed by Simon
Blackburn.Its basic idea is that we can accept moral 
language at its face value and yet explain it with a 
slim, austere, Humean theory. To accept moral language at
its face value is to accept that evaluative statements
have assertoric force and value words seem to refer in 
the same way as any other words and all the other
indications we have taken to imply that values are 
objective. It also accepts that moral experience can be 
such that values seem to be imposed on us or strike us as 
having a basis outside our own feelings and emotions. A 
quasi-realist can hold that "it is not my sentiments that 
make bear-baiting wrong; it is not because we disapprove 
of it that mindless violence is abominable; it is 
preferable that the world should be a beautiful place 
even after all consciousness of it c e a s e s . H e  can also 
say: "if everyone comes to think of it as permissible to
13. See S. Blackburn: Spreading The Word, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, ch. 6, pp. 181-223; "Error and the Phenomenology of Value" in T. Honderich: Morality andObjectivity. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, pp. 1-22; "Rule Following and Moral Realism" in Holtzman and Leich ed.: Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. London, Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1981, pp. 163-187 for the main ideas of Blackburn's quasi-realism.14. Blackburn, S.: "Errors and the Phenomenology of Value" p. 10
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maltreat animals, this does nothing at all to make it 
permissible: it just means that everybody has
deteriorated."!® Yet quasi-realism believes that these 
facts can be explained by an austere Humean theory of 
values which assumes that the mind spreads itself on the 
world and in fact that there are no values to be found 
there, only our emotional reactions to natural facts 
which are developed in interaction with other people and 
become commitments and duties and as this socialization 
develops we start to believe that these things are 
discovered in reality.
If this theory really delivers the goods, it is no 
mean feat. Let us see how it works out in going through 
some of the arguments.
The first question about this theory is why should 
we accept it? There are at least three reasons to be 
given. The first is economy. I take it to be fairly clear 
that quasi-realism would use slender means to explain a 
seemingly richer reality. Secondly, supervenience can be 
better explained in terms of quasi realism than in terms 
of realism proper. This needs some explaining. We often 
say about goodness: A thing x is good or bad in virtue of 
something. In the case of truth we are saying that there 
is something corresponding to the terms we use and in the 
case of goodness we are saying that there is a connection 
between the natural properties of an object and its moral 
properties. This seems to be the intuitive conception of 
supervenience. But the correspondence between a statement
15. Blackburn, S.: op. cit. p. 14
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and conditions in the world is different from the 
correspondence between the two kinds of properties, 
natural and moral.
So how should supervenience be described? Are we 
saying that the moral property, goodness for example, is 
identical with the property in virtue of which it exists 
or upon which it supervenes? This is not what we say and 
it is also false. The goodness of an apple and the 
goodness of a knife are not identical nor are the natural 
qualities of apples and knifes upon which goodness 
supervenes in each case identical. So how should we 
describe this relation between evaluative and natural 
properties? How is good connected with other features of 
things? Is it a relation of necessity? The necessity in 
question cannot be analytic necessity because it does not 
make sense to argue that "good" means the same as some 
term of natural property, "sharp" for example or "sweet- 
tasting" .
Blackburn describes the supervenience relation thus: 
it is necessarily true that if any particular type of 
things has both moral and natural properties, then all 
things of this particular type have them. Notice that 
this description of the supervenience relation does not 
say that it is necessarily true that if all things of a 
particular type have moral properties then they must all 
have natural properties. If this latter were true we 
could have an analysis of moral concepts in terms of 
natural ones. But this is specifically what supervenience 
does not supply. Some things could have natural
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properties only and other things could have moral 
properties only. And we can imagine that the moral could 
float free of the natural. But supervenience tells us 
that it is necessary that if moral properties ever 
accompany natural ones they always do so. What this 
account of the supervenience relation excludes is that we 
could find things with moral and natural properties and 
other things with the same natural properties but not the 
moral ones in the same world. This is an impossible world 
according to this description of the supervenience 
relation.
The natural idea behind supervenience is that if a 
change occurs in the moral properties it is necessary 
that a change has occurred in the natural properties. The 
claim is that it is easier for quasi-realism to explain 
this relation than for realism.
The third reason for favouring quasi-realism is that 
it preserves the belief-desire theory of action. It is 
assumed that the belief-desire theory is superior to any 
other theory of the explanation of action. What this 
claim amounts to is not quite clear. But it seems to 
exclude the truth of internalism about motives for 
action. I have already pointed out that moral realism can 
either adopt an internalist or an externalist account of 
motivation for a c t i o n .
There are two more developments of this theory which 
need to be mentioned to make the description of it
16. Blackburn, S.: Spreading The Word, pp. 181-189 For an alternative see T. Nagel: The Possibility of Altruism.Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970.
39
complete for my purposes. One is that it is a metaethical 
theory, not a normative one, a second order theory not a 
first order one. Two is that quasi-realism can take 
account of the fact that statements with value terms can 
occur in unasserted contexts which has been thought to 
count against all subjective theories of the meaning of 
value terms. It seems to me that formally such a 
subjective theory could be developed. If there are any 
troubles with it, they are to be found in its 
foundations, in the philosophical problems that seem to
beset quasi-realism.
These five points all tell in favour of quasi­
realism. Quasi-realism is the latest development in 
subjectivism and it seems to answer most, if not all, the 
problems that have persistently plagued subjectivist 
theories of value.
The first point about economy is not really telling. 
The reason is that the economy of a theory is not 
necessarily confined to the fewest assumptions. If the 
overall shape of the theory is simpler, even though the 
assumptions are more numerous than of another theory.
17. See G. F. Schuler: "Modus Ponens and Moral Realism"in Ethics. Vol. 98, April 1988, p. 492-500, who argues that nothing like quasi-realism could possibly succeed. See also S. Blackburn's reply in the same issue "Attitudes and Contents" p. 501-517 where he develops his theory about indirect contexts in more detail and tries to explain how evaluative terms can occur in unasserted contexts. It seems to me that Blackburn can develop a formal theory of the occurrence of evaluative terms in unasserted discourse. Whether it ultimately succeeds depends on his analysis of the notion of logical form, validity and truth. To deal with this issue properly I would have to look closely at these notions. But I do not intend to do that.
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then the number of assumptions is not a decisive point. 
Moral realists say, for example, that even though they 
assume moral properties this results in a theory of moral 
experience which is overall more unified and gives a 
better account of the moral world than a theory like 
quasi-realism which avoids positing moral properties. 
Considerations of economy are not obviously in quasi­
realism's favour because it is not just the starting 
point that is important but the end-result as well.
The second point was that quasi-realism was in • a 
better position to explain supervenience than moral 
realism. To see whether this is true we need to have a 
better look at supervenience and what is so problematic 
about it. When we say that an action is despicable or 
evil we are uttering a moral judgement referring to a 
moral value. Moral judgement is principled in the sense 
that any act meeting the same description would have to 
be described as despicable or evil. Supervenience 
captures the fact that moral judgement is principled and 
that we cite natural facts as reasons for moral 
judgements. Hence supervenience seems to be a seminal 
feature of moral judgement.
The problem of supervenience is the ban on mixed 
worlds. The ban on mixed worlds is the consequence of the 
description of the supervenience claim: It excludes the
possibility of having one world in which a set of things 
of the same kind having some natural properties and some 
moral property and another set of things of the same kind 
having identical natural properties but no moral property
41
or a different one from the original set. This is 
impossible if supervenience is correctly attributed to 
moral values. If anything has moral and natural 
properties, then something else with identical natural 
properties must have the same moral properties. If the 
moral properties are different, then the difference must 
be reflected in differences in the natural properties. 
The impossibility is to have two identical things in 
natural properties with different moral properties in the 
same world. So either these two things with identical 
natural properties have no moral properties or they have 
the same moral properties. It is impossible for one to 
have and for another not to have the same moral 
properties.
Let us look at an example. Let us assume that 
abortion is murder from conception onwards. There are two 
women with relevantly identical background, they come 
from broken homes, started to drink early, have had many 
unsatisfactory love affairs. They both suffer rapes from 
their sexual partners. Is it possible that abortion in 
one case is permissible but in the other not? The fact 
that they are two separate persons does not affect the 
issue, unless their characters were significantly 
different. The assumption is that they are not. It does 
not seem to be rationally possible that one abortion 
would be permissible and the other impermissible. It is 
obviously possible that in one world both these abortions 
might be permissible and in another impermissible. But we 
cannot have that in one case the abortion was permissible
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and in the other not in the same world. Our thought 
simply does not allow this; it is incoherent.
How should this ban be explained? The explanation of 
the ban is supposed to be a problem for realism but not 
for quasi-realism. The problem for realism is that it 
takes supervenience to be a relation between two kinds of 
properties of objects and there does not seem to be 
anything in the world which could explain the fact of 
supervenience. Quasi-realism claims to be in a position 
to explain this with features of our interests. Quasi­
realism claims that it can grant all the ordinary claims 
of moral thought and yet that it should be explained by 
the notion of moral sensibility. If we allowed that we 
could respond to the moral qualities of two things 
identical in natural qualities in different ways we would 
divorce morality from its purpose. The purpose of it is 
to guide our actions and if it is possible coherently to 
respond in different ways to two things identical in
natural qualities, then moral value is disconnected from 
practical decision making. So moral sensibility gives 
rise to moral qualities which in turn guide decisions.
The conclusion seems to be that the ban on 
mixed worlds is not a result of supervenience but of the 
fact that moral values require moral thought to be 
principled.
Now, let us turn to the distinction between first
and second order questions in ethics, between normative
ethics and metaethics. We mentioned this before as the
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fourth point in favour of quasi realism. This will be the 
last argument to be looked at in favour of quasi-realism.
It is only fair to point out that this distinction 
has most often been used against realism as if realists 
could not accept it without seriously undermining their
theory. At an intuitive level it seems to be
straightforward that quasi-realists need this distinction 
but realists proper not because quasi-realists have to 
explain away certain features of ordinary language and 
ordinary moral experience which realists do not have to 
do. But it seems to me that there is no a priori reason 
for realists to reject the distinction. They could just 
as easily accept it and say that their theory was the 
better one because it made better sense of our ordinary 
moral experience than quasi-realism or because ultimately 
realism was a coherent doctrine which quasi realism was 
not. This would all presuppose that realism was a second 
order doctrine with no implications for first order 
views. Then both quasi-realists and other realists would 
believe that the theoretical debate between them would
not make one jot of difference between the moral views
they held. They might just as well accept either of these 
metaphysical theories and go on believing in democracy, 
the efficiency of the free market, the benevolence of the 
state, the sinfulness of humanity or whatever. No first 
order view would be a compelling reason for rejecting or 
accepting either of these doctrines. This seems to 
account for the view that this debate has no significance 
for ethics, its conclusions are neither here nor there
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for rationally conducted debate and choice in ethics. 
This would amount to accepting the So What Thesis "that 
across a broad range of issues in and about morality iL 
makes no difference whether moral realism is true."!® I 
think it is only true to say that moral realists have 
usually taken the view that the distinction between first 
order and second order views must be rejected. In fact I 
know of no realist who has taken the view that this 
distinction is valid. But there are projectivists or 
anti-realists who want to reject it too and think it 
untenable.!9 it seems to me that ultimately the 
distinction is untenable as I will attempt to show below.
What is the status of this distinction? We describe 
it like this: we can hold any first order beliefs about 
morality without any implications or consequences for 
second order theories. Typical examples of first order 
views are that abortion is murder or capital punishment 
an effective form of punishment or that war is unjust. 
Typical examples of second order beliefs are that the 
truth or falsity of moral statements should be explained 
in terms of moral sensibility, or that there are moral 
properties in the world or that moral properties are 
intrinsically motivating.
It seems fairly clear that we can construct examples 
which straddle this distinction, where we progress from a
18. Sturgeon, N. : "What Difference Does It Make Whether Moral Realism Is True?" in The Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol. XXIV, 1986, Supplement, p. 11519. This is what emotivists or expressionists similar to A. J. Ayer do. And this is what S. A. Rasmussen does in "Quasi-Realism and Mind-Dependence", in Philosophical Quartgrlv, 1985, pp. 185-I9i
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first order view to a second order one without any 
obvious break. That's what examples like "All goodness is 
pleasure" seem to do. Another example could be that in 
ordinary morality we accept a principle that an act, even 
though bad, might not be blameworthy because of 
ignorance, i. e. if the agent did not know that the act 
was bad he is not as blameworthy as if he had known and 
if he could not possibly have known then he is not 
blameworthy at all. On the face of it this seems to be a 
second order principle with serious first-order 
consequences. The rejoinder to these examples is that 
there is no problem in talking about moral knowledge in 
ordinary first-order moral thought as long as we are 
careful that this does not imply anything about a second 
order theory about moral knowledge. These examples could 
be multiplied but this will have to s u f f i c e . 0^
The question that needs to be asked is: How should 
we understand the distinction between first and second 
order-questions, normative and metaethics? And if it is 
true that these examples demonstrate natural progression 
from one to the other is the distinction at all clear? 
The answer to this question is crucial for quasi realism 
because if the distinction proves to be unclear or 
unjustified quasi-realism seems either to collapse into 
old style subjectivism and not to be able to accept 
ordinary moral thought at face value or must find some 
further argument for this distinction.
20. See Sturgeon, N.: op. cit. where he discusses several such examples.
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It seems to me that the distinction is not thought 
to be an inductive truth, i. e. a truth we discover from 
experience and infer from it to a general rule, in this 
case a distinction. If it were an inductive truth the 
examples I have described and others would throw serious 
doubt on it. The other option is that it is a deductive 
truth. But if it is, it has never been argued for in that 
manner, as far as I know. What is usually done is to 
point out that we can draw this distinction and we can 
pursue inquiries into the nature of moral values without 
committing us to any particular view of the practical 
issues. And this seems to me to be correct; it is 
possible to draw this distinction. But the fact is that 
there are links between first-order views and second- 
order ones as the above mentioned examples indicate. But 
if the distinction were deductively established, it would 
give the supporter of it a strong device. I have not 
discovered any such deductive argument for the validity 
of the distinction.
There seems to be a grain of truth in the 
distinction. The grain of truth is this: Any second order 
theory seems to be compatible with many, if not most, 
first order views. But it is not true to say that it is 
compatible with all such views. It is a commonplace 
observance that a consequentialist and a rights theorist 
can have identical first order views, e. g. that abortion 
is never justified but their arguments for these views 
would be very different. In general it seems to be true 
that second order views can make certain first order
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views more or less plausible. A consequentialist for 
example is more likely to believe that abortion is 
justified under certain circumstances because the 
rightness or wrongness of acts depends on their 
consequences and these can change from one situation to 
another. But it is a perfectly possible position for him 
to say that they are never justified because the 
consequences of such a ban are preferable to abortions 
being allowed. Obviously the truth of such a view would 
depend on the truth of the factual claims about the 
consequences. If a rights-theorist takes the view that 
the foetus is a being with no rights, then abortions 
should be up to the parents or the mother because she is 
the only person concerned who indubitably has rights. But 
if he takes the view that it has rights, even a right to 
life from conception onwards, then abortion becomes 
questionable except in limited circumstances such as when 
the mother's right to life clashes with the right of the 
foetus. It seems to me it would be a curious view to hold 
a first order theory denying rights to any individuals, 
even persons, and a second order theory analyzing 
rightness and wrongness, goodness and badness, in terms 
of rights. But this is perfectly possible if it is true 
that any second order view is compatible with any first 
order view and there are no connections between any first 
order questions and any second order questions.
It seems to me that the onus of justifying the 
distinction is on those who want to hold it in this 
extreme form. It seems intuitively to contain a truth but
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the examples mentioned above indicate that there are 
connections between normative ethics and metaethics, 
first order questions and second order questions. These 
connections do not invalidate the distinction as such but 
only in the extreme form I have described. It is a 
legitimate distinction. Quasi-realism needs the strong 
form of the distinction.
One reply to this might be to inquire further into 
the nature of the distinction itself. There seem to be at 
least three possibilities of understanding it. The first 
is that it is similar to the distinction between ethics 
and the philosophy of ethics. Philosophy of ethics can be 
practised independently of ethics but it is still a part 
of ethics. The second is that it should be interpreted 
along the lines of the distinction between any metatheory 
and what it is a theory about like the distinction 
between metamathematics and mathematics. Metamathematics 
can be conducted independently of mathematics but it is 
about mathematics. The third is the distinction between 
metaphysics and ethics. Metaphysics is not a part of 
ethics but a theory about the status of ethical 
statements and an explanation of how they are possible. 
Metaphysics is not a part of ethics and can be carried on 
independently of ethics.
It seems to me that Blackburn would want to 
understand the difference as the difference between 
metaphysics and ethics. He says: "So far I have discussed 
the metaphysics as if it were exclusively a second-order 
issue, with no necessary consequences for first order
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moral t h e o r y . T h i s  is quite explicit in saying that 
his projectivist theory is a metaphysical theory and 
equating the second-order and the metaphysical.
If this is Blackburn's understanding of the relation 
between first- and second-order questions then the 
question is whether it matters for what I have argued up 
to now. Blackburn can, it seems, hold on to his sharp 
distinction and say that all the examples I have 
mentioned can be considered in two senses: either they
are first-order examples or second-order ones. Mackie's 
theory of error is flawed because it crosses the dividing 
line between these two kinds of questions. But there is 
one more argument to be considered about this.
If we see someone flaying a cat alive, the natural 
response is horror because doing such a thing is so vile. 
Anything so naturally, morally repellent has the moral 
quality of being evil. Quasi-realism wants to hold that 
such acts are evil whatever we feel about them just like 
realism proper. So quasi-realism like realism is 
committed to the falsity of this conditional:
(a) If our sentiments had been suitably different, 
then it would have been right to flay cats alive.
This conditional is a first-order moral statement.^2 
Someone saying or uttering this conditional could be
21. Blackburn, S. : "Error and the Phenomenology ofValue", p. 19
22. The argument here is taken from S. A. Rasmussen: op. cit.
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taken as arguing for changing our sentiments or he could 
be regretting that this possibility is open. Now we might 
ask how this conditional could be justified and one way 
of making out how it could be is to use this more general 
one;
(b) Had our sentiments been appropriately different, 
then moral truth would have been different, too.
It is not obvious that this conditional is true because 
it is ambiguous. If we want the right kind of connection 
to (a) then (b) ought to say:
(b') Had our sentiments been appropriately 
different, then moral truth values would have been 
different, too.
Given this qualification it entails (a). But then we need 
another one to capture Blackburn's thought about moral 
truth.
(b'') If moral truth is constituted by the best 
sentiments and the best sentiments can vary, then 
moral truth values can change.
Given this qualification, it seems that (b) entails (a) . 
But as I have noted quasi-realism agrees with ordinary 
morality in believing that (a) is a false statement and 
would corrupt morality, were it true. Flaying a cat alive
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is evil whatever we think or believe about it and however 
our sentiments are constituted.
As described above quasi-realism wants to accept the 
claims of ordinary morality and construe a metaethical
theory explaining such claims in terms of our 
sensibility, the idea being that even though moral
qualities strike us as being objective they are 
ultimately explained by the constitution of our nature. 
This can be done through defining the notion of moral 
truth by the notion of sensibility or attitudes, moral
truth being the best set of attitudes at any particular 
time. There might be various problems in doing this, but 
I want to grant that it be possible. One obvious 
consequence of this theory is that it should accept the 
truth of (b) because if moral truth simply is the best 
set of attitudes then, if that set changes, moral truth 
changes. In this sense moral truth is mind-dependent. And 
because (a) seems to be entailed by (b) its truth seems 
to follow. But the heart of quasi-realism is the 
acceptance of ordinary moral thought and the moral
objectivity that seems to go with it and at the same time 
have a second-order theory explaining this mind
dependence and construing the concept of moral truth
through the notion of the best set of attitudes and
arguing that this machinery does all the work that is 
required from a moral theory. So there is a problem here.
It is perfectly possible at this point for Blackburn
to dig his heels in and say these conditionals could be
understood in two senses: they could be taken as first-
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order statements or they could be taken as second-order 
statements and no connection between these two senses. 
There are two replies to this response. The first is that 
by doing it Blackburn seems to be guilty of equivocation. 
According to this response (a) would be false as a first- 
order statement but true as a second-order statement. But 
how is the first-order sense to insulated from the 
second-order sense? The second response is that the 
second-order doctrine does not seem very interesting and 
there do not seem to be many things to be said about it. 
The second-order sense seems to require some sort of 
quietism.
I want to consider one further argument about the 
validity of quasi-realism. Let us accept that the quasi­
realism project succeeds. What we would have is a theory 
explaining moral truth in terms of our sensibility, a 
theory saying that in reality there are no moral 
qualities. Yet it wants to accept that ordinary moral 
thought is objective, assumes the reality of moral 
qualities and that they are independent of our awareness 
of them. One consequence of the project succeeding seems 
to be that no one should really think like a quasi- 
realist, because if we did that we would stop acting as 
if moral qualities were objective features of the world, 
that flaying a cat alive was evil whatever we thought of 
it or believed about it. It would not be independent of 
our psychological make-up. But this would defeat the 
premiss of the theory that it could accept moral thought 
as practised and as we have described it. One response to
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this problem would be to say that this only demonstrated 
that the conditions for the theory being true were 
different from the conditions for accepting it as true. 
We might want to say that the theory was true but one 
consequence of it being true was that it could not 
rationally be believed. But this is impossible in terms 
of quasi-realism because moral truth consisted in the 
best set of attitudes or the most admirable sensibility. 
It follows that it is impossible to distinguish sharply 
between these two sets of conditions. If moral truth 
simply is the best set of attitudes we must be able to 
accept it. So quasi-realism cannot use the distinction 
between conditions of truth and conditions of acceptance.
These arguments seem to lead to serious doubts about 
quasi-realism as described. But the way out for the 
quasi-realist is to accept either anti-realism of some 
sort and try to get around the problems facing such a 
view and I have gone through. I do not want to say that 
this is impossible. To be able to do that I would have to 
tackle some difficult problems about the concept of truth 
for example. The other option is to accept moral realism.
1.1... CQBgiuS.iQ.ns
In this first chapter I have tried to give some 
outlines of an objective conception of moral properties. 
I have also attempted to show how moral realism would 
reply to two rival theories about the relation between 
evaluation and description and about the analysis of
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morality in terms of attitudes. It seems that moral 
realism has a satisfactory answer to these problems.
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Chapter 2
Morale Realism and Value
In this chapter I will discuss four versions of 
moral realism. I shall reject them but try to accommodate 
the valid points in two of them in what I want to say. I 
will categorize moral particularism as a version of 
realism which depends on a particular conception of 
supervenience. I shall argue for an objective view of 
moral value. I shall also argue that it is reasonable to 
accept a consequentialist conception of the good.
2.1. Three Types of Moral Realism
There seem to me to be three ways of arguing for 
moral realism prevalent in the literature. First, the 
analogy with secondary qualities is used as a ground for 
saying that moral qualities are real and objective in the 
same sense as secondary qualities. This is weak moral 
realism. Second, moral qualities are thought to be 
analogous to primary qualities and can profitably be 
treated as qualities of objects. This is strong moral 
realism.1 The moral realism I want to accept can
1. See J. Dancy: "Two Conceptions of Moral Realism"fzocssdinqs— of Ihs Aristotelian Society, SupplementaryVolume, LX, 1986, p. 167-169
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usefully be thought of as a version of strong realism but 
without any commitment to an analogy between primary 
properties and moral properties. Third, moral properties 
are argued for on the basis of what we can call 
pragmatism. This means that the truth of our beliefs 
about moral properties is the best explanation of our 
moral observations and r e s p o n s e s .  ^ i want to keep this as 
a separate category because the pragmatic argument seems 
to me to be different from arguments for the other two 
positions. The fourth position, ethical particularism, is 
hardly a different type of moral realism. It is only 
discussed because it offers a distinct, and in ity view 
mistaken, view of one feature of moral properties, i. e. 
generality.
It seems to me that most of the arguments, perhaps 
all, for moral realism can be put into one of those 
categories. This does not mean that there is a neat 
division between these three approaches. The literature 
on moral realism has grown so vast that no complete and 
exhaustive categorization is practical. How would 
dispositional theories of value, for example, be 
categorized?^ This characterization should only be taken 
as an indication of three ways of arguing for moral 
realism. But to make the theory of moral realism clearer
2. R. Werner: "Ethical Realism" in Ethics. Vol. 93, July 1983, p. 653-679. "Moral facts exist, in the sense that I am using the phrase, just in case the most reasonable explanation of reports of moral observations include the positing of the existence of the moral entities mentioned in the reports." p. 653
3. See "Dispositional Theories of Value I, II, and III" in Proceedings of The Aristotelian_Societv Supplementary Volume, 1989, LXIII, pp. 89-174
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we need to go through some of the arguments that have 
been offered and could be offered.
It has been offered as a strong argument for weak 
realism that there is a close analogy between moral 
qualities and secondary qualities. Ordinarily, the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities is 
that primary qualities such as size, shape, weight are 
qualities of objects independently of anyone perceiving 
them, in so far as human beings can be said to perceive 
primary qualities. Anyone should be able to recognize 
them independently of the nature of their sensory 
apparatus. Secondary qualities such as colours are not 
independent of the sensory apparatus perceiving them. 
This means that the property of being red simply is the 
tendency to be perceived as red by a human being. The 
property of being square is the property of having four 
corners of 90*. It seems fairly clear that the nature of 
secondary qualities is dependent upon the sensory 
apparatus but the nature of primary qualities is not 
because this is in part simply how they are described. If 
human senses were different from what they are, the 
nature of the quality red would change but it would not 
affect primary qualities.
One inference drawn from this difference between 
these two types of qualities is that secondary qualities 
are not real in the sense that they are not objective. 
But this is not a warranted conclusion. Secondary 
qualities are just as real as primary qualities even 
though their nature consists in the possibility of being
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perceived. But secondary qualities are remarkable in that 
they combine being subjective and objective. Being red 
consists in the tendency to produce a particular type of 
colour experience.
There are some things to ' notice about this 
description of secondary qualities. First, secondary 
qualities only affect those who have the appropriate 
sensory equipment. The same then presumably applies to 
moral qualities. The notion of "appropriate sensory 
equipment" implies the notion of normal sensory 
equipment. Second, moral qualities become anthropocentric 
in the sense that they are constituted by the possibility 
of a characteristic human response to them. Third, moral 
realism of any sort says that we form moral beliefs 
through recognition of moral qualities and they in turn 
generate responses. It then depends on whether the moral 
realist is an internalist or an externalist about 
motivation what relation is believed to obtain between 
belief, desire and action.
There are certain standard objections to weak moral 
realism which must be dealt with.^ The first objection 
is that secondary qualities are differently associated 
with underlying physical differences from moral 
qualities. Differences in colour are as a matter of fact 
associated with underlying physical differences. But 
somebody who believes that two situations require two
4. I use C. Wright's summary of these objections in "Moral Values, Projections and Secondary Qualities" inThe Proceedings of The Aristotelian Sasiaty,Supplementary Volume LXII, 1988, p. 5-11
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different moral responses is obliged to believe that 
there are associated non-moral differences. But this 
should not worry us too much, because it is open to the 
proponent of weak moral realism to say that moral 
qualities only affect morally appropriate subjects and it 
is just part and parcel of being a morally appropriate 
subject to be able to discern non-moral differences 
associated with the moral differences. To this extent 
there is a difference between secondary qualities and 
moral qualities.
The second objection is that moral belief and moral 
concern are not the same. This means that it is possible 
to have two societies with identical moral beliefs but 
different moral concerns. But this is impossible on any 
conception of moral properties because it is an intrinsic 
feature of moral qualities that they are reason giving. 
The response to this problem is simply to point out that 
acquiring moral beliefs is acquiring moral concerns.
The third objection is that it invites unacceptable 
relativism into ethics. A moral quality does not only 
depend on what is in the object but also on how the 
subject perceives it. If the perceiving subject changes 
then moral qualities change. But this point ignores the 
normality built into the notion of an appropriately 
perceiving subject which puts constraints on how the 
subject can be. Moral qualities have their distinctive 
effects on a certain type of subjects. If the subject 
radically changes the qualities cannot have their
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distinctive effects, but that does not mean that they 
have changed.
The fourth objection is that the analogy with 
secondary qualities cannot make any sense of being in 
extensive error about moral qualities, nor can it make 
any sense of widespread moral disagreement. The reason is 
that the quality of being red is constituted by normal 
human experience and response when it is registered in 
consciousness. If we want to hold that a population has 
fallen into extensive error about colour ascriptions, we 
lose hold of the concept of normal experience. It can be 
interpreted statistically in which case it would change 
when an extensive error arose; and it can be interpreted 
substantially or functionally meaning that it was the 
function of the sensory system to register their proper 
objects whatever they are. On this latter interpretation 
extensive error becomes problematic; we cannot hold that 
perceiving red, for example, is the function of the eyes, 
only that perceiving colour is their function. But a 
typical pair of eyes register red at a particular 
frequency of light waves. If this fact changed and most 
human eyes started to register some new colour, grue for 
instance, then we could say that they were flawed because 
this has not been their normal response. But this is a 
flaw only if the consequences of the changes are bad. If 
the changes do not have any bad consequences, this hardly 
counts as a flaw; the eyes would be more limited than 
before in not being able to perceive red. The question is 
whether the inability to perceive red counts as extensive
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error, if there are no bad consequences. And when does a 
flaw constitute a new norm? It seems we would have to use 
the statistical notion to make sense of the error. But 
this notion cannot explain extensive error; As soon as 
error becomes extensive enough, it becomes a new norm.
The response to this objection is that in both cases 
the norm is set by our best responses in any particular 
case. In the case of perceiving red the best response 
would under normal circumstances be the typical response. 
But in the moral case it is not so sure that the best 
response would be the typical response. It is a commonly 
observed fact about moral life that it is difficult and 
the obvious symptom of this difficulty is that our 
typical responses often diverge from our best responses. 
This difference enables weak moral realism to make sense 
of moral disagreements between cultures and widespread 
moral disagreement or at least it opens up a space where 
sense can be made of these facts.
Weak moral realism can handle these objections, it 
seems, without too much trouble. But there is one more 
objection which needs to be considered. The analogy 
between secondary qualities and values requires that 
values have a phenomenal or perceptual aspect. What does 
this amount to? One suggestion might be this: perceiving 
rightness simply is judging something to be right. But 
the analogy seems to go further in the sense that there 
should be a distinctive phenomenal aspect to moral 
experience. But the problem with this proposal is that 
seeing a cat flayed alive for example might or might not
62
create a particular experience. But morality consists in 
being concerned for the right kind of thing for the right 
kind of reason, in this case concern for a living being 
because of the pain caused to it.^ it seems to be true of 
secondary qualities experience that we can talk about raw 
experience of that sort meaning that ascribing hearing a 
sound to a child when it starts before it has any
conceptual resources to identify such experience. In our 
reaction to the flaying of the cat nothing in that
experience seems to be independent of the concepts we 
bring to bear on it. This seems to imply that moral 
responses are the formation of beliefs with moral content 
rather than the having of a certain sort of experience.^ 
If this is correct weak moral realism seems to be in 
trouble because there does not seem to be any particular 
kind of moral experience.
It is a fairly well established fact that babies 
tend to cry when presented with parts of a face deformed 
or in the wrong relation to each other. Presumably they 
are afraid when they see it even though they have no
conceptual resources to identify a face or any parts of 
it nor can they be conscious of the mental state of being 
afraid. I think most parents would accept that from 
fairly early on children start responding to pain in
5. Compare this part from Julian Barnes' novel Staring at The Sun : "...It may be different for others. I can't tell you what it's like being brave. You can't pick it up and look at it. When it's there you don't feel it's there. You don't feel excited or dizzy or something. Maybe you feel a bit more as if you know what you're doing; but that's all."(p. 47)6. C. Wright: op. cit. p. 11-13
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others for example. They easily cry and become afraid 
when somebody else is in pain. The question is whether 
such experience could count as moral or raw moral 
experience corresponding to the raw secondary qualities 
experience. But these responses can hardly count as moral 
until the child is in possession of the relevant 
concepts. Being afraid is not an experience of a 
secondary quality but it seems to have close resemblance 
to moral experience. It does not open up any space for 
raw moral experience. The same seems to apply to crying 
because of somebody else's pain.
But the point of these objections is that the 
intuition about the analogy between moral qualities and 
secondary qualities is that it can survive giving up the 
notion of moral experience. So even though the analogy 
disappears or gives out at this point the intuition can 
survive.
But ultimately it breaks down, if Wright is to be 
b e l i e v e d . 7 The reason it breaks down is that our best 
judgements about red, for example, determine the 
extension of the predicate “...is red". But our best 
judgements about evil, for instance, do not determine the 
extension of the predicate "...is evil". Ultimately our 
best judgements determine the extension of colour 
predicates but they do not determine the extension of 
moral predicates. The reason for that is that some of the 
conditions for applying moral predicates are based on a 
prior determination of moral status, determination, for
7. C. Wright: op. cit. p. 22-24
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example, of whether the subject delivering the judgement 
is an appropriate moral subject. This shows that the mix 
of the subjective and objective is different in the case 
of moral qualities from secondary qualities. In other 
words our best responses in the case of secondary 
qualities can be characterized independently of the 
notion of redness but our best responses in morality 
cannot be characterized independently of the notion of 
morality; it is a moral question what our best responses 
are. So secondary qualities cannot serve as a good 
analogy for moral qualities.
This result should not really be surprising. Moral 
realism does not rule out the possibility of at least 
some subjectivity of the moral properties. When 
explaining actions by moral properties we could say that 
certain situations merited some particular response. The 
merits of any situation just seem more naturally placed 
in the objective sphere rather than the subjective one. 
In explaining why maltreating children is wrong no 
significant contribution is done by the fact that 
perceiving such a fact as a spectator can be painful. It 
is the pain of the child that is one of the relevant 
factors.
Strong moral realism holds that moral properties are 
analogous to primary qualities. This view holds that 
moral properties can be described independently of human 
responses and they are part of the fabric of the world 
waiting to be experienced. This view immediately runs 
into a problem. Primary qualities serve to explain events
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in nature and have a causal function. Moral qualities 
serve to explain human actions but such explanations do 
not seem to be typically causal explanations. If you 
lodge a complaint against youngsters setting fire to a 
stray dog then the badness of the act is' your reason for 
your action in a typical case. But it is not 
straightforward to say that the badness of the act is the 
cause of your act. This would mean that the pain of the 
dog causes you to try to prevent the action. But then the 
question arises why should the pain make us do this 
rather than encourage such actions. The reason seems to 
be that the painfulness of pain is bad. The badness of 
pain is not on par with the pain itself. The moral 
quality is needed to explain our action.
But moral properties are problematic and many who 
are willing to accept realism about science, for example, 
think that the notion of moral properties makes no sense 
and reference to them should be avoided in a good moral 
theory. One way to avoid moral properties in explaining 
actions is to argue that it is our belief that an act is 
wrong which explains our response rather than the 
wrongness of the action itself. If this explanation 
works, then moral qualities seem to become redundant. The 
crucial issue here is that it is the moral belief that is 
doing the work, not the moral quality. If it proved 
possible to construct an example showing that moral 
qualities can have effects independently of being 
recognized, then this would throw doubt, at least on this 
denial of any role for moral properties.
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The Stalinist system of Soviet Russia has recently 
collapsed and a new order is slowly emerging. The 
swiftness of the collapse has taken many people by
surprise. One obvious explanation of this collapse is to 
point to the gross injustice of the Stalinist system. 
This would be a moral explanation of a social event. It 
is open to a theorist to deny this explanation and say 
that moral beliefs are the decisive factor rather than 
moral properties. But it certainly seems possible to 
construct an explanation saying that the injustice of the 
system caused a lingering, unreflective resentment of it 
which in turn caused some of those living within the
system to sympathize with its victims. In time this
became fairly widespread and some people started 
reflecting on the injustices of the system and formed
beliefs about it. When such beliefs were expressed they 
might have had explosive effects, if the resentment were 
widespread enough. If the expression of such beliefs was 
repressed, the system itself became morally bankrupt and 
in danger of losing the allegiance of the populace. If 
this is a reasonable account of possible events, then the 
prediction becomes plausible that when the repression 
would be lifted, the system would collapse.
An opponent of moral properties would say, at this 
point, that this example did not prove the point. The 
reason he would offer would be that the notion of 
resentment was an intentional notion and intentional 
notions and intentional states and concepts were 
problematic parts of a causal chain. The reason for this
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is that intentional states have objects conceived of 
under certain descriptions. It is this fact about 
intentional states that captures moral properties. The 
injustice of the Stalinist system is this social system 
seen under a certain description. This state is of a 
different kind from one billiard ball hitting another and 
causing it to move. So it is the belief itself or its
occurrence that enters the causal chain, not the moral
property.
The question now is whether it is possible to make 
sense of the belief without reference to the moral
property. But I do not want to pursue this argument
further. I only want to claim that an explanation in 
terms of moral properties is possible but I admit that 
this does not refute the the possibility of explanation 
in terms of belief. I also accept that intentional states 
are problematic entities in a causal chain. But if moral 
explanation is possible, as I have described it, it does 
not seem to be radically dissimilar from other 
respectable causal explanations. The moral explanations 
would have to fulfill counterfactual conditions like 
other causal explanations, such as if the injustice had 
been absent, the resentment would not have occurred nor 
would the system have collapsed from this cause. This 
obviously needs some further argument, but it seems to be 
reasonable to accept that moral explanations based on 
moral properties could possibly be analogous to causal
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explanations.^ So strong moral realism seems not to be 
obviously absurd and capable reasonably to accept that 
moral properties might play a role analogous to a causal 
role in the explanation of social, moral and 
•psychological events.
There are two main arguments which have been put 
forward for this strong version of moral realism.^ The 
first argument is that taking our moral experience at 
face value we judge it to be an experience of moral 
qualities of agents and actions. And if we have no reason 
to think otherwise we take it to be indicative of how 
actions and agents are constituted. So seeing an innocent 
man condemned to prison we take it to be an unjust 
decision. This property of the act is not thought to be 
something which we in some way attribute to the act 
without there being anything corresponding to it. The 
second argument looks at moral choice. In making a moral 
choice we are not trying to get ourselves to accept any 
answer or to find an answer compatible with other choices 
we have made. We are trying to find the right choice and 
we have to present this search to ourselves as governed 
by a criterion which does not lie in ourselves. If that 
were not so how could the choice be wrong?
These two arguments might lead one to think that 
moral realism is the right way to account for our moral
8. See N. Sturgeon: “Moral Explanations" in G. Sayre-McCord: Essavs on Moral Realism, New York, CornellUniversity Press, 1988 pp. 229-255 and Brink, D.O. op. cit. pp. 182-197
9. J. Dancy: "Two Conceptions of Moral Realism" in of The Aristotelian Society, SupplementaryVolume, LX, 1986, p. 172-175
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experiences. The claim is that this is how moral 
properties strike moral agents in their moral 
deliberations. But it needs to be pointed out that these 
two points do not establish moral realism, they indicate 
that moral realism could be a plausible way of describing 
and explaining morality and our moral experiences.
But why should we not say that weak moral realism 
suffices for these two arguments? The weak version seems 
to capture the important features of our moral experience 
or moral thought and be able to account for the fact that 
such thought seems to be guided by external reality 
because secondary qualities are qualities of external 
objects. But as I said earlier the mix of the subjective 
and the objective is not the same in secondary qualities 
and moral qualities, so the analogy ultimately breaks 
down.
The third major way of arguing for moral realism is 
on pragmatic grounds. The idea is to infer to the best 
explanation of reports of moral observations and 
experience. If moral qualities figure in the best 
explanation of our moral experience then we must assume 
that moral qualities exist. It must be admitted that in 
using the notion of "best explanation" pragmatic 
considerations have been used to argue both for and 
against moral realism. The notion of best explanation is 
spelt out as the one that is the most conservative, 
simple, general explanation of the fact at issue. As we
10. See Werner, R. : op. cit. Maybe White, M. : What Is and Ought to Be Done. New York, Oxford University Press, 1981 should be included.
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saw in discussing quasi-realism this type of 
considerations lends itself to arguments for a more 
austere theory than moral realism, but realists do have a 
reply. This sort of pragmatism can be derived from 
Quinean holism which considers all statements to be 
connected and of the same kind as a complex web, meaning 
that there is no sharp distinction between analytic and 
synthetic statements. All statements are révisable but 
those statements which can be considered at the fringes 
of the whole web are more easily revised than those at 
the center such as the law of the excluded middle. But in 
principle all are. It seems to follow from this that 
explanations of experience are not necessarily 
constrained by the reference of statements expressing our 
evaluations. In explaining the truth of moral statements 
there is no guarantee that moral qualities would figure 
in the best explanation, even though apparently they were 
being referred to in such statements. So an explanation 
of reports of moral experience in terms of the observer's 
psychological set can count as pragmatic and then we 
would enter into similar considerations as earlier on 
about moral explanations in terms of moral properties and 
moral beliefs. As noticed then, explanations in terms of 
moral properties rather than moral beliefs are certainly 
possible and, it seems, sometimes plausible.
Another fact which underpins the pragmatic argument 
is that our experience is ambiguous. It seems to be true 
that any part of experience can be interpreted in 
different ways. This is what the "seeing-as" examples
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show. It is just a result of our similar upbringing that 
we come to experience the world in the same or very 
similar ways. This should not be explained in terms of 
universal human nature or a unified structure of the 
world. If this is true it is just an interesting social 
fact that we tend to disagree more about morals than 
about science. It has nothing to do with the nature of 
the enterprises themselves or with the nature of the 
facts these enterprises deal with. The pressure to agree 
in science is greater than in morals and this is just a 
social fact about our post-industrial society but has no 
further metaphysical significance.
This type of pragmatism poses some difficult 
questions. One is about limits to theory formation. How 
does experience limit the possibilities of forming 
theories? Is there an unlimited number of theories which 
is compatible with experience? I will not answer these 
questions but accepting this theory would require an 
answer to them, I will not accept this theory. But it 
raises major questions about coherence, simplicity and 
other virtues of theories. In discussing moral knowledge 
in chapter 3 I shall try to accommodate concerns similar 
to those that appear in this type of pragmatism.
Moral realism, as I have described it and argued for 
it in the first and second chapters, is a metaphysical 
theory about the nature of moral properties. It says that 
moral properties are constituted by physical entities and 
that the moral supervenes on the physical but is not 
identical with it. It is possible to distinguish between
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prudential and moral goodness, the difference between 
these two being that prudential goodness is goodness for 
me but moral goodness is goodness simpliciter interpreted 
here as agent neutral. This means that if relieving the 
wretchedness in the world affects A*s good then it is a 
reason for anyone to do so. Moral properties make a 
proposition true or false and moral realism takes the 
view that moral propositions can be either true or false 
and that moral propositions cannot all be false,
2.2. Ethical Particularism
One view of moral properties subtly challenges what 
has been argued up till now about moral realism. This 
view can claim to be one type of moral realism but it 
denies the generality of moral concepts.
Ethical particularism is the view that there are no 
principles in ethics and our only option is to articulate 
the particular situations we find ourselves in at any 
point in time. The reason for saying that there are no 
principles in ethics is that moral concepts are not 
universal or universalizable. As should be immediately 
clear this is a radical view to take of the nature of 
ethics and an important one, if true.
There seem to me generally to be two ways of arguing 
for this view. First, I shall look at an argument for the 
view that the principle of universalizability is idle.^
11. P. Winch: "The Universalizability of Moral Judgement" in Ethics and Action. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 169
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Second, a distinction can be drawn between 
universalizability and supervenience and the valuable 
features of supervenience can be kept but 
universalizability rejected. If these two arguments were 
true, universal morality would be false. I shall try to 
answer them.
The first argument goes something like this. There 
is a distinction between an agent and a spectator when 
considering any action. This corresponds to the 
distinction between first and third person statements. 
The principle of universalizability says that any person 
in relevantly exactly similar situations should think 
that" X is good" and "I ought to do x" are true. But 
persons are parts of the situations and they make a 
difference to whether two situations are relevantly 
identical or not, or exactly similar or not. It is also 
true that it is not practically possible to know 
everything about another person's actual or concrete 
situation. It is especially difficult to know how 
somebody sees the moral features of his situation. As 
spectators we can express a universal judgement on a 
particular action. But if it is true what we have said 
about the practical impossibility of knowing an agent's 
actual situation, then any inference from the universal 
judgement of the spectator to the agent’s situation is 
blocked. Hence the universalizability principle is 
idle.Another possible way of putting this would be to 
assume that every individual person is unique; therefore
12. P. Winch: op. cit. p. 169
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any universal judgement about any action of any person is 
only applicable to that person. In this case the 
universalizability of moral judgement would be of no 
consequence for anyone. If an agent explained his action 
or inaction, why x was morally impossible for him for 
example, then he could go through the reasoning that led 
him to the conclusion. Another agent who came to an 
opposite conclusion would recount his reasons for his 
action. There would be nothing more to say than observe 
that different moral possibilities presented themselves 
to these two agents.
If this is correct, then the principle of 
universalizability is indeed idle. But this seems 
problematic. There is nothing wrong in observing that our 
knowledge of others is limited, as indeed it is. Anyone 
who has ever tried to fathom another person in depth, 
must have discovered that somehow something always 
escapes. The understanding never seems to be complete. 
But this is just humility which any moral theorist should 
acknowledge. Does it really limit universalizability as 
was claimed?
The second argument was that when supervenience and 
universalizability were properly distinguished the latter 
would lose all plausibility as a feature of moral 
thought. Hare says in one place that the thesis of 
universalizability is composed of two things: 
universality in the sense of the exclusion of references
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to individuals and supervenience.^^ This shows that Hare 
at least thinks that supervenience is a part of 
universalizability.
There is no need for an extensive explanation of 
supervenience here. The basic idea is that a supervenient 
quality is consequent upon some other property; in the 
central case for us a moral quality is consequential upon 
natural facts. Described like this supervenience is an 
ontological quality. But supervenience can be described 
as a quality of moral judgement. Then it says that moral 
judgement must be consequent upon moral facts. This is 
how Hare considers supervenience and this is how we must 
consider it in this context. Universalizability is the 
requirement that moral judgements are dependent only upon 
universal facts. When phrased like this it seems 
reasonable to think that universalizability is part of 
supervenience rather than the other way around as Hare 
thinks. How should we think of the relation between 
universalizability and supervenience?
The central idea in supervenience is that moral 
judgements are consequential upon facts: X is judged good 
in virtue of some fact, social, economic or natural. Any 
particular moral judgement can be supervenient upon any 
non-moral fact, any number of natural qualities or even 
upon the whole of natural qualities in an action as 
described.
13. R.M. Hare: "Supervenience" in Essavs in Ethical Theory. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 198 9, p. 7414. See S. Blackburn: Spreading the Word. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 220
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Hare thinks of this relation as one between a 
particular moral judgement and all the natural properties 
of the situation or object in question. At one place he 
is discussing two pictures P and Q and either P is a 
replica of Q or vice versa. "Now there is one thing that 
we cannot say; we cannot say ' P is exactly like Q in all 
respects save this one, that P is a good picture and Q 
not.'"15 The force of the "cannot" in the quotation is 
that to allow divergent judgements about the goodness of 
the picture is contradictory. So supervenience seems to 
bring universality along from the start. This is the
explanation for Hare's sometimes expressing the 
universalizability in practically the same terms as
supervenience. "The thesis of universalizability requires 
that if we make any moral judgement about this situation, 
we must be prepared to make it about any of the other 
precisely similar situations."1^  it is as if
universalizability were supervenience by another name. 
But the explanation for this is that the nature of
supervenience brings in universalizability. This seems to 
me to be Hare's reason for thinking of the relation 
between supervenience and universalizability in the way 
he does.
But this seems clearly false. Wit seems to be based 
on a supervenient judgement. It is true about a witticism
15. R.M. Hare: The Language of Morals. Oxford, ClarendonPress, 1952, p. 81, 131. See also Freedom and Reason,Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 18-19 and"Supervenience" in op. cit.16. R.M, Hare: Moral Thinking. Oxford, Clarendon Press,1981, p. 42
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that we can respond to it differently on similar 
occasions without anyone finding it curious or 
blameworthy. When we hear a joke for the second time the 
wit can be wearing thin. This makes judgement about wit 
different from moral judgement. But both are 
supervenient. One inference seems to be obvious from 
this: Universality or universalizability is not part of
supervenience but supervenience is a part of 
universalizability. Establishing supervenience does not 
lead to acceptance of universalizability.
Another observation seems to be in order. Hare's 
example of the pictures seems more readily to be 
assimilated to wit than to moral properties. Let us ask 
'Why can't we possibly say about the two identical 
pictures, P and Q, that one is good and the other is 
bad?' The answer is that we can. If one is a replica of 
the other, then it is not good in the same sense as the 
other one. It is only if we assume that the two pictures 
are exactly alike and made by two talented artists 
independently of each other, that we will be ready to say 
that they are both good. But this is an extremely 
unlikely possibility. If we are talking about the more 
likely possibility that one is a replica of the other, 
then we have no reason to say that they are both good. 
The question of origin is crucial in attributing goodness 
to works of art. To this extent, at least, the 
supervenience of aesthetic judgement is more similar to 
judgement of wit than to moral judgement.
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The set of facts moral judgements supervene upon is 
not the set of all non-moral facts. Some non-moral facts 
just are not relevant to the moral judgement in question. 
But how should we characterize the set of non-moral facts 
that are morally relevant? One obvious way of doing it is 
to say that they are the facts in virtue of which we 
judge an action as good for instance. The idea is then 
that whenever these facts are present a judgement that it 
is a good action results. This combines supervenience and 
universalizability in a way congenial to Hare as 
described above. But there are two problems with this 
explanation of supervenience. One, it is not possible to 
have a list of facts which guarantees a particular moral 
judgement whenever these qualities occur. The reason is 
that moral judgements are such that they can be defeated 
in particular circumstances.I might want to say that a 
girl should be judged as good in virtue of being chaste, 
pious and considerate. The implication seems to be that 
whenever a girl is chaste, pious and considerate she 
ought to be judged good. But what if a girl, having all 
these attributes, is also cruel? Should we ' say she is 
good? No, and the reason is that the attribute of cruelty 
defeats the goodness. But is the answer to this not that 
among the reasons for calling the girl good originally is 
that she was not cruel. The answer is negative. "I do not 
call someone good because he is not cruel, though I may 
refrain from calling someone good on the grounds that he
17. J. Dancy: "On Moral Properties" in Mind, 1981, Vol.XC, p. 376-377
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is cruel. Two, as a result of this feature of moral 
judgements it is not possible to infer from particular 
instances of moral judgements to any general criteria for 
the ascription of moral judgements. This rejection of the 
possibility of any general criteria is fully compatible 
with moral judgements being supervenient in a more 
limited sense than that suggested above. The girl is 
certainly judged good or evil, as the case may be, in 
virtue of something: She is judged good because she is
pious, chaste and considerate. But this carries no 
further implications for any other relevantly similar 
person. Three, the number of non-moral facts is 
indefinite and there is no subset of non-moral facts 
always giving rise to a moral judgement of goodness, for 
example.
A direct result of this argument against 
supervenience and universalizability seems to be ethical 
particularism, the view that each and every situation 
must be articulated without any comparison with other 
situations and that there are no general principles to 
back up the descriptions. In any particular situation the 
agent chooses some particular feature of it as especially 
salient and there is no thought of it being generally 
s a l i e n t . This is similar to aesthetic appreciation. In 
trying to appreciate a picture or a building we describe 
if and in describing it some prominent features of it are 
mentioned as especially important within the context of
18. J. Dancy: op. cit. p. 37719. J. Dancy: "Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties" in Mind. 1983, Vol. XCII, p. 546
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the whole object. This mention does not carry any general 
implication for appreciation of buildings or pictures. 
Picking a particular action out as wrong is net to give 
evidence that it is wrong but to try to get your audience 
to see that particular action as wrong and to see it that 
way is to join in the judgement of it being wrong.
This is most certainly a powerful challenge to the 
universality of moral judgement. If true, there are no 
general, moral principles possible and no universal moral 
judgements.
The first challenge to universalizability was that 
the principle of universalizability is idle. The reason 
was that when it was formulated from a spectator's point 
of view in the 3rd person propositions no inference could
be drawn about the personal point of view or 1st person
propositions. The reason is that it is not possible to 
say anything about how the moral possibilities appear to 
a particular person on the ground of some general 3rd 
person statements.
In thinking about moral matters we are often 
wondering about how we ourselves would have behaved. So 
we make hypothetical judgements about ourselves in
hypothetical situations. This is perfectly compatible 
with Winch's argument because he does not wane to deny 
that the principle of universalizability applies to our 
judgements about our own conduct at different times in 
different situations and in hypothetical situacions. It 
also applies to our judgements of the conduct cf others. 
To all these kinds of judgements the principle of
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universalizability applies. But it does not follow from 
this that we can say that others will come to the same 
conclusion about those situations as we have done or 
that they should come to the same conclusion.
The question here is • whether we should accept the 
universalizability thesis in this weak form. It is fairly 
obvious that in the example Winch describes in detail, 
from Melville's story Billy Budd, that no other position 
is reasonable. But this example is problematic. It is a 
literary example and literary examples are closed in an 
important sense.^0 So the appropriate judgement about 
Captain Vere’s action seems to flow from the description 
of the example. Moral judgements are based on 
descriptions of actions and in real life it is usually 
contentious how actions should be described.
Another reason for doubting this limit on the 
universalizability principle is that there seem to be 
fairly clear examples where we do not hesitate to say 
that others ought to judge a particular action in the 
same way as we do. In saying that causing unnecessary 
suffering is wrong we do not just think this to be 
coherent with our previous judgements or with our 
hypothetical judgments or that it is wrong for us. We are 
judging it to have the moral property of wrongness. It is 
obvious that we could be mistaken about this property, 
but if we are not then this is something which every 
moral agent could and should discover himself. Winch
20. O'Neil, 0.: "The Power of Example" in her bookConstructions of Reason. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 172-176.
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denies that he is arguing for a relational interpretation 
of moral properties, i.e. that A is the morally right 
thing to do amounts to saying that A is the morally right 
thing for me to do.^l Nor does he want to be understood 
as arguing that if G thinks that A is the right thing for 
him to do then A is the right thing for him to do. Winch 
thinks that the difficulty here is that we are trying to 
bridge the gap between propositions and expressions of 
decisions.The question is whether this is really 
possible. His suggestion is that deciding what to do is 
an integral part of finding out what is the right thing 
to do. It does not make sense to say that I can decide 
what somebody else will do. Hence, I cannot find out what 
is morally right for others because part of finding out 
is deciding what they will do.
It is perfectly true that it does not make sense to 
say that I can decide what someone else will do. But it 
makes perfect sense to say that I can decide or find out 
what is morally right for someone else to do. This is not 
the same as deciding what he will do. If he accepts my 
decision about what is morally right for him to do, he is 
likely to do it. The reason that it makes sense to say 
that I can decide or find out what is morally right for 
somebody else is that I can know what is morally right. 
Usually when I have bothered to find out what is morally 
right I do not need to decide what to do because I know 
what I ought to do. If I am my normal self I do what I
21. Winch, P.; op. cit. p. 16422. Winch, P.: op. cit. p. 165
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ought to do. I can admit that my knowledge of others is 
limited but this does not mean that I am completely 
ignorant of their beliefs and desires. In certain
circumstances I can even be in a better position than 
• somebody else I know to judge what is good for him and 
what is morally right for him to do taking into account 
his beliefs and desires. What is morally right for 
somebody to do is not something mysterious and 
inaccessible to everyone else but him. Admittedly, people 
can have notions about right and wrong that are very 
different from our own and such differences make all
discussions about moral rightness and wrongness 
difficult, sometimes even impossible. In the most 
difficult cases it can be difficult to find common
ground, but in some cases these different notions can 
actually be worse than our own, permitting actions which 
ought not to be permissible. It is possible to compare
different systems of values and we very often do. This 
implies that there is something which is morally right 
and it is not necessarily a part of any particular moral 
system as we know it. The difficulty of knowing other 
people and the fact that inferences from propositions in 
the 3rd person to propositions in the first are not 
obvious and straightforward, does not mean that there is 
nothing which is morally right and is accessible to 
everyone.
The basic reason for this being so is that morality 
is not just personal but social. Morality is a social 
institution bringing along a code of conduct accessible
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to all those who are part of that particular morality. If 
it were possible to say that the moral principles were 
not the same for everyone, then this social aspect of 
morality would be weakened, if not destroyed. Justice is 
the supreme example of a social principle forming a major 
part of any morality. It can be extremely complex and 
difficult to apply the principles of justice but the 
basic principles are accessible to anyone and apply to 
all.
There is another thing which should be considered in 
this context. Hare often says that universal principles 
correctly applied fully determine the right action in 
every conceivable circumstance. This they do in virtue of 
their universalizability. But practical judgement plays a 
part in applying the moral principles and it cannot be 
guided by principles in doing that. If it were, we would 
need still other principles for those guiding the 
practical judgement in application. These would be second 
order principles. Then we would need third order 
principles to guide us in applying the second order 
principles and so on. This would be an infinite regress. 
So the application by practical judgement of moral 
principles is necessarily not guided by moral principles 
or other principles. This does not mean that it is 
random, though.
So it seems to me that this much is true in ethical 
particularism: there is an ineliminable role of practical 
judgement in moral appreciation or understanding. We 
should also point out that moral situations do not come
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fully carved up to confront our recognitional capacities. 
They must be described and to describe them we use terms, 
sometimes moral terms. Such descriptions must be 
justified. It may be true that ideology always plays some 
role in what is considered to be a justified description 
of a situation. But we are not completely free in
describing any situation as we wish. If that were true, 
we would neither need nor be able to justify such a 
d e s c r i p t i o n . justifying a description of a situation 
we must refer to reasons and reasons seem to be general 
in form.
It is open to an ethical particularist to say that 
moral properties are like the salient features of a 
building and are not essentially tied to a comparison 
with anything else. This is how we should think of 
reasons we give for our descriptions. But it should be 
noticed that the examples used are of artistic objects, a 
picture and a building. There is nothing inappropriate in 
thinking of aesthetic properties in this way, as not 
essentially comparable to properties of other aesthetic 
objects. I know we often compare the aesthetic qualities 
of a work of fiction and a building to the aesthetic 
qualities of other artistic objects but the most
remarkable thing about them is their differences and that 
we are not obliged to think that another relevantly
similar work is good. There is no comparable option open
23. On these points see: O. O'Neil: "Abstraction,Idealization and Ideology in Ethics" in J.D.G. Evans : Moral PhilosoDhv and Contemporary Problems. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 55-69,
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about moral objects. There is nothing obviously absurd 
about holding that it is of the essence of artistic 
objects that they make many such interpretations 
possible. But we are very reluctant to accept this about 
moral qualities. The explanation seems to be that a moral 
judgement is principled in a sense that an aesthetic 
judgement is not. It should not be inferred from this 
that an aesthetic judgement is less objective than an 
ethical judgement. Properties can be objective without 
requiring the judgement about them to be principled. I do 
not want to say anything about that. This fact of an 
ethical judgement being principled I have described 
earlier as being concerned to do the right thing for the 
right reason. In doing this we come to see a certain 
situation as a situation of a particular sort and that
this sort of situation requires an action of this type.
The moral concepts used by our practical judgement make
us see it this way or that by constructing descriptions
of the situation. These descriptions are not unique and 
they must be justified. In justifying them we give 
reasons and reasons are general in nature. Moral reasons 
based on moral values seem to be general in the sense 
that, in so far as they are moral reasons, they are 
reasons for any moral agent.
2_.3 . Rea.s_on. Value and Desire
We do not seem to be willing to accept that there 
can be two or more opposing views about a moral action
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that are correct. Moral judgement is principled in the 
sense that we should do the right thing for the right 
reason. Implied in this description is strong resistance 
to the idea that two contradictory or opposing views of a 
moral action can both be correct. When considering 
whether two opposing views are possible of theft or 
murder, for instance, we are not primarily thinking about 
how particular instances should be described, although 
this is clearly part of our considerations. What we are 
most interested in is whether theft or murder described 
as such can properly be accepted as both right and wrong.
One way to explain this reluctance would be to think 
that what is right does not depend on our desires or on 
our practices. This brings in a number of considerations 
on subjectivism and objectivism about value, on truth as 
important for moral values and on the place of reason in 
moral thinking.
One way of looking at the nature of values is to say 
that they consist in the obtaining of certain
psychological states. An action can be good if it
produces pleasure, for example, or bad if it produces 
pain. On this view the goodness of an action consists in 
the psychological state it produces. A desire-
satisfaction theory of values falls into this category. 
It holds that goodness consists in the satisfaction of a 
desire and badness in frustrating one. This is an
instance of a subjective theory of value because 
satisfying a desire gets its value from the psychological 
state accompanying it, the satisfaction. Satisfying a
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desire for a glass of water means that I have to fill it 
with water, put it to my lips and drink the water. But 
this activity in and of itself has no value, if the 
desire-satisfaction theory is correct. It is only the 
satisfaction of the desire which gives value to the 
activity. The satisfaction of a desire is a psychological 
state because desire is a psychological state. So desire- 
satisfaction theories are subjective theories.
It could be objected to this that a desire 
satisfaction need not be a psychological ,state. What 
should we say about a desire for x when x is in the 
future? This means that the desire can be satisfied when 
X occurs, even though I shall never know that it has 
occurred. This is not really a denial of the 
psychological theory. What it denies is that the 
satisfaction must be a conscious mental state. It does 
not deny it is the satisfaction of desire that explains 
value. But this might also be taken to imply that value 
could be explained by reference to interests or the good 
of somebody. Even though this could not explain all 
possible value it is certainly true for much of what we 
deem valuable.
The question is whether desire-satisfact ion theory 
of value can account for our thought and talk about 
value. One fairly obvious implication of the desire- 
satisfaction theory is that the value of certain actions, 
traits of character or things depends on their ability to 
satisfy our desires. So things are good because they can 
satisfy desires. I believe that in ordinary moral thought
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we take it to be the other way around: We desire things 
which are good. This is not a fatal flaw in the doctrine. 
If it is a part of a fully fledged subjective theory of 
morality, it can defend itself by distinguishing between 
first and second order questions. I think this is 
implausible, as I have tried to argue before.
But because value depends on the satisfaction of 
desire, if this theory is true, the possibility opens up 
that we could have the desire satisfied in different ways 
from those that are most frequent and natural. This new 
way could be much easier and more effective than those we 
usually rely on. Drinking water from a glass you hold to 
your lips can, on occasion, be fraught with difficulties. 
If our psychological states impregnate our actions with 
value, then, perhaps, we should try to bring about the 
psychological states in the simplest, most effective way 
possible. Nozick's celebrated experience machine might 
come in handy.
"Suppose there were an experience machine that 
would give you any experience you desired. 
Superduper neuropsy ohologi s t s could stimulate your 
brain so that you would think and feel you were 
writing a great novel, or making a friend, or 
reading an interesting book. All the time you would 
be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to
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your brain. Should you plug into this machine for
life, preprogramming your life's experiences?"^^
The obvious answer is no and Nozick gives reasons for a 
negative answer. The basic reason is that we actually 
want to be a certain kind of person, do a certain kind of 
thing, to really affect the world. If this is correct, 
then the view that actions receive their value from the 
experience they cause or the psychological states they 
cause is false. So the desire satisfaction theory seems 
to be false.
This is not the end of the story because desire-
sat isf action theories and objectivism about values are 
not contradictories. It is certainly possible to have a 
theory mixing objective and subjective sources of value. 
I will give three reasons to think that objectivism is a 
plausible account of values.
The first is that we can distinguish between two 
kinds of desires. Some desires are value-laden and some 
desires are not value-laden. Value-laden desires are
dependent upon evaluations. If I want to be a good 
father, it is because I believe it is valuable and 
desirable. I believe that bringing up a child is a 
valuable kind of activity. If I want to be a writer, it
is because I believe writing to be a valuable kind of
activity. Desires like these do not confer value upon 
those activities; they presuppose the belief that the
24. Nozick, R.: Anarchv. State, and Utopia, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1974, p. 42
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activity desired is valuable. It is taken to be valuable 
independently of the desire for it.
Non-value-laden desires do not presuppose 
evaluations. An example of a non-value-laden desire can 
be my desire for a chocolate bar. In explaining my desire 
for a chocolate bar I do not have to presuppose a belief 
of mine that the chocolate bar is valuable. It is just 
that I want a chocolate bar as I sometimes want a glass 
of water. These desires have to compete with others to 
issue in action. But if we wanted an explanation of why 
we want a bar of chocolate, it seems to be sufficient to 
say that eating it leads to a pleasant mental state. And 
this seems to be all there is to say about this desire. 
But as will become clear I accept that all desires seem 
to presuppose desirability characteristics possessed by 
their objects.
It could be argued by someone believing the desire- 
satisfaction theory of values that the value-laden 
desires could be reduced to the non-value-laden ones. 
This seems to be the only option open to him because he 
cannot accept that there are actions, traits of character 
or objects that are valuable independently of their being 
objects of actual or counterfactual desires. I do not 
believe such a reduction can be carried through, but let 
us accept this for the sake of the argument.
There seem to me two replies to this move. The first 
is the objection implicit in the experience machine. If 
it is correct to reject the offer of plugging in for a 
planned out lifetime of pleasure, then this seems to
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amount to a rejection of any desire-satisfaction 
explanations of value. Accepting a desire-satisfaction 
explanation of value seems to come to accepting the offer 
to plug into the experience machine.
The second reply is this. Even when explaining 
desires that are non-value-laden we seem to be able to 
give a cognitive explanation so that the desire as such 
becomes redundant. A cognitive explanation is an 
explanation in terms of how the agent conceives his 
action which seems to me ultimately to come down to what 
the agent believes or conceives to be true about the
w o r l d . 25 I f  say that instead of a bar of chocolate
somebody desires to consume a saucer of mud, then we are
certain to be puzzled. It really is no explanation to say 
that he desires the saucer of mud and believes that the 
saucer contains mud. The problem is that the desire for 
mud is unintelligible and we just cannot see how anyone 
could find mud attractive. What is needed to explain this 
strange desire is to try to see how the agent views the 
desired state of affairs, i.e. what he takes to be true 
of his circumstances, his world. This seems to me to 
amount to reducing non-value-laden desires to value-laden 
desires or better to reduce non-value-laden desires to 
beliefs about the desirability or value of objects,
actions or traits of characters.
The second reason for accepting objectivism about 
values is that desire-satisfaction theories seem to give 
greater value to activities and lives which we ordinarily
25. See McNaughton, D.: op. cit. pp. 110-113
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do not think to be valuable. The problem is with two 
kinds of desires which, if satisfied, do not seem to 
increase value in the w o r l d . 26 The first kind is immoral 
desires. A committed Stalinist wants to put his opponents 
into jail, to internal exile or before an execution 
squad. In exterminating his opponents he satisfies his 
most important desires. He is willing to justify his 
desires by the overriding importance of bringing about a 
classless society. Such desires are obviously immoral 
because they completely disregard the interests of others 
and their satisfaction will decrease value in the world 
rather than increase it. But this is something a desire- 
satisfaction theory of value has difficulty in dealing 
with. The second kind is desires that are trivial. A 
desire to be able to fly in the air meditating in the 
lotus position is a fairly clear example. The 
satisfaction of such a desire can obviously be important 
for the one who has the desire. But it cannot reasonably 
be said to be valuable. Its satisfaction will not 
increase value in the world, unless we take the view that 
satisfaction of a desire is increasing value. But by 
accepting that according to our ordinary notion of 
triviality this desire is trivial it seems to follow that 
the satisfaction of this desire does not and cannot be 
valuable. The point is that the desire-satisfaction 
theory cannot explain why this is so. It seems to be 
better explained by supposing that there are objective
26. See Brink, D.O. : Moral Realism and The Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 226-227
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values. This does not logically follow from the failure 
but it certainly makes the thought that there are 
objective values explaining this failure of the desire- 
satisfaction theory more plausible.
The third reason for objectivism about value is the 
implied rejection of the instrumental view of reason in 
what has been said already about value. The instrumental 
view of reason states that reason is only concerned with 
how best to fulfill our present desires. It attempts to 
discover the best means to satisfy the ends supplied by 
our desires. Questions about the rationality of desires 
do not arise. This does not mean that all desires are 
completely indifferent to considerations of beliefs. The 
desire to go to the Scottish Opera or the desire to have 
a pint of beer at a particular pub can be discussed and 
they are subject to considerations such as whether it is 
possible to get a ticket for the Scottish Opera, whether 
you can reach it in time for the performance, or whether 
the pub is within reasonable distance and sells some good 
beer. But these desires are derived desires in a sense 
and we should distinguish between them and underived 
desires. The desire for a drink is the basic or underived 
desire on which the other desire depends, the desire to 
hear music is basic to the desire to go to the Scottish 
Opera. The claim of the instrumental theory of reason is 
only that these basic or underived desires are given and 
not subject to reason.
This claim is not implausible at first sight. But 
there are three reasons for doubting it. The first reason
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is the untenability of the distinction between these two 
kinds of desires. I have already discussed the 
distinction between value-laden desires and non-value- 
laden desires. Ultimately it seemed that even with non­
value laden desires we had to have an account of why we 
desired what we did in terms of the agent's beliefs. This 
becomes clearer when we look at the second reason for 
doubting the instrumental view of reason. The second
reason is that some desires seem to be irrational or 
immoral. The desire to kill or exterminate one's 
political opponents or class enemies is clearly an 
immoral desire. A desire to destroy the world is on 
ordinary understanding suspiciously non-rational, maybe 
irrational. It is certainly not absurd to say that they 
are irrational or immoral. If the instrumental theory is 
to be believed this should be absurd. The third reason is 
that we seem to be able to discuss perfectly properly 
whether some desires are valuable. This certainly applies 
to the desires that are immoral or irrational. What about 
a desire to eat or a desire to drink? Somehow they seem 
to be such that questions about their value do not arise. 
But even though they do not actually arise there is 
nothing to imply that they could not arise. It is just
that we find them so natural that questions about their 
value seem pointless. But as soon as we have strange
desires like a desire for a saucer of mud, as we saw
earlier, it should become clear that we can, in principle 
at least, have an answer to a question why we desire x 
which comes down to what we believe to be true about its
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value. These three reasons are strong indications that 
the instrumental view of reason is false.
In arguing for the objectivity of value it seems to 
follow that the function of reason becomes wider than the 
instrumental view implies. Reason is involved in 
establishing the truth or falsity of beliefs and 
considerations of truth or falsity play a major role in 
finding out whether a desire is valuable or not. It seems 
to be possible in principle to ask questions about value 
of every desire. So desires do not carve out a part of 
reality that is immune to reason. It is true that desires 
can be stubborn and refuse to bow to rational 
considerations. But this is not surprising. A desire for 
a cigarette is irrational given the desire to live, if it 
is true that smoking causes lung cancer and, possibly, 
death. But this desire can be immune to any such 
considerations and can cause serious damage to one's 
health. The same applies to a desire for a bar of 
chocolate. Consuming considerable amounts of chocolate 
can make you fat and being fat can damage your health. We 
can certainly ask about the value of such a desire. What 
is not subject to rational considerations at some point 
in time is ny liking of chocolate. The fact of my liking 
chocolate need not be based on any rational 
considerations. It is just something I find out about 
iryself. But over time this can change and my liking can 
disappear in view of my rational belief that eating 
chocolate can damage my health. So when explaining my
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wanting to avoid chocolate I must refer to my belief that 
chocolate is bad for me.
We do have particular beliefs and we do have sets of 
beliefs. I have a set of beliefs about a particular bar 
of chocolate, for example, that it is rectangular, brown, 
wrapped in paper and so on, and about chocolate in 
general. We also have beliefs about beliefs or second 
order beliefs. We have already seen how questions about 
the truth of particular beliefs arise. We can also ask 
questions about the truth of a set of beliefs. If we form 
more general beliefs we can have a theory about a 
particular domain of beliefs. We can apparently have a 
theory about moral beliefs, for example.
Moral particularism which I discussed in 2.2. denies 
that a moral theory is possible. One reason that might be 
given for this could be that moral properties supervene 
on natural properties and moral properties are multiply 
realizable. But this is not convincing. The fact that the 
property of being good can be realized in various types 
of behaviour has no bearing on the possibility of 
generalizing theory about moral properties. A denial of 
theory about morality must be based on a particular view 
of the nature of moral properties and their nature.
As I hoped to make clear in 2.2. moral particularism 
denies that moral properties can be general and one 
reason for this is that there is always the possibility 
of countervailing properties. I want to claim that moral 
theory can take into account that moral properties can be 
outweighed by other moral properties. It also seems to be
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true that the principles of a moral theory can be as 
specific as we need and yet they can be universalizable. 
Specificity is opposed to generality but 
universalizability is opposed to singularity.
There are reasons for accepting theory in morality. 
One is that morality is a social institution that guides 
our actions or ought to guide our actions. I have had 
reason to accept this earlier. This is especially 
important when we are dealing with cases that are new and 
which our previous moral judgements have not covered. In 
such cases we are unsure how to act and what to believe. 
It is also important when our evaluative views are in 
conflict, either when our own views are in conflict or 
when they conflict with the views of someone else. In 
resolving conflicts we appeal to general principles or 
very general evaluative views. This relation between 
particular moral judgements and general principles is the 
essence of moral theory. We try to find general 
principles which explain our particular moral judgements 
and we test general principles and theories by seeing 
whether they have any counterintuitive consequences and 
whether they fit our moral judgements. If a theory has 
widespread counterintuitive consequences it loses 
plausibility, but if it has problems in explaining some 
limited number of our particular moral judgments, this 
need not be decisive against it. It is not only that our 
beliefs must fit the theory but the theory must fit the 
beliefs. So if some beliefs do not cohere with the 
theory, we might have to revise the theory. The result of
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this process is a set of considered beliefs which are 
hopefully true and coherent. This set of considered 
beliefs is a result of applying the theory to our 
judgements. So if we believe we have a reason for action 
because we desire x but this desire depends on valuations 
that do not survive our reflection on these valuations, 
then this is not a good reason for an action. It does not 
justify the action. This shows again why the instrumental 
view of reason does not hold.
2.4. Conseauentialism
I hope to have established the conclusion that moral 
properties are objective, that moral facts seem to have a 
role to play in explanations. I have also argued that 
values are objective. These conclusions are compatible 
with a number of substantive theories about the nature of 
moral values. They seem to be compatible both with 
deontology and consequentialism. In this last part of the 
chapter I want to make the thought plausible that 
consequentialism is a good view of the nature of moral 
values.
There are five reasons why I think consequentialism 
is plausible. 1. Impartiality seems to be a necessary 
feature of consequentialism. We can at least sometimes 
evaluate an action or an agent impartially. If we come to 
be in a position of a judge in a dispute between two 
agents, then we should try to come to a conclusion which 
is fair to both. This requires impartiality which I take
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to mean that the judge takes into account the facts of 
the case without reference to who these agents are. He 
tries to come to a right decision. If he were a judge of 
a court of law he would have to take the law into his 
considerations. But this impartiality seems to require 
that we can think of the good of agents neutrally. We can 
think of several outcomes of the dispute and we can rank 
them according to a principle. This is not saying that 
there is only one such principle possible. Prima facie at 
least there are many principles possible for such a 
ranking.
This reason could be objected to on the grounds that 
impartiality created so serious problems for 
consequentialism that it should be thought a reason 
against it rather than for it.
This objection requires a threefold reply. First, 
the importance of impartiality should be explained in 
some more detail. Second, the problems impartiality 
creates for consequentialism need to be described. Third, 
it must be considered whether consequentialism can 
respond to and explain those problems.
Morality has to do with the good of rational agents. 
One common sense reason for accepting impartiality 
appears when we ask whether we should let anyone ‘ s 
interest count for more than the interest of another. It 
is at least prima facie plausible to accept the principle 
that the interests of one ought to count for no more than 
the interests of another. Another reason for accepting 
impartiality is the universalizability of morality. If it
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is true that moral principles are valid for all it is 
plausible to infer that impartiality is a feature of 
morality. A third reason for thinking of impartiality as 
a central feature of morality is agent-neutrality. 
Impartiality directly follows from agent neutrality. I 
have accepted both agent neutrality and 
universalizability as features of moral principles. These 
reasons seem to explain why we take impartiality as a 
most important feature of morality.
The second part of the reply to the objection 
mentioned above is describing how impartiality causes 
problems for consequentialism. There are at least two 
ways for impartiality to cause problems for 
consequentialism. The first results from the feature of 
consequentialism which says that the best or right action 
in any circumstances depends on what the best 
consequences are. This can easily be thought to 
contradict the requirements of impartiality. The idea, 
presumably, is that maximizing the good can easily lead 
to the disregarding of someone's interest. But this would 
be a misunderstanding. Even if we accept that all good is 
the good of individuals and that impartiality is a 
central feature of morality, this does not have the 
consequence that ultimately no one's interests should be 
disregarded. The impartiality requirement is only that 
everyone's interest must be taken into account. This does 
not rule out that ultimately maximizing the good might 
lead to disregarding someone's interests. It might be 
better, impartially considered, that the interests of
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someone were disregarded. The second way for impartiality 
to cause problems for consequentialism is that it seems 
to require us to disregard the personal point of view or 
our personal projects. But it is these personal projects 
that give value to our lives, are the sources of our 
deepest happiness. But if it is a fact that disregarding 
the personal point of view has worse consequences than 
not disregarding it, consequentialism tells us not to 
disregard it. It would not be maximizing the good.
The third part of this response is that 
consequentialism does seem to have replies to this worry 
about impartiality. This not to deny that other questions 
arise because of these replies. But there is no space to 
discuss them here.
2. Moral reasons tell us what we ought to do. In 
general it seems to be true that everyone ought to 
maximize the good and minimize evil. This seems to be a 
principle of practical reason. In conjunction with 1 this 
leads to the conclusion that we morally ought to increase 
goodness impartially.
3. Morality is a social institution enabling people 
to fulfill their needs and desires together. Morality is 
impartial. This seems to mean that the interests of each 
moral agent have equal weight. So in attempting to find 
the best action in a given situation one needs to judge 
how it affects everyone. This does not necessarily lead 
to the best state of affairs being that state which 
benefits everyone equally or harms everyone equally or 
leaves everyone equally unaffected. The best state of
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affairs can easily be unequal. The fact that everyone's 
interests have the same weight only means that everyone's 
interests have to be taken into account in judging what 
the best state of affairs is. It is perfectly possible 
that someone's interests must be disregarded if the best 
state of affairs is to obtain. But this disregard must be 
taken into account when judging what the best state of 
affairs is.
4. One might argue against this formulation of 
consequentialism that one could not distinguish between 
the bad effects of accepting something as true and its 
falsity. On any plausible account of the matter this 
should be possible. But this is only an effective charge 
against consequentialism if it denies that moral 
statements can have truth value. If moral realism 
accompanies the consequentialism this will cause no 
problem. This is because moral realism enables us to 
distinguish between the truth conditions of a theory and 
the consequences of believing it. In the extreme case 
consequentialist moral realism can accept that the 
acceptance of a true theory could have such disastrous 
consequences that it had to be repressed. It can even 
explain how this can come about because it can 
distinguish between truth conditions and acceptance 
conditions. This last point shows how consequentialist 
moral realism can deal with this problem and by doing
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that shows how it can be a true theory even though 
accepting it could have disastrous consequences.^*^
These reasons for consequentialism have not 
established it as true but hopefully they have given it 
some plausibility, Consequentialism is not obviously 
true. The reason is that consequentialism raises a number 
of difficult problems and seems to require a radical 
revision of our common sense moral views. One consequence 
of accepting that one should maximize good by aiming at 
the best state of affairs seems to be that the 
circumstances might arise when a rational agent had to be 
victimized. The standard example is to ask what one ought 
to do if faced with the choice between killing one by 
one's own hand or have terrorists kill ten. 
Consequentialism seems to require that it is morally 
right to kill one. But this conclusion is repugnant to 
our entrenched moral views.
Another problem is that consequentialism seems to 
require too much from us if we are to achieve the best 
possible state actually available in any situation. This 
means that I might be monstrously morally wrong in 
attending a course in philosophy because I could have 
gone to Ethiopia to save starving children. There are two 
responses to this. One is that it might actually have 
better consequences, if I did what I took to be 
important, rather than pursuing the course which appears
27. See Sturgeon, N.: "What Difference Does It Makewhether Moral Realism Is True?" in The Southern Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XXIV, 1986, Supplement, p. 132, where he makes this last point.
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impartially the best. The other is that any appreciation 
of the consequences of a course of action has to take 
into account a realistic human psychology. We might argue 
that it is not realistic to expect human beings to
attempt to bring about those states of affairs which are 
impartially best.
This is not the place to enter into a full 
discussion of the merits of consequentialism but suffice 
it to say that at least some of these problems seem to be 
soluble by consequentialism while it itself probably 
needs r e f i n i n g . ^8 But the best way of examining the 
theory is to see whether it can make sense of the 
questions that arise when tackling an important problem. 
This I shall do when considering paternalism. Paternalism 
seems to be a problem which is best accounted for in
consequentialist terms.
There is one more consideration which seems to 
support consequentialist view of the nature of value. 
Persons are purposive beings. This means that they have 
ends and under normal circumstances they desire these
ends and they act on the beliefs they have about the 
desirability of those ends. To say that persons are 
purposive beings implies that they do what they do either 
for some benefit they are attempting to secure or to
avoid some harm or because they think their action right. 
This seems to mean that all intentional actions of
28. See for example the essays in S. Scheffler (ed.) Conseauentialism and Its Critics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, esp. by T.M. Scanlon and P. Railton.
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persons have some apparent good as their aim. This
coheres well with the fact that it is apparently 
problematic to account for actions and desires that aim 
at the bad. But there are some clear instances of actions 
that do not aim at the good or even the apparent good 
which count as exceptions to this rule. There are
incontinent actions, i. e. actions the agent performs and 
intends but does not have sufficient strength of will to 
perform. These actions show weakness of will on the part 
of the agent. It may also be that the agent's reflection 
has led him to the conclusion that some of his desires 
are not the desires he wants to have. So second-order 
desires are possible which are desires about first-order 
desires. This makes it possible that the motivational 
structure of an agent can be different from his 
conception of good. So actions caused by desires the 
agent does not find desirable are an exception to the 
general rule that intentional actions aim at an apparent 
good.
For actions successfully to achieve the good they
set out to achieve they must be rationally ordered and
coherent. This prevents conflict between desires but 
conflict can be damaging for action. Reason puts our 
desires in order either by putting priorities on them or 
by getting rid of desires that are contradictory. I 
assume that when we have found that two desires 
contradict each other one of them gives way. One of them 
must be irrational. But this is relatively rare, I 
believe, in comparison to putting priorities on desires.
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Priorities resolve conflicts of desires. Desires can also 
be irrational in the sense that we are overcome by them 
and have no control over them. A desire to jump from the 
top of a cliff is an irrational desire of this type.
A third sense in which a desire is irrational is 
that it can involve a false belief. This can either be a 
belief about a fact or a belief about a value. I am 
thirsty and I believe that there is water in that glass. 
Hence I drink from it. Unknown to me someone has put 
transparent glue in it. It is a bit steep to call this 
desire irrational because the belief in question is 
false. What we usually need in addition for it to be 
irrational is that the belief resists correction or the 
desire for that glass is active after the discovery of 
the glue. But in this context I do not believe it makes 
much difference that I call such a desire irrational. 
There can also be irrational beliefs about values. I 
might desire the destruction of the whole world rather 
than move ray finger. This desire is based on the belief 
that moving ray finger is more desirable or worthwhile 
than the destruction of the whole world. This belief is 
irrational and the desire as well. In so far as a belief 
is irrational it prevents the action from achieving its 
aim. It is clear in the example of the glass of water. 
This seems also to apply to an irrational belief about 
values. If an agent acted on the belief about value 
described above, the destruction of the world would 
prevent him from moving his finger. But usually values 
are taken to be irrational because of other reasons.
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Their irrationality then comes down to abnormality or 
unnaturalness. It is false to think that moving my finger 
is more worthwhile than destroying the whole world. Hence 
it is irrational in a similar sense to the belief about 
the water in the glass. For the agent to be rational and 
successful in his actions he must eliminate irrational 
desires and beliefs. This he does through reflection upon 
those beliefs and desires and through experience. It does 
not seem to be possible to know all the desires well 
without having experience of them, i. e. seeing how their 
consequences are in practice. This process creates 
considered moral beliefs which ought to be coherent under 
ideal circumstances.
Let us think about an agent who is contemplating 
whether to inject himself with heroin or not. He has the 
desire for the pleasurable state the narcotic induces and 
he realises the dangers to himself from injecting the 
drug into his body. This knowledge does not persuade him 
to resist his desire; he thinks the present desire and 
its satisfaction are more important to him than his 
future state of mind and judgement. This can indicate 
that he has not discovered his ends or his good.
It seems that there are at least two ways for reason 
to discover ends. One way of doing it is through 
reflection on the conduct of others. By thinking about 
their conduct and seeing imaginatively why they do what 
they do their aims may appeal to us. If we had no aim 
similar to that which motivates their conduct it can 
become ours. This does not only happen reflectively
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though. These aims only become ours when we decide and do 
act on them. This is a more complicated process than one 
might think and there do seem to be all sorts of reasons 
stopping us in our tracks trying to improve ourselves. 
There is sheer laziness, indifference to what is 
admirable, and weakness of will and more numerous 
obstacles in our way.
Another way of discovering new aims for our conduct 
is not to glean it from the conduct of others but to 
discover it in ourselves, so to speak, to discover what 
we really want rather than what we apparently want. Our 
motivational structure is not clear enough to make fully 
transparent to every agent everything what he wants at 
any point in time. Some of his desires are clear to him 
but some are not.
Ends are not fully determinate and sometimes we do 
not know whether a particular action is a part of one or 
not. We know of clear instances of justice, for example, 
but it is sufficiently indeterminate to prevent us from 
saying whether another action which we have never 
performed before would be an instance of justice or not. 
The only way of finding out is to do it. In doing it we 
discover whether it is an instance of justice or not 
through our experience or perception of the moral 
qualities of the circumstances.^^
In these considerations we have gone over some of 
the ground covered earlier and it seems to me to
29, See Dahl, N. 0. : "Rational Desire" in Sartorius, R. ed, : Paternalism. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1983, p. 265-266
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reinforce some of the points I have already made. In 
particular it seems to me that this account of persons as 
purposive beings supplies one more reason to accept 
consequentialism as a theory of moral value. If persons 
aim at the good and more good is better than less, then 
we ought to maximize the good inherent in the ends we 
pursue.
2.5. Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that moral properties 
are objective and that they can be parts of explanations 
of social phenomena. I have argued against the view that 
moral properties are particular. It seems to be plausible 
to accept that values are objective. This means that they 
do not depend on desires and we can say that a person has 
interests which are independent of his desires. 
Consequentialism is independent of the considerations of 
objectivity but it has some features that make it a 
plausible substantive doctrine about the nature of moral 
value. This gets further support from considerations 
about the nature of persons.
Ill
Chapt.ex-l
MoralKnowledge
In this chapter I will argue that knowledge is 
possible and the best account to be given of the 
justification of knowledge is coherentism. I will also 
argue that moral knowledge is possible and we can be 
justified in claiming to know a moral property. The 
account of the justification of knowledge is unified in 
the sense that if it is correct for knowledge in general 
it is also correct for moral knowledge. Lastly I will 
argue that a counterexample to this theory, Williams' 
theory of moral knowledge, cannot answer some serious 
doubts. The conclusion will be that it is just as
reasonable to suppose that moral knowledge is possible as 
knowledge is in general and that it should be explained 
in the same way.
3.1. Knowledge
'A believes that p ' is a proposition that is usually 
taken to be relatively unproblematic, the relation of
believing not being too demanding on related notions. The
major condition for believing is that A understands the 
concepts he uses in the proposition. If he does not, 
there is a difficulty in identifying the belief in
question. But there is no requirement that a belief be
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true for it to be a belief. It is a natural supposition 
in all or most ordinary cases of believing that the 
persons take their beliefs to be true, but any belief 
that is false for whatever reason does not stop being a 
belief.
'A knows that p ' expresses a different relation 
between A and that state of affairs referred to by 'p'. 
Knowledge is a different relation from believing. This 
can be seen from the fact that there is a requirement of 
truth built into the notion of knowledge. If we believe 
that we know something and discover later that 'p' in the 
proposition ' A knows that p ' was false, we infer that 
there never was any knowledge. Knowledge requires truth 
and if there is no truth no knowledge is possible. It 
should also be born in mind that the minimum requirement 
of understanding applying to belief applies also to 
knowledge.
This can be expressed thus: A knows that p iff 1) p
is true, 2) A believes that p. We must add the third
condition: 3) A is justified in believing p. The third
condition is reasonable. A belief can either be true or 
false and we must have evidence for taking it to be true 
rather than false. This evidence can, for example, be 
sensory. This is why we should add 3} .
The problem, one might say, with this theory of
knowledge is that justification is no guarantee of truth. 
And we need truth for knowledge. So even with the best of 
justifications there is always the possibility of a gap 
between knowledge and justification. This gap the sceptic
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exploits. The problem is even more serious than that as 
the Gettier examples show.^ Let us assume that there are 
two people in my house, a friend and a stranger. A knows 
that his friend has a Renault car because he has seen it 
and travelled in it but unknown to him the friend has now 
sold it and the stranger has a Renault car. It is true 
that someone in A*s house has a Renault car and he 
justifiably believes that someone does but yet he does 
not know that someone in his house has a Renault car. 
This is a Gettier example. What it shows is that even if 
our belief is true and justified it does not amount to 
knowledge. Knowledge and the justification of knowledge 
are independent of each other.
This is a flaw in the traditional theory of 
knowledge. A number of responses are possible to this 
flaw. One might be to say that knowledge must be causal, 
so that the state of A and what p refers to must be 
causally linked. This immediately makes moral knowledge, 
the knowledge of the future and mathematical knowledge 
problematic. The basic problem with the causal theory of 
knowledge, though, is that it requires different 
explanations of the justification of true beliefs from 
the explanation of the justification of false beliefs. A 
true belief is caused and is justified in terms of the 
cause, but a false belief is without a cause and cannot
1. See E. Gettier: "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"in A. P. Griffiths (ed.): Knowledge and Belief. Oxford,Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 144-146. See also J. Dancy: Introduction to Contemporary Epistemoloov. Oxford, Blackwell, 1985, p. 23-36. These examples have been widely discussed.
114
be justified in the same way as a caused belief. This 
means that we cannot have the same kind of justification 
for true and false beliefs which is implausible. So other 
attempts have been made.
What needs to be accounted for, roughly speaking, is 
the non-accidental nature of the relation between 
knowledge and the thing known. The most prominent and 
most discussed recent attempt to account for this 
relation and its nature is Nozick's conditional theory of 
knowledge,^
Nozick accepts the first two parts of the analysis
of knowledge mentioned above but instead of the third he
puts two others which capture what is needed to avoid the 
Gettier examples and what is essential about knowledge 
according to him. These two additions come in the form of 
two conditional propositions: 4) If not p, then A does not 
believe that p; 5) If p, then A believes that p. In the 
case of the Gettier example described above, the theory 
can handle why this is not an instance of knowledge. The 
four propositions 1), 2), 4) and 5) must all be true, if
A is to obtain knowledge. Proposition 4) is not true of
the Gettier case. It would look like this, if it were
true: If no one in A's house had a Renault car, A would
not believe that someone did. Let us suppose that the
stranger is absent or owns no car or a different kind of
2. R. Nozick: Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge,Massachusetts, The Belknap Press, 1981, 3rd chapter, p. 167-288. What I say about the theory will be very brief and the important pages are 172-178. See also J. Dancy: op. cit. p. 37-49. There are all sorts of complications of Nozick's theory which he discusses into which there is no reason to go here.
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car from the Renault. But in this case A would still 
believe that someone in his office owned a Renault car, 
that is to say his friend. This offends against our 
understanding of the conditional in question. The
subjunctive conditional p >q says ’ "that in the
situation that would obtain if p were true, q also would 
be t r u e ."3 Correspondingly the conditional says that were 
p false q would also be false. This understanding of the 
conditional 4) has the consequence that it is not true of 
the Gettier case. Hence, A does not know that there is 
someone in his house that owns a Renault car.
This conditional theory captures the non-accidental 
nature of knowledge but it is not without its problems.^ 
The most important of these is the problem of 
internalism. Nozick argues that his theory is an 
externalist one and that it is one of its most important 
virtues. To get a grip on this the distinction between 
internalism and externalism needs to be explained. Let us 
take an example. If A wakes up each morning with a belief 
about which horse will win the race that day and it turns 
out that A is right, then Nozick would accept that A 
knows which horse will win that day.^ In such a case the 
subjunctive conditionals hold and A's belief tracks the 
truth. This can happen even though A has no idea how he 
knows. The distinction between knowing and guessing 
becomes blurred.
3. R. Nozick; op. cit. p. 1734. See J. Dancy: op. cit. p. 44-485. R. Nozick: op. cit. p. 266
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There are two things that need to be said about 
this. The first is that the key idea in externalism is 
that A can know p without believing or recognizing that 
he knows. Knowing without believing that one knows is on 
the externalist account a genuine instance of k n o w l e d g e . & 
Because the relation of tracking is a factual relation in 
the world between the beliefs in question and the facts 
or truths, this consequence of the theory should not be 
surprising. Second order knowledge is analyzed in terms 
of the subjunctive conditionals just like first order 
knowledge. So knowing that one knows is just keeping 
track of one's knowledge that p. The second thing that 
needs to be said about this example is that the same 
question arises about justification as about knowledge 
itself because it is implied in the example that there is 
a reliable method through which knowledge is obtained. 
The question: how do you know that you know? is a
question about justification.
It seems to me that the question about second order 
knowledge cannot be discussed without discussing 
justification. The major question here is whether it is 
plausible to think that knowledge is possible without 
second order knowledge or beliefs. I think everyone would 
hesitate, at first at least, to ascribe knowledge to A 
just on the basis of his uttering one morning which horse 
will win and turning out to be right. But given 
consistency in his utterances and predictions and that
6. R. Nozick discusses this on p. 245-247
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the subjunctive conditionals apply, then the consequence 
of this theory is that A knows what horse will win.
It is not quite clear what sort of generality is 
implied in this account. Nozick thinks generality is
implied: "...since tracking involves some generality to
other (subjunctive) situations, it seems plausible that 
whenever a person knows, there will be some reliable
submethod via which he k n o w s . S o  if we have the
subjunctive conditionals turning out true in some
particular circumstances of A and we can say that in 
relevantly similar circumstances he would know, then the 
theory is more plausible than before. It could also be 
argued that thinking that epistemology should supply us 
with an account of second order knowledge is 
unreasonable. All it could do is to explain first order 
knowledge and if such an account worked it would be an 
effective reply to the sceptic. To try to do more would 
be hopeless and ultimately gives the sceptic all the room 
he needs to manoeuvre to undermine knowledge. If we must 
add to the four propositions above another one 6) A 
believes that 4) and 5) , as is plausible, if we are to 
include second order knowledge, then still another one 
must be added 7) A's belief that 6) is justified and yet 
another one 8) A's belief that 7) that A's belief that 6) 
is justified because it tracks the truth. This leads to 
an infinite regress and dooms internalism.
The obvious justification of internalism is the 
naturalness of the notion that knowledge necessarily
7. R. Nozick: p. 267
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implies knowing that you know and, at least in favourable 
cases, knowing how you know. If you do not know that you 
know that p, then you do not know that p. What is 
troubling in the example of knowing which horse will win 
the races that day, is precisely that the agent is not 
able to give any account of that he knows or how he 
knows. In saying 'A knows that p ' we can fill in any 
proposition we like for p. In the example of the horse we 
might put 'that Red Rose will win the 3.30pm race at 
Ascot today' or 'that grass is green' or 'that increased 
CO2 in the air causes the heating of the atmosphere' or 
'that genocide is morally wrong'. Obviously these are 
different beliefs. Now the question is this: Is it
plausible for all these beliefs to say that A knows them 
if they are true and A's beliefs track the truth? It 
seems plausible to say that any rational agent would have 
different reasons for accepting these beliefs. But on the 
externalist account the bare truth of any belief and, as 
should be clear from the quote from Nozick, the 
reliability of the belief generating method, are 
sufficient to make it knowledge and to justify it as 
such. Now any externalist could accept that any rational 
agent had various reasons for accepting these different 
beliefs, but what it ultimately comes down to is that 
truth and reliability generate knowledge, even though the 
knower is incapable of recognizing his knowledge. But one 
thing should be noticed here. What is reliability in a 
knowledge generating process? The consistent transfer of 
truth from fact to belief. But this seems just another
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way of saying that a belief tracks truth. So nothing is 
really added by using the notion of reliability.
Pointing to the truth of any belief is an 
unsatisfactory justification of it as knowledge. In the 
case of the horses we would suspect that A had a lucky 
guess rather than he knew that Red Rose would win, even 
though we could say that his belief tracked the truth 
repeatedly. It is plausible to justify empirical beliefs 
by pointing to their truth, beliefs like 'this patch of 
grass is green' and even with the general proposition 
'grass is green'. But I do not know what it amounts to to 
point at the truth of 'genocide is morally wrong'. Causal 
knowledge as in 'increased carbon dioxide in the air 
causes the atmosphere to heat' is problematic as well. 
Showing that this is true is not just pointing at 
increased heat and increased carbon dioxide but showing 
why one should lead to the other. This obviously takes a 
lot of background facts for granted. The lesson from this 
is that the more complex the knowledge becomes the more 
implausible the externalist account becomes. The notion 
of justification cannot be exhausted by the notion of 
truth. Pointing to the truth of a belief is not 
sufficient for A to be justified in believing it.
So what is being justified in believing that p? In 
justifying we cite other beliefs and facts which are 
supposed to lend credence to p. The obvious question here 
is: what about these other beliefs and facts? What lends 
credence to them? If they still need other beliefs and 
facts, the same question arises about these facts and
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beliefs. And so on ad infinitum. The consequence would be 
that there are no justified beliefs. The only other 
option, it seems, is to accept that there are beliefs 
where justification comes to an end. Such terminal or 
ultimate beliefs are not justified by anything else: they 
are self-evident or fundamental in some other sense. If 
such beliefs were found, we would have secured a basis 
for all our knowledge. There have been various candidates 
for such beliefs. One is beliefs about our present mental 
states and going along with that is the notion that we 
cannot be mistaken about our present mental states. 
Hence, they are a good candidate for self-evident 
beliefs. Another one could be some general and generally 
accepted beliefs about the world anybody takes for 
granted such as ' the world has existed for longer than 5 
minutes' or 'I have two hands'. Propositions expressing 
this knowledge are more certain than any other 
propositions doubting them or adduced as a reason for 
them. If we have an argument saying that we do not know 
that we have two hands, for example, we can be sure that 
one of the premisses of such an argument is wrong or 
there is a mistake in the reasoning leading to the 
conclusion that we do not know. This argument about the 
certainty of knowledge or the lack of it is fully 
coherent with what I want to say about knowledge and 
moral knowledge, so I shall not say anything about it 
now. But the first possibility is more problematic than 
it seems. The most important characteristic of our 
present mental state is that it seems to be infallible.
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If there are such states of which we can truly say that 
we infallibly know that p, they would probably be the 
best candidates for the ps that must be self-evident. 
What does this notion of infallibility come to? What is 
it that we cannot be mistaken about and how is it that we 
cannot?
Our present mental states can be described with 
propositions like 'This appearance of a red patch I seem 
to see before my eyes'. The words in this proposition 
express concepts and these concepts are true of a certain 
range of things. It seems possible that in applying these 
concepts to my present mental state I might make a 
mistake. But what does such a mistake amount to? One view 
could be that it is a mistake in applying the concept of 
'red', for example, to the kind of colour appearing in my 
visual field. But this can be either of two things. It 
can be that I have made a mistake about the word 'red', 
my belief about the word can be mistaken; it does not 
express the concept I thought it did. So this is no 
mistake about my present mental state. This is no trouble 
for the infallibility view being considered here. But 
another understanding of the mistake is possible. It is 
not just that we can be mistaken about what concept a 
word expresses but we can also be mistaken about the 
things the concept applies to, in this case about the 
experienced colour appearing in my present mental state. 
Assuming that I am fully attentive and have deliberated 
about my words and concepts, then a mistake of this 
nature is a substantial mistake about the quality of my
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experience. It may be that the concept which is true of 
the experienced colour of my present mental state is 
'pink' rather than 'red'. This would then not just be a 
mistake about the word but a mistake in ny understanding 
of my mental state and hence a mistake in ny belief about 
rry mental state. The consequence of this, it seems to me, 
is that no infallible beliefs are possible given that 
one's present mental state is the best candidate for a 
state about which we can be infallible.
There are other qualities of beliefs which might 
make us think that they could serve as foundational 
beliefs. Qualities like incorrigibility and
indubitability. An incorrigible belief is a belief no one 
could ever be in a position to correct and an indubitable 
belief is a belief no one could ever have a reason to 
doubt. The problem with both these sorts of beliefs is 
that they do not make sense without infallibility. If it 
were possible to have incorrigible beliefs and these 
beliefs could possibly be wrong, this would be a profound 
disaster in our intellectual make-up. I do not see any 
reason for believing that rational beings are subject to 
such a disaster nor do I see any reason for arguing for 
this possibility. We would be better off without such 
beliefs.
The conclusion which should be drawn from this is 
that no basic or foundational beliefs seem to be 
possible. But this means that no convincing account has 
been given of knowledge yet.
123
Earlier I rejected the view that we could give an 
account of knowledge based on the principle that 
justifying beliefs need to be justified themselves
because it led to an infinite regression. After having 
found the foundational view wanting, it is reasonable to 
have a closer look at the earlier view. The first
question might be: why is the infinite regression so bad? 
Because if the view is true, knowledge is impossible. So 
if this way of arguing for knowledge is to get anywhere 
the regress must be stopped.
In discussing the possibility of mistakes about our 
present mental states one thing that might have been 
mentioned was that in using words to describe anything we 
are committing ourselves to describe like qualities 
alike. In saying that some thing is red we are committing 
ourselves to using that concept about any other thing 
appearing to us to have the same quality. This is a
condition for the intelligibility of language in general. 
This seems to mean that comparison with other judgements 
is involved in any particular judgement. So in judging
something to be red we are comparing it with other things 
which are red or which are not red. A belief that x is 
red is justified by other beliefs about the same type of 
quality and beliefs about similar qualities. So beliefs 
seem to be justified by other beliefs.
But this has in no way avoided the problem of 
infinite regress. It only indicates what we are doing 
when forming a belief. But if we are comparing beliefs 
and this was all that could reasonably be required from
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us, when justifying, why should this infinite regress be 
bad? Maybe knowledge is possible compatibly with such 
regress. One suggestion might be this: if we are
satisfied that the belief we are checking coheres with 
other beliefs and is not in direct contradiction to them, 
can't we say that we are justified in saying that we know 
that belief? It seems to flow from the fact that in 
forming a belief we are comparing, that we cannot check 
beliefs in isolation. Even though we can single out a 
particular belief and come to a conclusion about it 
whether it is true or not or whether it is justified or 
not, this has consequences for innumerable other beliefs. 
So even if we think we have a very secure belief, an 
empirical belief for example, this does not mean that it 
could not change in the light of other beliefs. In that 
sense our beliefs form an interconnected whole. If one 
belief is changed, many others will have to follow.
Beliefs can possibly be infinite in number but the 
chain of justification of our knowledge cannot be, 
because human beings are finite. Maybe infinite regress 
will not be a serious problem, but the question arises 
whether justification will be circular. A belief p is 
justified by belief q which in turn is justified by 
belief r but because this is not infinite it will 
ultimately have to come back to p. This seems to imply 
that p is ultimately justified by p which is viciously 
circular. This does not seem to be any better than the 
infinite regress.
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A distinction can be drawn between two kinds of 
justification. Justification can be linear and it can be 
inferential, it can be either of these and it can be 
both.8 The vicious circularity assumes that all 
justification must be linear. This means that p is 
justified by q, q by r, r by s and so on. Were this the 
only type of justification available, we would either 
have an infinite regress or vicious circularity.
But there is the inferential justification. And it 
has been claimed that it avoids vicious circularity 
because it allows "justificatory chains to loop back upon 
themselves."9 The notion of inference is thought of here 
in the standard way as going from premisses to a 
conclusion. But this ultimately comes down to inferring p 
from p. So what is the difference between inferential 
justification and other kinds of justification? There are 
two possibilities here, at least. One is to say that 
inferential justification is always conditional in the 
sense that it is only if q and r are true that p is true. 
So we are not saying that p is true but p is true, if q 
and r are true. This means that any belief will only be 
true conditionally. This is no vice of such a theory. 
Coherentism should be understood in such a way that the 
justification of p is its contribution to the coherence 
of a whole set of beliefs. So the conditionality of any 
particular belief should not be surprising. The
8. See D.O. Brink: Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 1059. D.O. Brink: op. cit. p. 10510. See J. Dancy: op. cit. p. 55-57 and 127-130
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justification of any particular belief, then, is its 
contribution to the coherence of the whole set of 
beliefs. If we accept this, the question to be answered 
is how do we justify sets of beliefs. Here it is possible 
to say either that a fully coherent set of beliefs is 
unconditionally and actually justified, and that this 
blocks regress, or that no justification of a coherent 
set is possible. Justification is defined in terms of 
contribution to coherence of belief sets, but this does 
not mean that justification and coherence are one and the 
same thing.
The other possibility of explaining knowledge in 
terms of inferential justification is to draw a 
distinction between a systematic and contextualist 
justification.Contextualist justification is in 
essence incomplete justification. It applies the 
principle of justifying beliefs being justified to those 
beliefs being checked but assumes some beliefs to be 
known to be true even though not justified. A systematic 
justification does not leave any belief unjustified but 
applies the principle of justifying beliefs being 
justified to all beliefs. I take it to be obvious that 
such an application of the principle cannot possibly be 
linear. If the principle of the justification is applied 
to all beliefs, then there will always be one belief 
unjustified at least. But the idea in inferential 
justification is that ultimately justification is allowed 
to loop onto itself, as mentioned earlier. The question
11. D.O. Brink: op. cit. p. 123-125
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is whether this is any better than saying that p 
justifies p, just in a bit long winded way? The answer is 
no, it is no better, unless something else is added,
"...one's belief p is fully or systematically justified 
insofar as p is part of a maximally coherent system of 
beliefs and p's coherence at least partially explains why 
one holds p."^^ This way of explaining justification
comes down to the same thing as discussed above. 
Justification as a contribution to coherence stops the 
regress and makes knowledge possible.
It should be noticed that having a systematically 
justified set of beliefs, as just described, cannot be a 
realistic prospect for human beings for the simple reason 
that beliefs are infinite but a human life is finite and 
chains of justification must be finite. It should also 
make us suspicious of this formulation of the
justification of knowledge that the set of all truths or 
all true beliefs is a very problematic entity, to put it 
mildly, and this would be the set resulting from 
systematic justification. So systematic justification is
a problematic notion. But this should not worry us too 
much. Giving up the notion of a fully systematic notion 
of all true beliefs does no damage to the coherentist 
view of knowledge here espoused. It only means that all 
our systems of beliefs are provisional in the sense that 
it is always possible to have another one more 
comprehensive and more coherent.
12. D.O. Brink: op. cit. p. 124
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In the quotation above it said that p being a part 
of a coherent system of beliefs at least partially 
explained why one held p. This is a reasonable 
requirement. In so far as we are rational beings we must 
have a reason for accepting p to be true and this reason 
must justify our belief that p. If justification is 
thought of in terms of coherence, it follows that p being 
a part of a coherent system of beliefs should explain our 
belief that p, at least in part. This also means that 
having a reason to believe p is having second order 
beliefs about the belief that p. Such beliefs would be 
beliefs about why the belief that p came about, what type 
of p it was. I suggest that what was lacking in the 
example above of the man who knew what horse would win 
the race later that day was rationality. He could not 
give a reason for believing that he knew this and hence 
could not justify it. This seems to lead to internalism 
about justification and there does not seem to be any 
way of avoiding it. But it should be pointed out that it 
is possible for coherentism to be externalist because it 
seems to be possible for beliefs to be coherent without a 
rational agent being aware that they are.
One question needs to be answered about this view of 
knowledge. Is this coherentism compatible with the 
realistic view of moral properties taken earlier in this 
essay? It seems to be natural to think that a maximally 
coherent set of beliefs guarantees truth and knowledge 
and maximal coherence seems to be the best possible 
reason for truth and knowledge. This would mean that
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truth and knowledge could not be evidence transcendent 
and a maximally coherent set of beliefs could not be 
false. Having attained it we would have everything we 
could possibly have as evidence for knowledge. But this 
is a denial of realism as I have described it.
There is a reply to this worry. First, let us recall 
that we rejected the notion of a set of all true beliefs. 
If there was one we might want to say at some stage that 
we had reached it or that at some stage in the future we 
could. This does not seem to be either a realistic or a 
reasonable hope. Why we should accept that we have at any 
point in time got to a maximally coherent set of beliefs 
of which it could not be said that another one was 
impossible which was more coherent is not clear. If there 
is no such point, then the possibility of being wrong 
opens up and, it seems, that truth could transcend 
evidence. Second, the beliefs we have about beliefs, i.e. 
the second order beliefs, are realist beliefs as should 
be clear from earlier chapters. These second order 
beliefs must cohere with the first order beliefs and 
these second order beliefs provide strong evidence that a 
maximally coherent set of beliefs is true. But, as should 
be clear, they do not provide a guarantee of truth. It is 
always possible that maximally coherent sets of beliefs 
are wrong.
One could question at this stage whether the 
relation between second-order beliefs and first-order 
beliefs was the same as between first-order beliefs and 
the world. We claim truth for our first-order beliefs, if
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we succeed in knowing something, and evidence of truth 
for our second-order beliefs. This evidence consists in 
coherence with other second-order beliefs and first-order 
beliefs. But it will not do to claim that the truth of 
all first-order beliefs consists in coherence. The theory 
would then be a pure coherence theory.The problem with 
pure coherence theories is that they lack grounding and 
we do not seem to have a reason for believing them.
I have anyway been willing to accept the possibility 
that even though our beliefs were justified they might be 
false. This means that I have to accept for some beliefs 
that they are not true in virtue of coherence. This means 
that the theory is an impure coherence theory and such 
theories combine coherence and correspondence. Their main 
problem is that they are using two concepts of truth: 
correspondence and coherence. But this should not prove 
too difficult an obstacle. There are serious reasons for 
using both these notions. Correspondence has intuitive 
plausibility and coherence seems needed to avoid 
scepticism. But coherence does not exclude the malin 
génie, there is always the possibility of falsity, but it 
is not reasonable to expect to be able to exclude its 
possibility. It is only if we take knowledge to require 
complete certainty that the exclusion of the malin génie 
would be required. But knowledge does not require
13. Walker, R.C.S.: The Coherence Theory of Truth.London, Routledge, 1989, pp. 6-7 and 210-220. Walker discusses theories of truth but essentially the same questions arise for a coherence theory of the justification of knowledge.
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certainty or perfect assurance.So even though it is 
correct that these two notions are at work in accounting 
for our knowledge, there seem to be good reasons for it.
What I have presented here is an internalist theory 
of justification, not a theory of knowledge. As mentioned 
at the beginning of the chapter, knowledge requires 
truth. We may reach truth through some natural relation 
between the knower and the known. But justification does 
not require truth. On the contrary, it can only supply us 
with evidence for truth, not with truth itself. This is 
not because justification is entirely divorced from any 
relation to truth. Justification is evidence for truth 
but the justification must be accessible to the knower. 
Beliefs are not only justified when true. The 
justification of beliefs is a function of the relation 
between a particular belief and other beliefs, primary 
and secondary. Coherence of beliefs is evidence for their 
truth. Coherentism explains how we are warranted in 
claiming to know.
This seems to me to follow from what has been said 
about knowledge and truth and that justification does not 
guarantee truth. If we add to that the claim that 
justification is uniform in the sense that we can have 
the same kind of justification for both true and false 
beliefs, then the account I have given of the relation 
between knowledge, belief, justification and truth 
becomes at least possible and, hopefully, probable.
14. Karlsson, M. : "Epistemic Leaks and EpistemicMeltdowns" in Hume Studies. Vol. XIV, Nr. 2, November 1990, p.122
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2L2HQral Knowledge
I have given an account of the justification of 
knowledge in general which does not refute the sceptic 
and hence it does not satisfy the strictest conditions we 
can lay down for the possibility of knowledge. The 
question is whether the notion of moral knowledge is more 
susceptible to sceptical arguments than the general 
notion of knowledge.
Moral knowledge is knowledge of a moral property. 'A 
knows that p ' expresses moral knowledge when p is filled 
by propositions like 'x is wicked' or others, referring 
to moral properties. Now, one question which needs to be 
addressed is about the relation between natural or social 
properties and moral ones. Earlier I argued that moral 
properties were supervenient upon natural properties. 
What this relation comes to is that two things cannot 
differ in their supervening properties unless they differ 
in the properties supervened upon. This relation of 
supervenience can be construed in different ways, which 
does not matter in this context. But the important thing 
about this is that supervenience, as described, blocks 
one claim to moral knowledge. One might want to claim 
that if you knew all the natural properties of a 
particular situation, then you would know all you could 
possibly know about its moral properties. This is not 
true. The reason is that you would not know the moral 
properties. Only if you antecedently knew that in this
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type of situation, this type of moral qualities occurred 
and there was no obvious defeating quality, could you say 
you knew the moral quality. We could also claim that you 
would have to know that this particular moral quality 
occurred in situations with these particular natural 
qualities. The only thing you could know on the basis of 
supervenience is that in two identical sets of natural 
qualities there will be the same moral quality. You could 
not know what the moral quality was.
Even if one accepted the account given here of the 
justification of knowledge in general, one might want to 
reject the possibility of moral knowledge. A number of 
arguments could be used to support this point of view. I 
shall consider four such arguments and attempt to reject 
them. In the course of discussing these four arguments I 
hope to make it plausible that moral knowledge is not to 
be considered impossible any more than knowledge in 
general is to be considered impossible.
The first argument is the argument from queerness as 
Mackie calls it.^^ This argument can come in two 
varieties. It can be ontological and it can be 
epistemological. It is only the epistemological variety 
that I shall consider here. The argument goes like this. 
If there were objective values or moral qualities, they 
would be entities of a very peculiar sort, unlike 
anything else in the universe. They would require a 
special faculty in us to discern them, different from
15. J. Mackie: Ethics. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books,1977, p. 38-42
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other ordinary ways of knowing. There is no evidence that 
we possess such a faculty. Hence we cannot know moral 
qualities.
This argument boils down to the claim that moral 
objectivism must assume intuitionism about moral 
knowledge and moral intuitionism seems to be implausible. 
The first question is why is intuitionism so implausible? 
I guess the response should be, according to the 
description above of the argument, that the claim about a 
special faculty is implausible. But why is that 
implausible? The answer to this comes in two parts. 
First, empirical knowledge comes through the senses and 
hence it is plausible to think that all our knowledge is 
related to perceptual faculties in a similar way. Second, 
there is no evidence at all for thinking that there might 
be an organ through which we could receive our moral 
perceptions and acquire our moral beliefs as we acquire 
our perceptual beliefs through the perceptual organs.
I take it to be obviously true that there is no 
organ detecting the presence of moral properties in the 
same way as our eyes, for example, detect visual 
properties. But a moral faculty is not the same as a 
moral organ. A moral faculty could consist of a 
distinctive way of seeing the world and a set of 
distinctive moral concepts. It does not require a 
particular organ. There is plenty of evidence for a moral 
faculty in this sense, even though there is no evidence 
for a moral organ.
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One idea pervades the discussion of this subject and 
the analogy between perceptual beliefs and moral beliefs. 
It is that perceptual beliefs are probably the best 
candidates for foundational beliefs in our claims to 
empirical knowledge. It is often claimed that moral 
intuitions have this structural feature. But I have 
already argued that foundationalism in general does not 
give us the best theory of knowledge in general and there 
is no reason to believe that it gives us a good theory of 
moral knowledge in particular.
There is one argument against coherentism of the 
type here espoused. D. O. Brink argues for an internalist 
coherentism about the justification of knowledge. The 
notion of considered moral views plays an important role 
in such a theory. Considered moral beliefs are formed 
under conditions of cognitive reliability and also on the 
basis of impartial and imaginative considerations of the 
interests of the relevant parties.This type of moral 
belief is used in justifying other beliefs and actions. 
One property of the set of considered moral beliefs is 
coherence and these beliefs are reliable and hence they 
can be evidence of moral truth. The end point of 
coherentism is reflective equilibrium and it is its end 
point because it is only reached after systematic 
justification. It is this end point which is contentious.
It seems to me, as I have said earlier, that the 
goal of systematic justification is not a reasonable goal 
for rational human beings because they are finite and
16. D.O. Brink: op. cit. p. 132
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moral beliefs with all other beliefs are infinite. There 
is another reason for thinking that this is an 
unreasonable goal for moral knowledge. Knowing a set of 
facts p-px seems to imply that on a systematic 
justification all other facts or very many others, at 
least, must enter the justificatory chain and it becomes 
problematic where one's knowledge stops. Do we know, for 
example, all the propositions implied by our knowledge of 
the facts p-px? Even if we accepted a positive answer 
this does not mean that we would know all other facts. 
Even though the justificatory chain was deductive in 
nature, this would not follow. But the point is only that 
this blurs the borders of one's knowledge. So reflective 
equilibrium interpreted in this way is not a reasonable 
ideal. Our body of coherent beliefs is always a half way 
house, never fully systematically justified.
But it might be objected to using the notion of 
considered moral beliefs in this way that these beliefs 
are foundational, even though not claimed to be so. But 
to be foundational they would have to be self- 
j u s t i f y i n g . whatever considered moral beliefs are 
they are not self-justifying. Even though there is no
place for the notion of reflective equilibrium in the 
sense described in a theory of moral knowledge, there is 
no need to deny that considered moral beliefs forming a 
coherent set have a role to play. Such beliefs are
credible, we have a reason to accept them as true, and
they can be used to predict moral behaviour and they are
17. D.O. Brink: op. cit. p. 134
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révisable. If we have a statement about some moral 
behaviour and it contradicts a belief which we have taken 
to be well established and a considered moral belief, 
then we must either reject the statement or revise the 
moral belief. In that respect considered moral beliefs 
can have a similar position to theoretical beliefs in 
science, they generate hypotheses and predictions which 
can be checked against experience. An example of a 
considered moral belief is that causing avoidable pain is 
wrong.
The second argument against my view is the argument 
from disagreement or relativity. It goes something like
this: there are radical differences in moral opinions and 
moral judgements. Hence, our moral judgements are very
unlikely to be instances of moral knowledge. The idea in 
this, it seems, is that the principle of non­
contradiction is violated, if we allow that it is 
possible for two claims to knowledge to be valid 
involving contradictory propositions. This is a 
reasonable thought because knowledge involves truth and 
the law of the excluded middle excludes the possibility 
that two contradictory statements can both be true at the 
same time of the same things. So a variety of different
views on moral properties seems to imply that knowledge
of those properties is impossible because all the views 
cannot be true.
This seems to me to be correct, as far as it goes. 
But the obvious question about moral opinions is: why
18. J.L. Mackie: op. cit. p. 36-38
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should we take all moral views at face value? Why should 
we believe them to be true without further argument? 
These questions are relevant because it is only if all 
moral opinions are taken to be true without further 
deliberation that this argument is strong. One move at 
this point might be to say that the argument from 
disagreement only gets a grip when we add that the best 
explanation of our moral attitudes is that we approve of 
our practices because we partake in them not the other 
way around. This seems to imply that we believe murder to 
be wrong because we partake in social practices accepting 
this view. But this way of justifying the belief gets the 
chain of justification the wrong way around. We partake 
in such practices because we believe murder to be wrong. 
It is possible to evaluate such a belief independently of 
the practices.
The important question in this context is how do we 
know that any particular moral proposition is true? Is 
there any procedure we can rely on to distinguish between 
true and false moral beliefs? Implied in what has been 
said already has been the view that our ordinary moral 
beliefs have certain initial plausibility and these 
beliefs should be checked against other moral beliefs, 
secondary non-moral beliefs and moral principles when 
thinking about moral matters. If these beliefs can be 
shown to be coherent with all these other beliefs we have 
the best ground possible to take them to be true. This 
checking against other beliefs assumes that our initial 
moral beliefs play an important role in constructing a
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moral theory, the relation between beliefs is inferential 
and the theory-construction process should result in a 
coherent end-state. If we find that the moral belief we 
are thinking about does not cohere with other beliefs of 
ours then we must either reject it or revise it in some 
way or revise other beliefs incoherent with it.
Is there any other procedure or method which could 
be used in thinking about moral decisions or to construct 
a moral theory? I shall mention two other suggestions. 
One is that our ordinary moral views should play no 
part in constructing a moral theory.There can be 
various arguments for this view. One is that our ordinary 
moral views should and can play no part in constructing a 
moral theory or coming to a moral decision. One argument 
for this could be that some of our ordinary moral notions 
have a disreputable epistemological origin. Some of the 
moral beliefs we hold strongly we hold, not because of a 
justification or deduction from moral laws or principles, 
but because situations strike us in a particular way. 
Hence we need to start from well established first 
principles. Another method could be that our ordinary 
moral notions ought to play a larger role than on the 
coherentist view in the sense that not all our ordinary 
moral views should be révisable. They might act as 
constraints on moral theory construction.20
19. See, for example, R.M. Hare: Moral Thinking. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981, ch. 3 and 1220. These views are discussed in W.D. Solomon: "Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge" in Proceedings of TheBmsricen Catholic Philosophical Association. Vol. 59,1985, esp. p. 46-49
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These two alternative views deserve a separate 
discussion which I shall not go into. I shall mention two 
reasons to doubt the former view. The first reason can be 
seen from this question: why is it a reasonable
requirement that no moral attitude should play any role 
in constructing a moral theory? This means, for example 
that Socrates should have dropped all his moral opinions 
in deciding whether to escape from prison and subject 
himself to some general method which might result in it 
being rational that he ought to have tried to escape from 
prison which he did not by any means want to do whatever 
his friends argued. This is only a reasonable requirement 
if all our opinions are on the same level, so to speak, 
that they are all preferences and no more than that. This 
is counterintuitive. The second reason is that this view 
implies that there is a one way traffic in revisability. 
Moral opinions can be revised in the light of general 
principles, not vice versa. But we can and sometimes do 
revise our principles in the light of specific examples. 
These two reasons will have to suffice as suggestions 
that this is not a promising method to construct a moral 
theory which explains moral knowledge.
The latter view is that some of our ordinary moral 
beliefs are such that they act as restraints on the 
construction of moral theories. This means that they are 
not révisable. Candidates for such beliefs could easily 
be 'torturing is abhorrent', 'murder is wrong' or 'rape is 
foul'. On the basis of these beliefs we could have 
corresponding absolute imperatives. It seems that rape
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could not but be foul and murder could never be 
justified. If there are any absolutes, there does not 
seem to be any room for revisability of moral beliefs. 
So, if this is correct, coherentism, as here described, 
is more limited than I have supposed.
The difference between this method and coherentism 
is the priority given to coherence and revisability on 
the one hand and the priority given to some absolute, 
non-revisable beliefs on the other. They both agree on 
accepting our ordinary moral beliefs as having some 
evidential force. On coherentism's view the aim is to 
find a theory which is coherent and non-contradictory on 
the assumption that this will be the true theory and the 
justified one. One problem is that moral beliefs could 
conflict in the sense that they would entail two
imperatives both of which we could not act on in a 
particular situation. Then it would be true that I ought 
to do A, I ought to do B but I cannot do both. One 
inference we might want to draw from this possibility is 
that a fully coherent theory of moral knowledge is not 
possible. Hence, we should allow some of our ordinary 
views to be constraints on theory.
This challenge to coherentism is not as serious as 
it seems. The first thing to notice is that these two 
views have many things in common. They accept the
evidential force of our ordinary moral beliefs and they 
accept that coherence is a worthwhile aim, even though 
the absolute view does not give it unlimited priority. 
But the sticking point is the possible problem of
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incoherence or inconsistency and this problem seems to 
undermine both realism and coherentism. I shall consider 
four responses to this problem. The first is that realist 
coherentism can accept that there are situations in which 
there are no correct answers to the question what is the 
right thing to do. But it points out that this does not 
imply that any answer goes. It does matter what we do in 
these situations. The second is that the scope of the 
principle of coherence is not all possible situations but 
most situations. It is precisely situations like moral 
dilemmas which limit its scope. Accepting moral dilemmas 
as possible does not mean that all moral situations are 
like moral dilemmas, only a limited number. The third 
response is to point out that it is perfectly possible to 
have a coherent non-contradictory set of considered moral 
beliefs and yet to have to decide between two options 
which are inconsistent in the sense that I cannot do 
both. The important point is that the inconsistency in 
question is not identical with being logically 
contradictory. The impossibility in question is an 
empirical impossibility. It is not the case that the 
descriptions of the two actions contradict each other or 
that they are self-contradictory. This empirical 
impossibility is in no way caused by or derivable from a 
contradiction in the set of considered moral beliefs. It 
becomes problematic when we add the admittedly plausible 
principle that ought implies can. Fourth, moral conflict 
is only problematic, if we think that moral realism 
implies that there is an algorithm or a computational
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method to decide what is right in every possible 
situation. Moral realism implies no such thing.
The third argument against the view I have advocated 
is that moral beliefs do not allow prediction and 
confirmation in the same way as beliefs about natural 
properties do. The idea seems to be that in the case of 
non-moral beliefs we can better check whether the belief 
is true than in the moral case. The obvious case to
compare is science. In science we have theories
generating predictions leading to observation sentences 
and these observation sentences can be checked by 
experiments. Now the failure of an observation sentence 
to get confirmed does not necessarily lead to the 
rejection of the theory. In deriving the sentence from 
the theory we may have made a mistake in the auxiliary 
hypotheses used, for example. We check observational 
beliefs and they are not wholly independent of other
beliefs. Scientific theories do not come isolated from 
observational sentences.
Why should it be thought that moral beliefs can not 
generate predictions and observation sentences? If we 
look at the matter, there does not seem to be any reason 
against it. If we know that A is a good man and he has 
promised to do x, then we can predict that A will fulfill 
his promise, even though it will be at some cost to 
himself. If A keeps his promise and no alternative
explanations of his action are plausible, then I can 
conclude that his action tends to confirm the principle 
about promise keeping.
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So observational beliefs have a role to play in 
ethical theories along with considered moral beliefs. 
This comparison, at least, does not show any break 
between ethics and science.
The fourth objection to the coherentism is that it 
leaves no independent criterion of the validity of moral 
theories or moral knowledge. This should lead us to 
reject moral realism. One argument for this could be the 
claim that the truth of a moral claim consists in its 
coherence with other beliefs. I do not claim that 
coherence is the only constituent of moral truth. I have 
already admitted that we must allow for correspondence in 
3.1. Both these concepts play their part. Even though we 
had the best justification in terms of coherence there is 
no guarantee that we might not be mistaken. Systematic 
error is possible. Coherence alone can never guarantee 
truth because it can always lead to false beliefs. So the 
view advocated here does not identify moral truth solely 
with coherence, but it recognizes our limits in the sense 
that our best justification for moral knowledge may be 
coherence but it is not necessarily the whole story. 
There may be other possible arguments for this objection 
but I shall not discuss them.
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3^ -3 . Williams ' _Theory of Moral Knowledge
Bernard Williams has put forward a theory of moral 
knowledge which, if true, would refute the view I have 
argued for here.21 it is worth looking at in detail.
Williams distinguishes between the scientific and 
the ethical and he argues that the difference between 
these two is best explained by convergence. In the 
scientific sphere we can ideally expect answers to a 
particular question to converge and this convergence 
should be explained by these answers representing things 
as they actually are. It is not impossible that a 
convergence on answers to ethical questions could take 
place but this convergence should not be explained in the 
same way as in the scientific field.
This distinction is related to another distinction. 
We can distinguish between the absolute conception of the 
world and the perspectival conception. The ethical is a 
subset of the perspectival. The absolute is not our 
notions of the world prior to any system of beliefs about 
it. We form our conception of the absolute on the basis 
of some of our beliefs about the world. But in forming 
this conception we concentrate not on the world out there 
but on how our beliefs about the world represent what 
they are about. In this way we form an absolute 
conception which is such that any inquirer would arrive
21. B. Williams: Ethics and The Limits of Philosophy.London, Fontana, 1985, ch. 8
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at it, even if he was very different from us. The 
perspectival is constituted by properties which do not 
have this quality, properties like green. The claim is 
that the absolute conception would give a good 
explanation of how knowledge is possible of the absolute 
and the perspectival. The crucial idea here is 
explanation and in the perspectival field it is the 
different explanations of two or more perspectival 
beliefs which justify the distinction between different 
sorts of perspectival beliefs, like ethical beliefs and 
perceptual beliefs. In the case of perceptual beliefs a 
theory of error is possible which is not possible in the 
case of ethical b e l i e f s . 22
The question is how to account for ethical knowledge 
within this framework. It might seem fairly 
straightforward to deny the possibility of moral 
knowledge, but Williams' theory is much more 
sophisticated than that. To arrive at what he wants to 
say about moral knowledge we shall assume with him that 
we are dealing with a society that is "maximally 
homogeneous and minimally given to general reflection." 
This is the hypertraditional society in which its members 
simply use certain ethical concepts.22 Can the members 
of such a society be said to have ethical knowledge? 
Williams does answer yes, but his answer is different 
from the one I tried to argue for earlier.
22. B. Williams: op. cit. p. 15023. B. Williams: op. cit. p. 142
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Williams distinguishes between reflective and 
unreflective knowledge and the distinction is roughly 
that reflective knowledge involves being justified in the 
sense of believing that one knows. In the 
hypertraditional society only the unreflective kind is 
available. Unreflective knowledge in such a society is 
problematic. One reason is that it is not easy for an 
outsider to determine the truth of the judgements in 
question because he cannot use those same concepts. But 
even though an outsider might be barred from using the 
ethical concepts in question, it is always available to 
him to say 'what they call F' and recognize what they say 
as true.
Parallel with the distinction between reflective and 
unreflective knowledge is the distinction between thick 
and thin ethical concepts. Examples of thick ethical 
concepts are concepts like 'courage', 'generosity', 
'brutality'. Examples of the other kind are 'good', 
'right'. The thin concepts can only be used at the 
reflective level but the thick concepts can be used at 
the unreflective level.
But the basic problem is how should we think of the 
relation between these two kinds of knowledge. Williams 
suggests two models, an objectivist model and a 
nonob j activist model. On the objectivist model we see all 
judgements, both on the unreflective and the reflective 
level, as having general implications which the persons 
uttering the judgements may or may not realize. A member 
of a primitive society might believe that there are holes
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in the sky letting in light or whatever. On the 
objectivist model we would want to say that this man's 
belief about the stars is false. On the nonobjectivist
model one would look at the judgement as a part of a way
of life, a cultural artifact, and there would be no 
objective grounding possible for ethical concepts. The 
argument for this seems to be twofold. On the one hand
the objective grounding would have to be in terms of the 
thin ethical concepts and general arguments. But the thin 
ethical concepts are precisely not world-guided as would 
be necessary if they are to be accepted as objective. On 
the other hand, and as a result of this first point, the 
other available option for objective grounding is to use 
concepts from the surrounding culture. But these do not 
give an objective grounding in the required sense because 
they only serve you for a particular culture. There are 
no culturally independent, thick, ethical concepts.
This does not exclude the possibility of convergence 
in the ethical. The thick concepts a culture shares are 
world-guided in the sense that we would expect those 
sharing the same culture to share the same thick ethical 
concepts and know how to apply them. This is the case
with colour concepts as well. But the explanation of the 
convergence of colour concepts is that we know that the 
perceptual capacities underlying our perception of the 
world present it to us in reliable and useful ways. This 
is not possible for ethical theory:
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"But while it (ethical theory) might 
explain why it was reasonable for people to 
have these various ethical beliefs, it would 
not be the sort of theory that could explain 
why they did or did not have them. It could not 
do something that explanations of perception 
can do, which is to generate an adequate theory 
of error and to account generally for the 
tendency of people to have what, according to 
its principles, are wrong beliefs.
This is ultimately what justifies the distinction between 
the scientific and the ethical.
As should be clear Williams' view is a powerful 
argument, if true, against the views I have stated and 
attempted to justify in this chapter. The important 
things about it are the distinction between the ethical 
and the scientific and the rejection of the objectivist 
model which has been implicit in everything I have wanted 
to say up till now in this chapter.
The possibility of a theory of error was the
important point about the scientific whether it was of
the absolute or of the perspectival variety. The claim is
that it is not possible to have such a theory for the 
ethical. Williams claimed that the absolute conception 
should be concerned with how our beliefs come to
represent the things they do and in that way explain our 
knowledge. The idea seems to be that evolutionary theory.
24. B. Williams: op. cit. p. 151
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the physiology of perception and the physics of light, 
sound or whatever have supplied us with such an 
explanation for perceptual beliefs.
The first thing to notice about these branches of 
science is that they are not aimed at explaining our 
beliefs. Their explananda are things in the world 
whatever part of the world a particular branch of science 
is concerned with. Physics explains physical phenomena, 
evolutionary theory explains the development of 
biological beings. If we look to cognitive science to 
explain our beliefs, the important thing about cognitive 
science is that it is independent of any particular 
theory in physics, for example. The results of cognitive 
science would obtain whether we believed in Aristotelian, 
Newtonian or the modern physics. So no results in physics 
can be adduced to confirm or reject a theory in cognitive 
science.
The theories in physics are confirmed or refuted by 
experiments, as in many other natural sciences. In some 
sciences we do not have this powerful tool for checking 
theories, sciences like meteorology. The important thing 
about this is that it is not the import of science that 
explains our beliefs, not even the beliefs of the 
scientists themselves. The experiments can confirm or 
reject the truth of a particular hypothesis about the 
world, but where we do not have experiments there is
25. W. Quinn:"Reflection and the Loss of Moral Knowledge: Williams on Objectivity" in Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 16, Nr. 2, p. 200-201
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ultimately no further check possible than the ingenuity 
of the scientists at interpreting the data.
At this point we can distinguish between two senses 
of belief. One is a psychological sense and one a logical 
sense or scientific. This is the difference between
belief as a mental event and the content of belief. I 
take it to be obvious that the truth of a content of 
belief cannot be derived from the occurrence of a mental 
event, unless, of course, the content of that belief were 
about that occurrence. The truth of the statement 'snow
is white' is not determined by my belief that snow is 
white. It is not even determined by the fact, if it be a 
fact, that this belief is widespread. There seem to be
three things going on here: it is the mental event, the
content and the truth of the belief. As I have described 
this the question of truth can only arise for the 
content.
On Williams' theory the absolute conception should 
explain how it itself is possible and how we come to know 
it, it should explain why we do or do not have particular 
beliefs. The truth of those beliefs is supposed to play 
an important part in such an explanation. In the light of 
the distinction above it is not at all clear how beliefs 
as mental events are supposed to be connected to the 
truth of their contents. One explanation for saying above 
that the results of cognitive science are independent of 
results in physics, for example, is that cognitive 
science deals with the relation between the mental events 
and their content but physics is concerned with the
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content of some beliefs and its truth or falsity. There 
is no necessary connection between the content of a 
belief and its occurrence as a mental event. Rational 
beings do have beliefs which they have acquired in a 
variety of ways. Some they get from their parents, some 
from their peers, some from their own thinking, some from 
books and some from other places like the media. Some of 
these beliefs are reasonable and some of them are, maybe, 
true. The way to find out is to see if they are 
justified.
The question now is: how is the theory of error
possible? It is supposed to be embedded within a general 
theory which does not only explain that some beliefs are 
mistaken but is also supposed to explain how we come to 
acquire the beliefs we have, mistaken or otherwise. There 
is no problem in explaining how beliefs are mistaken; the 
mistaken ones are the false ones. But the general theory 
should do more. It should explain how we come to have 
these beliefs. The primary example of such an explanation 
is, I think, perceptual, especially colour, beliefs. The 
explanation would be similar to this: we have a theory of 
light explaining, for example, how light is different at 
different wavelengths. We have a theory of the nervous 
system which describes how the eyes and the brain link 
with light from the world around us. Given the natural 
functioning of the nervous system, particular wavelengths 
of light should be perceived as certain colours. The idea 
must be that we could in principle explain beliefs in the 
sense of mental events and we could also explain
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systematic mistakes by, for example, deficiencies in the 
sensory system. This seems to me the case for Williams' 
theory of error for scientific knowledge.
There are some questions which should be raised
about this account. First, suppose this is correct about 
colour concepts. Does it work for other kinds of 
concepts? Are colour concepts not special? I am not going 
to answer these questions, but they do point to the fact 
that further argument is needed. Second, I think there 
are reasons to believe that this account for colour
concepts is not as convincing as it might appear. It is a 
fact that there is good consensus about the use of colour 
concepts. It is this consensus which makes the account
above of the explanation of our beliefs plausible, not 
the other way around. Were there more divergence in the 
use of colour concepts than there is now, the 
plausibility of this account suffers.
If we can, and sometimes do, make mistakes in our
judgements of colour, how would an explanation of such a 
mistaken belief look? It seems that it could not go 
beyond pointing out that the belief is false and could 
not give any account of why one came to hold such a 
belief. In the case of colour blindness it is possible 
to go further and give an explanation of why one comes to 
hold systematically mistaken beliefs about some colours. 
But the case of colour blindness is special and not 
typical.
Third, it should be noticed that a scientist 
inquiring into physiological events in our brain is
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attempting to find out the type of events occurring and 
the relations that hold between them. There is no 
requirement for him to hold that such events enter into 
explanations of our beliefs. Nor would the findings of 
such a scientist enter into explanations of his own 
beliefs. He would hold his scientific beliefs on the best 
evidence available to him. Even though it is reasonable 
to expect to be able to reject or confirm our beliefs in 
the light of evidence, it is implausible to think that we 
can have an account of how we came to hold a belief in 
all cases. It also seems to be true that such an account 
of origin would not explain the truth or validity of the 
belief. This seems to me to essentially the same as the 
chimera of trying to explain the achievements in the arts 
and sciences by the childhood or the upbringing of the 
artist or scientist. This way of explaining perceptual 
beliefs, and other beliefs as well it seems, is the only 
good explanation to be had of our beliefs. The theory of 
coherence I have argued for in this chapter endorses that 
view. This seems to me to throw serious doubt on 
Williams' views on the distinction between the scientific 
and the ethical.
The other important thing about Williams' theory is 
his rejection of objectivism. The notion of objectivism 
in this context is the view that knowledge at a certain 
level, here the unreflective level, is impossible without 
consequences at another level, here the reflective level. 
The distinction between these two levels can be analyzed 
in terms of thick and thin moral concepts. The thick ones
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can be deployed at the unreflective level but the thin 
ones at the reflective level. The thick ethical concepts 
are world guided, objective, but the thin ones are not. 
Reflection, on Williams' view, seems to consist in, at 
least in part, the use of thin ethical concepts. In 
starting to use thin concepts to reflect on a system of 
ethics, certain implications come to hold which did not 
hold before the reflection took place.
The key question, it seems to me, about this is why 
should we believe that the thin concepts are not as 
objective as the thick ones? The distinction between 
thick and thin ethical concepts is not very clear. 
Sometimes it is a matter of generality and sometimes a 
matter of level. If it is a matter of level, the concept 
of goodness, which is at the second level, should not 
combine with concepts of the first level. We should not 
be able meaningfully to talk about a good parent or a 
good friend which are thick concepts. But the concept of 
goodness does not operate at a different level from these 
thick concepts and we have no problem in understanding 
the notion of a good parent, for example. If the thin 
concepts are more general than the thick concepts, why 
should that count against their objectivity? It is 
certainly true that the concept of goodness is applicable 
to a bewildering variety of things, but this does not 
mean that its meaning is unclear. The function f(x) does 
not have value until we have given a value to x. This 
does not mean that the function is unclear or in any way
26. W. Quinn: op. cit. p. 202-203
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less objective than it is after x has received a value.
The same seems to apply to goodness.
It is true that probably there is wider disagreement 
about thin ethical concepts than about thick ones. But as 
has been pointed out before, disagreement needs not to be 
a pointer to nonobjectivity or subjectivity. But if 
agreement were reached about thin ethical concepts, would 
the explanation of that agreement be in any way different 
from explanation of agreement about thick ethical 
concepts? Thick ethical concepts are world guided, 
objective. Presumably, something about the objects the 
concept is true of, be it their use or one or more of 
their qualities, should explain the convergence of 
beliefs and the agreement. The same should apply to the 
thin concepts. Admittedly, the concept of goodness may be 
difficult, if we tackle it on its own, but as soon as we
take into consideration that 'good x ' is like a function
this should not be problematic.
Williams rejects any possibility of a theory of 
error for all ethical concepts. But it might be 
worthwhile to ask whether an error theory for thin 
ethical concepts would be different from an error theory 
of thick ethical concepts. A typical mistake in finding 
out whether an action is right or a man good would be to 
think something relevant which was not. If what I have 
said is correct, we should not expect any difference in 
the case of thin concepts. The coherence with other 
beliefs would be evidence of truth.
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I do not claim to have refuted Williams' theory. But 
I hope to have shown that it is reasonable to doubt it.
3.4,. Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that a coherence 
theory of knowledge best explains our knowing the 
external world. Even though moral knowledge is more
complicated the same considerations apply as for
knowledge in general. Williams' theory does not show that
this account of moral knowledge is false.
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Chapter 4
Moral Expertise
I have just argued that it is reasonable to believe 
moral knowledge to be possible and justifiable. One 
natural inference from this is to take moral expertise to 
be possible as well: where knowledge is possible
expertise is possible. In this chapter I shall argue that 
moral expertise is indeed possible and that there can be 
moral experts. But to make this thought plausible much 
more will need to be said about the nature of moral 
expertise and why so many people find it repugnant.
4.1 Moral Expertise and Wisdom
To be expert at something is to be knowledgeable 
about it, to be skilled at it or to have had wide 
experience of it. Expertise is expert opinion or 
knowledge. This explanation of 'expert' and 'expertise' 
can be found in any dictionary. I checked The Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionarv. What is obvious from this is 
that there is a direct connection between knowledge and 
expertise, which should not be surprising. It also seems 
that expertise is closer to skill than to the cognitive 
aspect of knowledge. This should not be taken too 
strictly because it seems fairly clear that some experts 
have no other skills than cognitive skills as parts of
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their expertise and some experts have other skills as a 
part of their expertise. An economist must understand 
some part of the workings of the economy well and be able 
to explain these workings if he is correctly to be called 
an expert. This is as pure an instance of knowledge as we 
can get. A cook is an expert at preparing food for 
eating. This does not mean that he will be able to 
explain why a certain mixture of ingredients turns out be 
delicious food, only that he knows how to mix them, that 
certain things go well together and others do not. In 
short, he knows what makes good food. Cooking is a skill 
and knowing how the economy functions is not a skill in 
the ordinary sense of the word. But I do not think that 
one should hesitate to call a knowledgeable economist an 
expert nor to call a cook an expert.
Sometimes the use of the term ’expert' in ordinary 
language is so loose as to mean anybody who knows 
anything about something. But the more established idea 
of an expert is someone who is knowledgeable about 
something or about some particular area of knowledge. 
This description would include the cook and the
economist. We would expect an expert to know the general 
principles of his area of expertise, how to apply them 
and at least some of the nuances of such application. He
should know all the major theories held and the
viewpoints on the serious issues in his field. In knowing
the theories he knows the assumptions made and the 
inferences drawn from these assumptions. The expertise in 
question can be learnt and this learning results in a
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change of ability. This description of expertise seems 
applicable to any field of knowledge whether you are 
talking about an economist, an historian, a linguist, a 
doctor or an engineer. One might hesitate about the cook, 
as I described him above, and ask whether his skill 
required any theoretical knowledge. It is certainly true 
that some of the things do not apply to him, but this
should not exclude him from the field of experts because 
being a good cook is dependent on skills. Included in his 
skills is knowledge of the ingredients he uses, even 
though he might not be able to explain why these
ingredients go well together, I do not think it would be 
possible to have a good cook who knew nothing about the 
properties of the ingredients he uses. Knowing what an 
onion is just is knowing some of the properties of an 
onion. A cook knows those properties of an onion relevant 
to cooking.
One part of the idea of an expert is that the expert 
must know more than someone else, a layman. In a field of 
knowledge it is possible that all members of a group have 
the same level of knowledge. It is certainly possible 
that all members of a society have the same skills in
cooking. Then it has no point to distinguish between
experts and laymen. But we can say whether the level of 
knowledge is high or low, whether the members of that 
society should all be called experts or not. So it seems 
that expertise is relative to the distribution of 
knowledge within a group and also relative to the level 
of knowledge acquired by a group. If we had a group of
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people and the large majority did not know how to boil 
potatoes, let alone anything more complex, then anyone 
who knew how to prepare ratatouille or to roast beef 
would be an expert.^ But if the majority or most of the 
group knew how to prepare ratatouille and to roast beef, 
then those who knew how to cook exquisite, complex dishes 
in addition to those practically everybody else knew, 
would be the experts. The relation between the experts 
and laymen in this latter instance is not identical to 
the one in the former. The level of knowledge makes a 
difference.
Moral expertise is being knowledgeable about moral 
properties. The description above of expertise seems to 
apply to moral expertise. A moral expert is somebody who 
is acquainted with moral theories, the arguments for and 
against them, he should be able to discern what are 
reasonable assumptions about actions and persons and the 
inferences that can be drawn from them. He should be able 
to think rationally about moral issues and understand the 
nature of moral concepts. He should be able to use 
analogies and be able to tell what are the relevant 
differences and similarities between two things being 
considered. He should be able to recognize the nuances in 
applying the general principles of the moral theories, 
seeing what is justified and what is not. He should be
1. The disparaging remarks about cookery Plato makes in Goraias. 463a-465d, are quite unjustified, it seems tome. There is no obvious justification for saying that cookery is unreasoning and hence does not have a rational account. The question is about the nature of the rational account to be given of cookery.
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well acquainted with the major issues about morality and 
the viewpoints on these issues and how these are related 
to the theories. Moral expertise also requires experience 
in dealing with people in various situations and 
sensitivity to their needs and feelings.
One thing that might occur to you about moral 
expertise so described is that it must be closely related 
to wisdom. But what is wisdom? The Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary gives this meaning: "Capacity of judging
rightly in matters relating to life and conduct; 
soundness of judgement in the choice of means and ends; 
sometimes, less strictly, sound sense, esp. in practical 
affairs." It is quite clear that 'moral expertise' is not 
synonymous with 'wisdom' . The obvious difference is the 
acquaintance with theories and arguments mentioned in the 
description of moral expertise which is not referred to 
in the definition of wisdom. But judging rightly in 
matters of life and conduct is certainly the hoped for 
result of achieving moral expertise. The objective of 
moral expertise must surely be that it is more likely 
that our moral judgement be right as a result of 
acquiring moral expertise.
Moral expertise, it seems, could be instrumental in 
bringing about wisdom. Wisdom consists of reflectiveness 
and judgement in practical matters, it is often 
proverbial and is sometimes implicit in what is said or 
decided rather than explicit.^ By reflectiveness, which
2. See B. Blanshard: "Wisdom" in P. Edwards : TheEncyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan, London, 1967, Vol. 8, p. 324-326.
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did not appear in the definition above, is meant the 
opposite of impulsiveness. The idea is that conduct 
resulting from impulsiveness is more likely to be 
misguided than conduct based on considering the grounds 
and consequences of every action. This reflectiveness 
does not necessarily result from knowledge of moral 
theories or their application but from experience of 
rational beings in various situations in their lives, how 
they react and what they believe. It is obvious that such 
responses will have many things in common and be very 
variable. This indicates the difference between moral 
expertise and wisdom hinted at earlier. It seems that 
wisdom does not require any knowledge of moral theory but 
a sensitivity of mind and a willingness to think about 
one's own and others' moral reactions and beliefs.
Before going on I want to make one distinction which 
is important to avoid confusion. Sometimes moral experts 
are taken to be philosopher kings of the Platonian type, 
able to discern everybody's needs and real longings and 
willing to enforce their knowledge of other people's 
needs on them whatever their own beliefs and assessment. 
So if people did not accept the conclusions of the moral 
expert, he would be right in coercing them to accept 
these conclusions. A moral expert in the sense of a 
philosopher king is a paternalist and thinks that his 
paternalism is justified because of his superior 
knowledge. But a moral expert need not necessarily be a 
philosopher king. As I have described moral expertise, 
and as will become clearer in what follows, there was no
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hint of paternalism being a part of it. A moral expert 
would certainly have superior knowledge to those who 
could not bother to think about moral matters seriously. 
But this does not entitle the experts to get others to 
accept their views by force. There are certainly 
connections between the possession of moral knowledge and 
being justified in attempting to change people's moral 
views. There are also connections between moral expertise 
and justifiable paternalistic intervention with someone 
else's action. If the intervention is non-coercive and 
based on moral expertise, there does not seem to be a 
presumption against it.
4.2 There Are No Moral Experts
Mary Warnock has argued that there are no. moral 
experts. Implied in this claim, as presented by her, is 
that there is no moral expertise. It is instructive to 
see how she argues for this conclusion.^
Warnock uses four arguments, it seems to me. I shall 
describe them all first and then discuss them.
1. She states that moral experts, similarly 
described as above where I described moral expertise, are 
really no moral experts. They look like intelligent, 
first-year undergraduates in philosophy. So this 
description does not capture anything like an expert or 
expertise.
3. M. Warnock: A Question of Life. Blackwell, Oxford,1985, p. 95-100. Her views are endorsed by D. McNaughton: Moral Vision. Blackwell, Oxford, 1988, p. 203-205
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2. Moral experts cannot be so called because the 
only point in calling them experts is that "their 
conclusions should be accepted without question.The 
laymen must feel that they are in no position to disagree 
when the experts have delivered their judgement. But as
this is not the case with moral experts there are no
moral experts.
3. Everyone must make their own moral choices.
Matters of family, life and death are at the heart of any 
morality. Decisions in these matters are based on 
everyone's conscience and conscience is the highest 
authority. Hence no moral experts.
4. In moral matters there can be better or worse
judgements, but there cannot be a correct judgement. 
"That being so, no judgement can be imposed by one person 
on another as the only right or possible or proper 
judgement to make (even though each of us may feel that 
his judgement is manifestly best)."^
These arguments seem to lead to the conclusion that 
no moral expertise is possible and consequently that no 
moral experts are possible. Warnock does not clearly 
distinguish between these two claims. But it is possible 
to hold either one or both of these claims to be true or 
either one or both to be false. It is certainly 
conceivable to hold that moral expertise is possible and 
denying that moral experts are. Moral expertise might be 
so difficult to acquire, for instance, that it was not
4. M. Warnock: op. cit. p. 965. M. Warnock: op. cit. p.96-97
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reasonable to expect anyone to achieve it. It seems to be 
contradictory to hold that moral experts are possible but 
not moral expertise. If no moral expertise is possible, 
it seems to follow that no moral experts are possible 
either. To have experts without expertise seems to be 
contradictory. Lastly, it is possible to deny both claims 
to moral expertise and moral experts. Mary Warnock seems 
to take the last option and, judging from the arguments I 
have described above, that is reasonable enough. It seems 
to me, though, that all these arguments are invalid.
The idea in the first argument is that the
description given of the group of experts and the nature
of their expertise does not capture anything resembling 
that. The capacity is that of first year undergraduates 
in philosophy, reasonably competent. But is this true? Do 
first year undergraduates feel confident in their 
understanding of moral Concepts and the major moral 
theories? Are they also acquainted with the major moral 
issues and the viewpoints taken on them? This seems to be 
false.
But I do not think any heavy weather should be made
of this point. Mrs. Warnock clearly does not intend it
very seriously and it is closely linked to the second 
point.
The second point was that experts' conclusions 
should be accepted without question. If true, this is an 
important point. But first this needs some clarification. 
The claim is that the opinions and conclusions of the 
experts, apparently in virtue of their expertise, should
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be accepted by laymen without question. Implicit in this 
is that there is no such acceptance of experts' view of 
moral problems. There seem to be two ways to doubt this. 
One is to point out that there are obvious cases of 
conclusions about moral problems where you would find 
such acceptance. The other is to draw attention to cases 
of expertise where laymen are as willing to question the 
verdict of other types of experts as they presumably are 
to question the verdict of moral experts.
Let us first look at verdicts or conclusions about 
surrogacy, which is one of the subjects tackled in the 
report of a committee Mrs. Warnock chaired inquiring into 
human fertilization and embryology. ^ Let us assume that 
after some thinking we come to the conclusion that 
surrogacy contracts through commercial agencies should be 
made illegal even though surrogacy arrangements by other 
means are not recommended to be made illegal. The 
arguments for this could be the welfare of the children 
born by a surrogate mother, the danger that their status 
would be very uncertain if disagreements arose, that a 
woman's labour should not be made a commodity like any 
other on the free market, nor should children be made a 
commodity. One could also claim that commercial surrogacy 
could seriously affect the family of the mother who 
undertook it.
These seem to be moral arguments for moral 
conclusions. Anyone who does not know a thing about 
surrogacy would not be in a position to dispute these
6. M. Warnock: op. cit. p.1-94
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findings and would in all probability accept them without 
question. If the only point of calling someone an expert 
is that he can come to conclusions of this sort, then 
moral experts seem to be possible and actual, as these 
are actual conclusions. And they are not, apparently, 
hotly debated by laymen. It seems to me that a large part 
of the population would have no hesitation in accepting 
verdicts like these and not want to question them, maybe 
a majority.
Is it the case that in all undisputed cases of 
expertise the laymen are always willing to accept the 
verdicts of the experts without question? If a doctor 
advises his patient to stop consuming fats, as much as he 
can, because his heart is so weak, it is to be expected 
that the patient accepts the advice. But some do not and 
prefer to stick to their lifestyle rather than prolong 
their lives. There is nothing peculiar or strange in 
doing that. A meteorologist may predict rain tomorrow, 
but there is nothing untoward in disputing his 
prediction. Both these cases are cases of expertise in an 
unproblematic sense and there is no absurdity in 
disputing its verdict.
One reply to this could be to point out that Warnock 
said that the experts' conclusions "should be accepted 
without question." It is the force of this 'should' that 
ought to be considered. First of all, I suggest that 
‘without question' should be dropped without further ado. 
It simply is inappropriate as the cases above showed. It 
seems to me a condition far too strict and ruling out
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practically anything we are usually ready to accept as 
expertise. Second, the obvious understanding of 'should' 
in this connection is that it is grounded in superior 
knowledge and therefore the verdict is to be accepted in 
virtue of it. If the verdict of experts is based on 
superior knowledge to our own, then we are to accept it. 
The problem with this interpretation is that it applies 
both to moral experts and to other kinds of experts 
because moral knowledge is possible, as argued in last 
chapter, and moral experts have, presumably, acquired it. 
This second argument of Warnock's does not support her
view.
But Warnock's idea could be that those who accept 
the advice should not accept moral advice without
question. This is compatible with believing in moral 
expertise and moral experts. The idea seems, then, to be 
that it is incumbent on those who receive moral advice to 
question it because they are the ultimate authorities in 
decisions about their own conduct. This is essentially 
the same point as the next one, to which I will turn. But 
the obvious reply to this is that it is true that 
everyone is the ultimate authority about what he decides 
to do, but this does not mean that he is the ultimate 
authority on whether his conduct is morally right or 
wrong.
Warnock's third argument was that matters of the
family, life and death are at the heart of morality and
everyone both wants to and must make up their own mind 
about them. It is also important that the Protestant
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tradition in Britain, and in other North-European 
countries, is that the conscience of the individual is 
the highest authority in moral matters.
It is certainly true that no one can go through life 
without taking moral decisions about some moral matter or 
another. These are in most cases connected to the family. 
I am not so sure about life and death. In a sense one 
could say that one decides every day to go on living. But 
this is no real decision in practically all cases but 
just what you do every day. When one needs a real 
decision about whether to live or die, it can be 
excruciatingly painful. I do not think that people commit 
suicide lightly. There are other types of decisions about 
life and death. Some people may have to decide the fate 
of their parents or children, if they become very ill and 
come to the point of no recovery. I think it is untrue to 
say that people want to take such decisions. This is 
obviously untrue in the sense that everyone probably 
prefers to avoid getting into such situations, but it 
seems also to be untrue in the sense that not all would 
want to take such a decision if landed in circumstances 
of this type. In the present state of medical technology 
it seems unavoidable that some people will land in such 
situations. It is certainly possible that the medical 
staff took such decisions, but I believe that one 
rationale for putting the obligation on the closest 
relatives is that they are most likely to take decisions 
based on the interests of the patient. If it turned out 
that such decisions tended to disregard the patients'
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interests, then this arrangement would and should be 
considered and changed. There is nothing inviolable about 
the person most concerned taking these decisions.
The principle that the individual's conscience is 
the supreme judge in moral matters is problematic. This 
is so because it ultimately amounts to everybody being 
the supreme judge in moral matters and no further appeal 
possible. If one accepts that propositions about morality 
can be true or false, then it is certainly possible that 
some of the judgements based on conscience could be 
false. This is especially clear if one considers that it 
varies among individuals what their consciences tell them 
to do. If moral judgements conflict, both of them cannot 
be true. This applies also, if one accepts that one moral 
judgement can be better than another. The inference one 
should draw from this is that the individual conscience 
cannot be the supreme arbiter in morality, in deciding 
what is the morally right action. It is the supreme 
authority on what each individual will do. The reason is 
that we can have true or false statements about moral 
rightness or wrongness. Decisions about actions cannot be 
true or false.
Another problem with this view of the role of 
conscience appears when we think about complex moral 
problems. Many of the moral problems confronting us in 
everyday life are relatively simple, and reasonable 
upbringing, basic education and some intelligence should 
equip us for solving them. This does not necessarily mean
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that these problems are easy; they may be very difficult 
because of the importance of the issues involved.
Moral issues in human fertilization and embryology 
in the present time are becoming very complex.^ Sexual 
intercourse, which can be considered relatively simple as 
a moral problem, is no longer the only way of begetting 
children. What should we think of these new ways of 
begetting children? To come to a conclusion about that is 
no simple matter and conscience is not a good or reliable 
guide to an informed and rational view. There are no 
established rules to rely on. What we need is to gather 
information, organize it, apply the moral concepts to 
these new techniques and draw some inferences about the 
morality or immorality of these new ways of begetting 
children. This can lead to us changing our original views 
on this matter or on other related matters, trying to 
make them consistent and, hopefully, right. The point is 
that conscience is not the best guide to intelligent 
views in a matter like this and it would be foolish to 
accept it as a supreme guide in complex moral matters 
concerning human fertilization and embryology. So the 
status of conscience as a supreme arbiter is problematic 
and it seems to be false to say about all moral issues 
that conscience is the supreme arbiter.
The fourth argument was that in moral matters there 
cannot be a correct judgement and so no moral judgement 
can be imposed by one person on another. This point is
7. see M. Warnock: op. cit. and P. Singer and D. Wells:
ThSi Reproductive Revolution. Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress, 1984, p. 13-189
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simply a confusion of moral expertise with paternalism. 
Whatever the connections between these two it is not the 
case that moral expertise just is paternalism. Experts of 
any kind are not entitled to force their advice on 
anybody simply in virtue of their expertise. But they can 
expect that their advice be taken seriously and accepted 
or rejected, as the case may be, on serious grounds. It 
is instructive to consider the report of the Warnock 
Committee. It is as clear a case as one can expect to 
find of moral advice to Government. This type of advice 
does not exclude statements of fact. The bulk of the 
report is a collection of statements about various 
important and relevant facts bout alleviation of 
infertility, about laws or the lack of them in this area 
and the possible future developments in this area and 
recommendations about the shape of the laws. The 
principles on which this advice is based are moral and 
can be seen, for example, in the advice that experiments 
on embryos are believed to be justified in the first two 
weeks of their lives.
Another important fact about this inquiry is that it 
is about an area which is new, as I mentioned above. So 
what is needed is an interpretation of the moral concepts 
we use to apply to this new area. In such a case it is 
not unreasonable that laymen should be willing to accept 
the verdicts of experts in this field and would find it 
difficult to disagree with them. Yet, Warnock expresses 
an important truth about the recommendation of such a 
committee: "It has to be remembered that Ministers are
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not bound to follow advice they are given by committees 
of inquiry. The report is onlv advice. The 
recommendations begin to have force only if they seem 
sensible and persuasive to Ministers and their civil 
servants."® This a good description of the function of 
moral experts and avoids the confusion between moral 
expertise and paternalism. The important point to notice 
is that moral experts, like other experts, give advice. 
It is up to the one who gets the advice whether he
accepts it or not. The acceptance depends, presumably, on
the quality of the advice.
This concludes my discussion of Mrs. Warnock ' s
argument against moral experts.
■4..,3 -Further Objections to Moral Expertise
Mrs. Warnock ' s objections do not by any means
exhaust the objections that have been raised to moral 
expertise. I want to start by taking a look at what might 
be construed as Mill's objections.
Mill's theory of individuality provides him with a 
justification of his opposition to paternalism and, 
apparently, to moral experts, if not to moral expertise.
I will argue that this interpretation of Mill ought to be 
rejected.
The general ideas in Mill's theory of individuality 
seem straightforward enough even though he may be working
8. M. Warnock: op. cit. p. 99
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with more than one notion of individuality.^ He thinks 
that individuality is of the highest value and should be 
developed and encouraged as much as possible. 
Individuality consists in deciding and choosing one's 
actions and plans of life. In choosing one must
deliberate about other alternatives to our plan of life 
and check their characteristics and come to a conclusion. 
This choice should assist our development rather than 
hinder it. Freedom to choose is essential, if the nature 
of everyone is to develop and for any choice to be 
meaningful. To achieve happiness one must develop one's 
character or individuality. Happiness on this view is not 
the satisfaction of a desire but the developing or
perfecting of one's individuality.
Mill's theory does not presuppose the absence of 
objective truth in this area as might be believed. If it 
is up to the individual to choose his own plan of life, 
it might be inferred that there could be no objective 
truth about such choices. This would mean that any ideal 
an individual happened to embrace should be welcomed 
because it is his ideal. But this is not Mill's view. It 
is both more congenial to his general view to say that 
there is truth to be had in choosing a plan of life or
deciding a moral action, but admittedly such truth
depends on one's own characteristics and hence no general 
truth is to be had about what life plan anyone ought to
9. J.S. M i l l :  Liberty, ch. 3 in Three Essavs. Oxford,Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 69-91. See also C.L. Ten: Mill on Liber tv. Oxford, Oxford University Press,1980, ch. 5, p. 68-85.
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choose. This is in accordance with his statements about 
polygamous marriages, for example, of which he
disapproves s t r o n g l y . S u c h  marriages should be
tolerated but they are outside what can be considered
attractive to human development. Another reason for
thinking that there is truth to be had in these matters 
is that the choices one makes are in part discoveries and 
can be mistaken. In virtue of a false belief about my 
potentialities and unique endowments I can make a choice 
which can turn out to be mistaken.So the choices one
makes lead to self-knowledge and knowing oneself is a
useful thing both to oneself and others. For these
reasons it is false to say that Mill rejects the notion
of truth in the personal sphere.
In choosing our own plans of life, in deciding our 
own actions in the light of our own dispositions our 
actions are our own. This is a key element in Mill's 
theory of individuality. But what does it mean to say 
that an action is mine in this context? It is clearly not 
sufficient that I performed it. It is necessary that I 
decided on it and it also seems to be necessary that such 
actions are "expressions of his own nature, as it has 
been developed and modified by his own c u l t u r e . F r o m  
this I think one can infer that an action is one's own 
when one has freely accepted a personal ideal and tries 
to conform to it and this ideal is appropriate in the
10. J.S. Mill; op. cit. p. 112-11311. See J. Gray: Mill on Liberty: A Defense. London,Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983, p. 7912. J.S. Mill: op. cit. p. 74
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sense that it is based on an accurate perception of one's 
own talents and potentialities. This is admittedly rather 
vague but it is clear that on Mill's view an action is 
mine if it results from a chosen ideal and a settled 
disposition of mine.
Mill uses this to support claims about the badness 
of habit and how it prevents development. "The human 
faculties of perception, judgement, discriminative 
feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are 
exercised only in making a choice. He who does anything 
because it is the custom, makes no choice. Implied in 
this is that a customary action excludes choice and hence 
cannot count as really mine in the sense described.
Some of the implications for moral experts and moral 
expertise need to be drawn out from this account of 
Mill's theory of individuality. The first thing to notice 
is that Mill does not need to deny that moral expertise 
is possible. On this account of his theory it seems to me 
that moral expertise is perfectly possible. It may be 
that it will never amount to anything resembling a full 
blown academic discipline because any generalization will
13. J.S. Mill: op. cit. p. 7214. It is arguable that this relies on too narrow a view of customary action and even a confusion of habitual and customary action. See Scruton, R. : "Freedom and Custom",in Griffiths, A.P.: Of Liberty. Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, 1983, pp. 192-195. It is fairly clear that if we give tradition and custom the place Scruton wants moral experts would have a larger role to play than I am willing to argue. This seems to be true even if allowing for the fact that deep desires and realinterests must take into account the agent's perspective.But I will not pursue this argument but note that Mill seems to be willing to accept a substantial role formoral experts.
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be difficult. But as a practical subject where the 
knowledge in question need not be backed by a full blown 
theory of any sorts, I do not see any reason for Mill to 
deny moral expertise. Second, Mill need not deny that 
moral experts are possible either. They would be the ones 
in possession of moral knowledge. The argument for saying 
this is that Mill allows that there are competent judges 
in distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures and 
that the higher ones are better for human be in gs. Thi s 
competence seems to be a competence in judging what is 
morally good. This is the sort of competence a moral 
expert would need.
It is possible that someone might want to reply on 
Mill's behalf that it is undesirable to seek the advice
of the moral experts. The obvious reason is that it is
the individual himself who should attempt to solve the 
moral problems he encounters. Otherwise he would not be 
fully rational and not attempting to develop his talents 
and faculties to the full. The defender of Mill might
also want to say that seeking moral advice is unworthy of
a rational being, somehow demeaning for the one who seeks 
it. He might even go further and say that seeking moral 
advice is morally crippling.
Before replying to these points I want to say that 
this is not a view that Mill seems willing to take. I 
stated this above in connection with those competent to 
discern the difference between higher and lower
15. J.S. Mill: Utilitarianism in M. Warnock (ed.):Utilitarianism. London, Fontana, 1962, p. 259-261. -
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pleasures. But it is clear from what Mill says about the 
doctrine of individuality that he is in no way opposed to 
moral guidance by men of genius or originality. What he 
is opposing with this doctrine is the tyranny of the 
masses and public opinion. He says:
"The initiation of all wise or noble things, 
comes and must come from individuals; generally at 
first from some one individual. The honour and glory 
of the average man is that he is capable of 
following that initiative; that he can respond 
internally to wise and noble things, and be led to 
them with his eyes open. I am not countenancing the 
sort of 'hero-worship' which applauds the strong man 
of genius for forcibly seizing on the government of 
the world and making it do his bidding in spite of 
itself. All he can claim is, freedom to point out 
the way.
Now back to the argument described above. It seems 
to me that this argument against the seeking of moral 
advice does not work. I shall look at the points in turn. 
The first was that somehow rationality requires that each 
individual himself tries to solve his moral problems. 
This is certainly true in the sense that each individual 
ought to take his own moral decisions if he wants to be a 
rational being, and as I have argued above, moral advice 
does not in any way encroach upon our ability to decide.
16. Mill, J.S.: On Liberty, op. cit. p. 82
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As is likely, it will be the more complex moral problems 
that will prompt us to seek moral advice. Moral problems 
can easily be so difficult that we are at a loss what to 
do. If we do not seek advice, this can lead to our 
inaction. But our inaction may have worse consequences 
than our informed action. Rationality seems to require 
that we aim for better consequences of our actions rather 
than worse. Hence, rationality seems to require that we 
seek moral advice.
Let us accept then that there are such situations 
where we should seek moral advice. But it can be 
important how often such advice is sought. If it becomes 
a habit to look for the guidance of the moral expert, 
whenever a moral problem arises, it is likely that there 
comes a time when we would simply lose our ability to 
think and solve moral problems. And in so far as this 
ability is necessary for our moral development, we should 
try to use it as often as possible and in as various 
circumstances as possible. In some we would better seek 
moral advice. But doing that too often blunts our moral 
sensibility and our ability to solve moral problems. But 
it is a fine judgement where to draw the line but it 
seems reasonable that such a line could possibly be drawn 
and should be drawn. We should also remember a 
distinction between personal problems and social policy 
issues. There is no problem in arguing that on social 
policy issues, in so far as they involve moral issues, 
moral advice should be sought. It is in the personal 
problems where a line needs to be drawn.
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The next issue was whether seeking moral advice was 
demeaning. But this can only be demeaning because it is 
presupposed that each individual should be able to solve 
their moral problems. But why should we think this? One 
view could be that everyone ought to be able to take his
own moral decisions. In one sense this is a truism.
Everyone can obviously take a decision in any matter, 
moral as well as others. But it is not true that everyone
can take a rational decision in any moral matter
confronting him without seeking information, 
deliberating, and seeking advice is part of acquiring 
information. If all moral problems were simple, like a 
decision what to have for dinner is simple, then it would 
be a reasonable requirement about moral decisions that 
everyone should be able to take them on his own without 
any advice. But if moral decisions are complex, like a 
decision to become a surrogate mother is complex, then 
rationality seems to require that moral advice be sought. 
So seeking moral advice cannot be demeaning because 
everyone should be able to solve their own moral 
problems.
To confirm this we can look at the seeking of advice 
in other fields. If you encounter a legal problem, let us 
say about the selling of a house, then you go to a lawyer 
and he will tell you what the law is concerning this 
issue, what the likelihood is of your achieving the 
desired objective and he might take into account the 
consequences of pursuing your preferred course. For those 
not trained in law this would be the only rational way to
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conduct their case. Why should it be different in the 
moral case? I think it would be absurd to say that it is 
demeaning to seek moral advice on the moral aspects of a 
social issue. This only seems to be appropriate when 
talking about simple, personal, moral problems. One might 
have the feeling that seeking moral advice about simple, 
personal problems is a sign of failure on the part of the 
one who seeks the advice, just like going to a 
psychiatrist is sometimes considered to be a sign of 
failure. In a sense it can be a sign of failure because 
the problems may have grown too difficult for you to 
solve on your own. But then the best way is to seek help 
and I do not see how one could argue that it is in any 
way shameful to do so. Also, you do not need to be in any 
desperation or about to lose control over your own life 
to seek moral advice. You can be doing it before any real 
trouble arises because you think you need some advice. In 
seeking moral advice you are not failing, but rather 
doing the rational thing. Unless, of course, you were 
failing to take most of the simple moral decisions you 
have to take in everyday life. If it could reasonably be 
shown that seeking moral advice would probably lead to 
such a decrepit moral state, it should not be sought. 
This is really the argument that moral advice will 
cripple.
The question is whether it is likely that the 
seeking of moral advice will cripple you as a rational, 
moral being. This is only likely, if we are speaking 
about personal moral problems, not social issues with a
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moral aspect. Also, it seems, that we can only talk about 
a crippling effect if the seeking of moral advice made 
you unable or severely diminished your ability to take 
rational decisions about simple, rather than complex 
moral problems, admitting that there is no sharp line to 
be drawn between simple and complex in this context. One 
of the decisions that most people have to take at some 
stage in their lives is about whether to marry or not. 
Nowadays, for many people, this decision is independent 
of the decision to live with someone. But let us assume, 
here, that there is only one decision. First, the 
marriage contract is not very clear at this point in 
time, even though, I guess, most people would expect that 
it covered sexual fidelity, mutual support, respect and 
love and doubtless various other things as well. Second, 
the decision to enter marriage is a moral one. It is a 
decision about how you will treat another person. Third, 
the decision to enter marriage is about a complex moral 
issue.
It seems to be true that it is preferable that 
everyone should ultimately be able to decide in his own 
case whom to marry rather than having to ask someone else 
to decide it for him. The reason is that it is he or she 
who has to live with the consequences of the decision. 
Other societies arrange the taking • of this decision 
differently, usually by parents. There can be various 
different arguments for such an arrangement, the obvious 
one being the more mature judgement of parents which, we 
could argue, led to happier marriages. There might also
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be a different arrangement suggested once by Samuel 
Johnson: "Marriages would in general be as happy, and
often more so, if they were all made by the Lord 
Chancellor.But this is beside the point here. The 
only thing I want to consider is whether it would be 
likely that the seeking of moral advice on a decision 
like this would cripple our moral sense and judgement. I 
guess many people seek advice on a decision as important 
as getting married. They discuss it with their parents or 
friends. Some of the advice they get will be moral advice 
because it involves how you treat another person and 
kinship ties and sexual relations are subject to 
considerations of justice. It seems that he who seeks 
such advice is possibly in a better position to 
appreciate what he is deciding to do than another who 
does not seek it. To that extent he is rational and has a 
sharper and deeper appreciation of the morality of such a 
decision. It is difficult to see how this can blunt our 
ability to take moral decisions. Admittedly, this is a 
decision about a complex moral issue rather than a simple 
one.
It seems to me that there is nothing quaint in 
seeking moral advice about social issues and complex, 
personal, moral problems. What about simple, personal, 
moral problems? I shall assume that avoiding causing 
unnecessary pain is a simple moral truth and that when we 
come across a gratuitous infliction of pain, as when a
17. As quoted by Michael Walzer in Spheres of Justice. New York, Basic Books, 1983, p. 227. The quotation is from The Life of Samuel Johnson by James Boswell.
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cat is flayed alive, there is no question that it is 
wrong and that we should try to prevent it if there was 
any possibility of doing so without putting ourselves in 
serious danger. This seems a reasonable case of a simple 
moral problem. One of the reasons for calling it simple 
is that we do not need any advice on how to understand or 
respond to it, if it arises and if we are ordinary, 
normal, rational, human beings. When we reflect about 
this example, it is not at all simple to explain why we 
think the moral properties are as they are. But in this 
sense there is no simple moral property, any more than 
there is no simple physical property when closely 
scrutinized. But the main point about simple moral 
problems is that there are such things and we take it as 
a matter of course how we should respond to them. We do 
not need to ask anyone how we should.
If we do need advice on how to respond to simple 
moral problems, it is a sign of considerable weakness, 
which may go to the heart of your rationality and 
morality and make you unable to deal with ordinary 
problems of any kind. In this sense not being able to 
respond spontaneously to simple moral problems is 
indicative of a serious failure. It seems that being 
adult and fully rational requires that we can deal on our 
own with simple moral problems and moral problems that 
are likely to arise in any life such as moral problems 
within the family. We should not need to ask whether we 
ought to avoid killing other human beings intentionally.
186
But if the need is there, the rational option is to seek 
advice and help.
There are three more arguments against moral 
expertise which I want to consider in this part of the 
chapter. The first is that moral expertise seems 
radically different from other types of expertise. If 
true, there might be an argument for saying that there is 
no moral expertise. Knowing how to be brave or knowing 
what is morally good is not really knowing anything in 
particular. Knowing how to play golf means that you know 
how to hit a drive, how to putt etc. Knowing what is good 
does not entail any comparable identifiable skill. "We 
attribute technical goodness to a man on the ground that 
he is good at some activity. But there is no specific 
activity at which, say, the courageous man must be good - 
as the skilled chess-player must be good at playing chess 
and the skilled teacher must be good at teaching. There 
is no art of 'couraging', in which the brave man 
excels."!® Von Wright takes this to imply that specific 
virtues do not imply specific activities nor act 
categories. Yet he does not deny that morality, the 
virtues, can be learnt.
There are ways of countering this. One answer is to 
say that the good man is "good at discerning what is 
right and wrong, and in doing something about it. He, for 
example, takes extra pains to find out if he hurt that 
old lady's feelings and to do something about it if he
18. G.H. von Wright: The Varieties of Goodness. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, p. 139
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did."!9 Being morally good or virtuous is difficult and 
needs to be learnt. We seem to have a natural tendency 
for the pleasant and the easy in preference to the 
arduous and painful. We need to learn that this tendency 
can be a source of moral failure. Moral failure sometimes 
results from wickedness, but more often from ignorance 
and weakness.
Another reply could be this. Von Wright's view of 
the nature of moral expertise ignores moral problems and 
moral dilemmas. It is only when moral principles clash 
that clear thought and experience in judging what is 
right and wrong become important. Even though no 
particular type of competence corresponds to every 
virtue, it does not follow that virtues do not require 
any skills. It is just a matter of judgement in every 
particular situation what competence and what skill is
required.20
This requires some consideration. What is von Wright 
denying when he says that bravery does not need 
'couraging'? One way of understanding this remark is to 
say that bravery does not entail any particular physical 
movement of the body. The problem with this is that it 
seems to be a truism which nobody would want to deny. The 
same seems to apply to other good qualities of a man. 
Intelligence does not require any particular act 
appropriate to it, nor does wit. But intelligence and
19. R.W. Burch: "Are There Moral Experts?" in Monist. 58, 1974, p. 65220. B. Szabados: "On 'Moral Expertise'" in CanadianJournal of Philosophy, Vol. VII, March 1978, p. 128
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courage require that one's behaviour can be described as 
intelligent or courageous as the case may be. The same 
seems to apply to teaching. Von Wright would not want to 
deny that either. There does not seem to be any point in 
denying that the actions of a brave man should be 
described as courageous. This is not quite as empty as it 
may sound. The description of an action depends at least 
partly on the point of view of the agent, how he saw what 
he was doing. So the description of an action can never
be removed completely from the attitudes of the agent.
Another way of understanding von Wright's words 
might be that we should be able to have the typical 
action required by a virtue described in non moral terms. 
Then we would have the question about what the proper 
relation was between moral and non moral qualities of an 
action. The answer is that moral qualities seem to be 
entailed by non-moral qualities in a way that is
described by the concept of supervenience. But I do not 
think this is what objectors to moral expertise have in 
mind when quoting von Wright ' s words.
The idea in von Wright's objection is that any 
virtue would require a typical action described in the
relevant way whenever the occasion arose for showing it, 
be it courage, justice, charity or whatever. Being good 
at chess means that you have certain skills you employ 
when playing that game. There is no sense to be made of 
saying about somebody that he is good at virtues or 
morality because there is no comparable skill which can
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be employed. This certainly has some intuitive 
plausibility.
There are two things to notice here. The first, as I 
have already mentioned, is that this view about the 
connection between the virtues and action is true of 
other characteristics as well, like intelligence. To 
ascribe intelligence to somebody he must regularly 
exhibit behaviour one can term intelligent, but there is 
no action typical of intelligence, 'to intelligence'. The 
second is that the virtues do make a difference to 
behaviour. There is the most important difference between 
indiscriminate throwing away of your belongings and 
benevolence, just as there is a most important difference 
between courage and foolhardiness or doing whatever you 
please without any recognition of risk. This difference 
is important because the benevolent man knows something 
the other does not. This is what someone who does not 
know benevolence must learn. It is knowledge of 
benevolence and other virtues and other good-making 
characteristics which constitute moral knowledge and make 
moral expertise possible.
The two objections described above to von Wright's 
view of the connection between the virtues and actions 
should now be clearer. They were basically that moral 
dilemmas made von Wright's view implausible and that 
moral virtues required some skills. The most important 
skill of somebody who is virtuous or has moral expertise 
is that he is able to discern the difference between 
right and wrong. I have earlier given as an attempt at a
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description of moral that it is the ability to do the
right thing for the right reason in the appropriate 
circumstances. So what the two objections come down to is 
that there is a skill accompanying the virtues and it is 
the skill of telling the difference between right and 
wrong and the willingness to do something about it.
It is important to remember that this skill does not 
exhaust our set of moral abilities. The love of the good 
must also be included and moral emotions or sentiments. 
But the skill is a part of it. This skill relies on
different non-moral abilities as we judge appropriate. 
Our judgement about the morality or immorality of 
surrogacy, for example, is certainly not independent of 
the information we have of what it is and what effects it 
is likely to have or known to have. Our judgement about 
the morality of surrogacy is certainly not independent of 
the knowledge that it might harm the children born in
surrogacy. If we did not know that it might, our
judgement would be more likely to be mistaken than if we 
were in possession of the knowledge.
But why does von Wright not think that there is any 
moral skill? One important reason, it seems to me, can be 
detected from his example. With the example from chess 
playing it is initially plausible to think that there is 
no comparable skill to the skill in playing chess when we 
think about morality. But it is important to realize that 
a game like chess is in important respects different from 
anything in morality. The game of chess is a closed whole 
in the sense that it is played with two sets of sixteen
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men on a surface divided into sixty four squares. There 
are a finite number of rules, even though the number of 
playing possibilities does not seem to be numerable. The 
skill in chess is the ability to play the men around the 
table with the aim of checkmating the king of the 
opponent. Morality does not have any limited area which 
can be described in a similar way to the chess-table and 
there is not a limited number of rules in morality and it 
is controversial, to say the least, whether we can 
discover the aim of morality comparable to the aim of 
playing chess. This lends credibility to von Wright's 
argument.
But it should not be inferred from these 
disanalogies between chess and morality that no moral 
expertise is possible. The only thing that can be 
inferred from these disanalogies is that moral expertise 
operates under different conditions from expertise in 
chess. Moral expertise consists in the ability to tell 
right from wrong and everything that goes with it. Some 
people seem to be better at it than others. If this 
ability is accompanied by good moral sensibility and wide 
knowledge of human nature we get moral experts.
The second argument I want to consider at this point 
goes something like this. Moral virtues are accessible to 
everybody. Hence there can be no moral expertise.
The moral dignity of simple people has been an 
important source of some doctrines in moral theory. Kant, 
for example, thought the conscience of ordinary people to 
be a shining example to moral theory and the
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sophistication usually accompanying it. But reverence for 
the conscience of ordinary people can be taken to 
extremes. You do not have to deny a profound respect for 
the moral feeling of ordinary people, even though you 
accept that this feeling can have its limits.
It is true that every rational, human being can be, 
and probably most often is, moral. There is no need to 
deny the possibility of amoralism, nor do I need to 
explain this possibility in this context. It is part of a 
good upbringing to learn how to deal with certain 
problems and how to respond to some central examples of 
evil or goodness. For some people who want to live a 
quiet, simple life based on some plain, homespun rules it 
is sufficient to adopt fairly simple rules and a fairly 
simple moral sensibility too. But for anyone who 
encounters a serious, moral dilemma these homespun truths 
will not suffice. For anyone who is actively thinking 
about radically new, moral problems these truths will not 
be enough. They may go a long way, and I suspect that 
they go a longer way with more people than many moral 
reformers believe. The point is that most, if not all, 
rational human beings must take serious moral decisions 
at some stage in their lives and they do not have any 
other reliable guide than their own thinking and their 
knowledge of right and wrong. .In this respect every 
rational human being is a moral expert. But it is also 
true that some people use more of their time in thinking 
about moral problems than others and the answers of some 
of them prove more reliable than of others. These people
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would be the moral experts. The relation between experts 
and laymen in this area is not like that between experts 
and laymen in civil engineering where one can assume that 
many, if not most, of the laymen know very little about 
the building of bridges or houses, for example. Most 
people know a good deal about taking moral decisions and 
are familiar with many of the views about at least some 
of the major moral problems. I guess most people have a 
view about the rights or the wrongs of abortion or 
infanticide, but much fewer would have a view about the 
rightness or wrongness of area bombing by the Allies in 
the Second World War. As Mary Warnock pointed out, family 
life is central to practically everybody's life and hence 
views on the major moral, decisions that everybody has to 
take in the course of his life concerning his family is 
familiar to almost everybody. So some moral problems will 
be familiar to most people and some will not. But the 
relation between moral experts and moral laymen is like 
that between physicists and people like Stephen Hawking 
who are at the forefront of his scientific discipline. 
They have solid knowledge of many of the facts and are in 
position to dispute many of the inferences and 
conclusions of the experts.
There is another difference as well. Moral expertise 
consists in wider knowledge than one can expect in the 
layman, as I have already indicated. The other 
difference, no less important, is that moral experts are 
better equipped to give reasons for their moral views 
than laymen. It is often the case that people hold moral
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views without having a clear idea about how to justify 
them and often give reasons that are not relevant or not 
potent in the context. But moral expertise is knowing how 
to justify your views and recognizing the logical 
connections between views on different problems and 
between different arguments. One obvious instance is to 
recognize the logical connection between views you have 
on experiments on embryos and your views on abortion. It 
is, at least prima facie, strange to be willing to accept 
abortion let us say until the foetus is 20 weeks old but 
allowing experiments on embryos only until the second 
week after the fertilization of the egg. So with moral 
expertise one should expect wider knowledge of what is 
right and wrong and one should also expect that the moral 
views can be backed with better arguments than with 
laymen.
The third and last argument against moral expertise 
I want to look at in this section is that morality is not 
teachable and therefore no moral expertise is possible. 
Usually the important reason given for this argument is 
that there are no moral academies, no schools where you 
can go and learn morality.
There are three points relevant here, at least. The 
first is that moral expertise covers many different 
areas. It can consist in the ability to clarify moral 
issues, the ability to live well, the ability to give 
moral advice and the ability to teach morality to name
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some of the abilities that make up moral expertise.2! it 
is not necessary for all these abilities to be present to 
be able to ascribe moral expertise. So it is possible to 
be a moral expert without being able to live well. It is 
also possible to be an expert at moral teaching without 
being able to clarify moral issues very well, although
that may seem unlikely. The second point is that there
are schools which explicitly aim at teaching their pupils 
how to live a moral life. The teachers in such schools 
attempt to impart to their pupils the knowledge that
there is a difference between a moral life and a 
successful one, that even though one was not successful 
one could live a good and moral life. This is what
religious schools try to do. The third point is that 
there are moral teachers. I guess parents are the most 
likely ones for children, but there are peers and there 
are moral teachers like Jesus Christ. This should not be 
surprising. If moral knowledge is widespread, then we 
would expect that most people could possibly be moral 
teachers, at least in some areas even if not in all. We 
are learning about morality in our everyday dealing with 
other people. This also explains why there is no need for 
schools for morality in the sense of schools where we can 
learn to live well.
21. B. Szabados: op. cit. 120 This is not an exhaustive list of the factors in moral expertise.
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It should come as no surprise that I think that 
moral philosophers are moral experts. I have mentioned 
this before in this chapter. This does not mean that 
moral philosophers are the only moral experts. There are 
others like social workers, priests, anyone who regularly 
has to deal with serious moral problems. Some moral 
philosophers try to avoid normative problems altogether 
and deal only with metaethical problems. They would, 
presumably, not want to be included in the set of moral 
experts. But those moral philosophers who spend much of 
their time thinking about normative problems, should be 
accepted as moral experts. This is not to say that they 
lead a blameless life or live well. They may or may not 
do that. But the moral expertise one can expect from them 
is not of that type. They are educated to argue about 
moral problems, formulate premisses and conclusions, put 
forward theories that attempt to explain what is to count 
as right and what as wrong. Therefore, their special 
contribution as moral experts is not in leading 
especially worthy lives or consoling those in distress. I 
guess many, maybe most, are not equipped to do that. But 
they are well equipped to articulate moral problems, 
clarify them, add perspectives to the arguments about 
them and to advise about them. They are fully acquainted 
with the major theories about morality and can identify 
the sort of argument being used in debates. This can
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often be important because of the conceptual issues 
involved.
One natural suggestion about the nature of the moral 
expertise of moral philosophers is that they are applying 
moral theories when dealing with moral problems. This is 
sometimes called the fruits-of-theory m o d e l .22 in putting 
it like this there are at least three things assumed: 1. 
that there is an identifiable body of moral theory; 2. 
that there is a set of problems identifiable as moral 
problems; 3. that moral theory can be applied to this set 
of problems. These are important assumptions which can be 
questioned.
Let us take the second assumption first. There are 
two questions about it. One, what are the criteria of 
moral problems. In general moral problems are those which 
arise in our relations with other sentient beings, the 
rightness and wrongness of actions affecting them. As 
should be clear from this, there is no sharp line to be 
drawn between moral problems and other problems. Two, we 
could also ask who identifies moral problems. Is it the 
philosopher? Is it the professional who must face and 
tackle the problem? Is there anybody in general who can 
decide authoritatively which problems are moral and which 
problems are not? Lurking behind this question is the 
suspicion of many professionals that philosophers think 
of themselves as final authorities in all questions 
moral. Are philosophers such authorities?
22. J.M. Brown: "On Applying Ethics" in Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Problems. J.D.G. Evans (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 81
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To answer the last question first, I think I have 
already indicated that philosophers are no such 
authorities and they would be making a serious mistake if 
they thought of themselves as such. More reasons for this 
opinion will follow.’ Is there anyone who has the 
authoritative say about what counts as a moral problem? I 
do not think there is. But is there anyone who should 
have such an authoritative say? That is a different 
question and a more difficult one. Let us look at the 
relation between a doctor and a patient. Let us assume 
that the doctor has to decide between two methods of 
treatment of cancer, either of which has some major 
drawbacks and also major advantages. This could obviously 
be a purely technical decision. But if one of the 
treatments led to the patient being in a relatively good 
condition for a limited time and then foreseeably dying 
but the other leading to the patient living for a much 
longer time but foreseeably being in much poorer 
condition and then dying, which one should the doctor 
choose? This seems to be a moral choice and it inevitably 
involves consideration of how the patient himself views 
and values the options, whether he finds it more 
desirable to live longer where the quality of life is 
less or to have a shorter life with better quality.
The doctor in question has to weigh the evidence, 
appreciate the patient's view and the arguments for and 
against. He might think that it is within his power to 
decide this or he might take the view that the patient 
should decide. He might also think that ultimately it is
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his conscience as a doctor that is decisive and no
further appeal possible. But as before, this is not the 
case. There is another possibility. It is that his 
decision is subject to the scrutiny of others, e.g. moral 
philosophers, who can constructively contribute to an 
informed and rational decision. Moral philosophers can
make a considerable contribution to such a decision by 
clarifying the issues, adding a perspective, thinking 
through the problem with the doctor. In any such
discussion the philosophical contribution is not the 
knowledge of facts, the doctor would supply the facts, 
but in seeing what the possible arguments and inferences 
are. Sometimes such assistance is not needed, maybe more 
often than not, but in many difficult and complex 
decisions the moral philosophers would be able to make a 
contribution. The decision resulting from such a process 
would be more informed and, hopefully, more rational 
than, if the doctor had made it on his own.
There is a strong feeling among many professionals 
that moral decisions are private in the sense that their 
own consciences are ultimately the arbiters and it is 
nobody's business to interfere with that. This has
historical roots in Protestantism, I would suggest, and 
does not survive close reflection. So neither 
professionals nor moral philosophers are ultimate 
authorities in moral matters, but their contribution to 
rational decisions in moral matters can be valuable. Nor 
is it the case that moral philosophers only take over 
moral problems as presented by the professional in
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question. In his discussion with the doctor one of the 
legitimate things a philosopher can and should do is to 
question the description and assumptions made when the 
problem is approached. There is no single group that can 
authoritatively identify moral problems and no group 
should have that authority. It would be unwise of 
philosophers to accept moral problems as presented by 
professionals without question because it "risks 
proceeding with unreflective acceptance of established 
categories and l a b e l s . " ^ 3
Now to the first assumption. The first assumption 
was that there was an identifiable body of moral theory. 
This is subject to some obvious counterarguments. I shall 
mention two. One, there is an identifiable body of moral 
theories disagreeing among themselves and this throws 
serious doubt on the assumption that there is an 
identifiable body of theories. Two, maybe moral theory is 
simply inappropriate for moral reflection. Maybe moral 
considerations do not lend themselves readily to 
theoretical considerations. I shall look at these 
arguments in turn.
It is true that there are some distinct types of 
theories of ethics: utilitarianism, Kantianism,
Aristotelianism and some others. These theories disagree 
among themselves about important issues such as the 
nature of goodness, whether rightness is based on 
goodness and various other things. But moral disagreement
23. O. O'Neill: "The Power of Example" in Constructionsof Reason. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 179
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need not be theoretical. We can have disagreement about 
morality among people uninfluenced by moral theory. 
Opinions differ about many moral issues in most, maybe 
all, societies. Should children care for their ageing 
parents until the end? is one example of an issue people 
disagree about nowadays. Should the rich. Westernized 
societies distribute some of their wealth to the poorer 
societies in the Third World? is another. But 
disagreement can also be at the level of theory. When 
thinking about morality, we start with views, concepts 
and practices from our own society. There is no other 
starting place. But these views can be changed and 
revised to form a set of considered moral views. This set 
we can attempt to make a consistent whole. We would 
expect that at this level disagreement would not be as 
frequent, vociferous and fundamental as at the level of 
ordinary opinion. This may or may not be true. In so far 
as realism, as here argued for, creates the expectation 
that there should not be fundamental disagreement among 
moral philosophers, it is disappointing to experience the 
present state of affairs in moral theory. But we should 
not infer that this precludes the possibility of moral 
expertise in any meaningful sense. Many other kinds of 
experts disagree among themselves and nobody infers that 
their expertise is any less for it. Also, this means that 
moral expertise might preside in moral philosophers as a 
whole rather than i n d i v i d u a l l y . ^4 There might also be
24. T.C. McConnell: "Objectivity and Moral Expertise" inCanadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIV, Nr. 2, 1984, p. 208
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realist explanations for why there is theoretical 
disagreement among moral p h i l o s o p h e r s . 5^
The second question or counterargument was that 
maybe theory was not appropriate for moral thinking. 
Maybe something in its nature is such that theory somehow 
distorts moral reality. Hence, the first assumption is 
wrong and the fruits of theory model misleading. B.
Williams argues against moral theory and says that this 
does not mean that prejudice is the only other
alternative. He thinks that the fact that a moral
concept belongs to a moral theory gives it no special 
status and must be justified in terms of our ordinary 
moral concepts. Two considerations might, though, give 
credibility to the role of theory. One is that some moral 
reflection is an attempt to understand our ethical life. 
This seems, plausibly, to lead to a theory. But Williams 
thinks that such a theory cannot be a moral theory. The 
second is that in giving reasons for our actions we are
trying to justify them in terms of our practices. But
what justifies our practices? This might call on a
theory. But the problem is, according to Williams, that 
this seems to be a claim for a foundation of such 
practices. Foundationalism of this sort, he argues, is 
rejected by most philosophers today.
It should be clear that the last point is no
problem. I have already made it a part of my account of
moral knowledge that foundationalism is implausible. The
25. D.O. Brink: op. cit. p.204-20926. B. Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.London, Fontana, 1985, ch.6, esp. p. 111-119
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first relies too heavily on the supposed contrast between 
moral theories and scientific theories. There is no 
reason to accept it. I argued earlier that Williams' 
theory of moral knowledge was seriously flawed and, when 
properly looked at, there was no fundamental difference 
between moral knowledge and scientific knowledge. The 
same seems to apply to moral theories and scientific 
theories. So, I think that there is no reason to believe 
that somehow moral life does not lend itself to 
theoretical reflection in the same way as other parts of 
reality. To this extent, the first assumption is not 
problematic.
The third assumption was that moral theory can be 
applied to moral problems. I have argued that there are 
moral problems, even though no group has a monopoly in 
identifying them. Also, I have argued that there are 
moral theories and these theories are trying to explain 
our moral experience and ethical life. It seems to follow 
from this that moral theories can be applied to moral 
problems. But we need to be careful about such 
applications. It depends on the theory being applied what 
solution we might get to a moral problem. The solutions 
of different theories can easily conflict. But this is no 
argument against the possibility of the application of 
moral theories. Applying a moral theory is not simply 
seeing whether a moral property falls under a particular 
concept.
I want to emphasize that even though moral theories 
can be applied to moral problems, this does not exhaust
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moral reflection or our moral life. For an action to be 
moral it has to be done for the right reason. A part of 
being able to act morally is to love the good, to have 
the right concern and the right attitude. Another part is 
to be able to think and reason rationally about the aims 
of our actions and about the means to those aims. To be 
able to do that we need knowledge and competence in 
understanding and applying moral concepts and 
considerations. I think it can be inferred from this that 
we cannot act morally accidentally or in ignorance of the 
nature or consequences of our actions. Moral expertise is 
based on the cognitive part of the ability to act 
morally. But this type of expertise could perfectly well 
play a part in forming the right attitude or concern, but 
this is a complex and long process for any human being 
and takes place for most of them from infancy until the 
late teens or the twenties.
4.5. Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that moral expertise 
is both possible and plausible. Moral expertise is 
related to wisdom and can be justified along the same 
lines, i. e. that reflective actions are more likely to 
be successful than unreflective ones. Moral expertise 
contributes to our understanding of morality and towards 
moral action. There are moral experts and they can enrich 
our moral lives and assist laymen to come to rational 
conclusions about moral issues be they social or
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personal. Normative philosophers can be moral experts. 
But they have no monopoly on moral authority or ultimate 
answers to moral questions and problems. There does not 
seem to be any reason to reject the possibility of moral 
theory.
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Paternalism
In this chapter I will examine how paternalism 
should be understood and justified. Paternalism is making 
somebody act in his own interest. It does not seem to be 
ruled out as immoral. I will take a look at the 
justification of paternalism, how prevention of evil and 
lack of rationality possibly justify paternalism. Any 
theory of paternalism must take into account that there 
are clear cases of paternalism that are justified and 
also others that are unjustified.
The discussion of paternalism falls into two parts. 
In thinking about paternalism two assumptions seem 
plausible. The first is that normal rational beings in 
full possession of their faculties are able to decide and 
control their own lives. What is more, we think that they 
ought to control their own lives. But, secondly, we also 
think that there are clear instances of justifiable 
interventions in such decisions for these persons' own 
good. In this chapter I will discuss the reasons for 
thinking that there are such instances.
5.1. What Is Paternalism?
To get a grip on the notion of paternalism it is 
probably best to start with some examples of it and try
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to see what they show. There is in this country, and many 
others, an obligation on motorists to wear seat belts 
while driving on pain of paying a fine, if caught while 
driving without one. This obligation has been justified 
on the grounds that it is in the drivers ' best interests 
to wear seat belts. This is an instance of paternalism.
Another example of paternalism is stopping a man who 
is about to go on to an unsafe bridge not knowing that it 
is dangerous. The reason one could give for stopping him 
is that it is in the man's own interest to know what he 
is doing. There is a ban in most countries on selling 
hard drugs to anyone who desires them. One reason given 
for such a ban could be that it can be in no one ' s 
interest to use such drugs on himself. Hence the ban is 
meant to protect his own good. When a parent stops his 
own child eating sweets on the grounds that it is bad for 
the child his action is paternalistic just like the ban 
on narcotics.
All these examples seem to be examples of 
paternalism. They have two things in common. First, all 
paternalistic actions, laws etc. seem to be interferences 
with the actions of somebody different from the 
interférer. Second, these interferences aim at the good 
of those interfered with.
Both these things need some explaining. One question 
about the first part is whether it is possible to be 
paternalistic toward yourself,- i.e. can you interfere 
with your own action for your own good. In general we can 
describe paternalistic actions like this: x makes y do A
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for his own good. The question raised by paternalism 
towards yourself, or self-paternalism, is whether it is 
possible that x and y are one and the same person. This 
means that it is not a necessary feature of a 
paternalistic action that it involves two agents. I think 
it could be reasonably believed that self-paternalism is 
an instance of paternalism proper. This may seem 
incoherent but I think it is not and that it is 
worthwhile to try to spell out the sense in it.^
It is claimed that the central example of this 
phenomenon is Odysseus and the Sirens. Odysseus wanted to 
hear the song of the Sirens but he was not confident in 
his ability to withstand the seductive lure of their song 
so he asked his crew to tie him to the ship's mast and 
refuse any request or order to set him free while their 
song lasted. The crew put wax in their ears to prevent 
them from hearing the song. The claim about this example 
is that Odysseus interfered with his future actions by 
his request to the crew, his own will prevented him from 
doing what he desired to do while the Sirens ' song 
lasted. This interference with his later desires is 
claimed to be self-paternalism.
It might be pointed out that on this description it 
is the crew's action that is paternalistic, not Odysseus' 
request. But this would be to miss the point. The idea is
1. Husak, D. N. ; "Paternalism and Autonomy", in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 10, nr. 1, 1980, p. 43-46 discusses such examples and argues that they amount to paternalism towards oneself, which is his term, or self-paternalism, a term suggested to me by John Skorupski.
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that the request is paternalistic because it limits 
Odysseus' liberty during the Sirens' song. Other examples 
of self-paternalism can be when one fails to apply for a 
credit card because of the fear that one will abuse it 
when obtained. Or when one makes an irrevocable promise 
of giving away one's future inheritance. Both these would 
count as self-paternalism.
There is one legitimate question which should be 
asked about these cases. What if you change your mind 
about your promise, contract or commitment when it is 
about to be fulfilled? This is not a problem for ordinary 
contracts and promises because there is another party who 
can, and in most cases will, hold you to your contract 
and promise. If it could be argued that such holding to 
one's promises was in one's own interest, this might 
count as paternalism proper. But what about commitments 
like not applying for a credit card or giving away your 
inheritance? If you change your mind about them, your 
earlier decision is revoked. You may have reasons for 
your change of mind like thinking that you are now a 
better judge of your financial position than you were 
earlier or that giving away your inheritance is silly. 
You may be right about this or wrong. But the point is 
that this is a perfectly normal thing to do and there is 
no stopping you. Now, if the original decision is so 
easily revocable, then there does not seem to be anything 
to hold you to your earlier decision. And what is more 
there does not seem to be any sense to be made of
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usurping one's own choice as must be the case, if there 
is any sense in self-paternalism.
But I think we should look at the example of 
Odysseus again. The crew refuse his order to release him 
at his request. It is true to say that Odysseus request 
is self-paternalistic and the crew's refusal is 
paternalistic. But why do we say it is paternalistic? It 
is paternalistic because Odysseus' new choice is denied 
and the crew discount his new belief about what is for 
his own good. Odysseus original request is self- 
paternalistic for essentially the same reason. It 
discounts his new decision and request because Odysseus 
accepts the belief that his judgement will be so affected 
by the Sirens ' song that his desires and choices during 
that time will be entirely unreasonable or irrational. 
His fatal desire to swim to the Sirens which the song 
produces is irrational. What Odysseus is doing is to 
exclude the possibility that he will act on his own 
desires while the effects of the song last. His request 
to the crew is just instrumental in preventing him in 
acting on his irrational desires.
It is perfectly possible to attempt to prevent 
yourself from acting on your future desires without 
having anyone else ensuring that your will is enacted. If 
you have a key to a Pandora ' s Box and you want to make 
sure that in the future you will never be tempted to open 
it, then you would have the key destroyed. It is also 
possible to imagine cases where one might have a drug 
which had the effect of, let us say, your desire for
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alcohol never arising. Should we inject ourselves with 
this drug? If we do, this is a case of self-paternalism. 
If one asks for sterilization, then one is making sure 
that in future one can never beget children. One may have 
perfectly good reasons for this, like poverty. These 
cases have in common that the decisions are not 
revocable. So even though it is true that some cases of 
self-paternalism are such that the decisions to be self- 
paternalistic are rather easily revocable, this is not 
true in all such cases. So this fact cannot be counted 
against the possibility of self-paternalism. Self- 
paternalistic decisions are meant to be binding on 
oneself and some are revocable and some are not. So self- 
paternalistic decisions really do usurp one's future 
choice.
There is another feature of paternalistic actions 
and self-paternalistic ones. It is that it seems to be a 
necessary feature of any paternalistic act that it is 
believed to be superior to the choice which is denied. In 
most cases, it seems, that the superiority is based on 
better knowledge and better judgement. One might avoid 
drinking alcohol because one believed that the influence 
of it on one's judgement would make the judgement worse. 
Odysseus knows that under the influence of the Sirens' 
song he will become irrational. One believes that getting 
hold of a credit card will make the temptation to buy 
many things one cannot afford irresistible. The 
irrationality of the judgement and the irresistibility of 
the temptation are marks of a flawed judgement. This
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indicates that presumed superior judgement and presumed 
superior knowledge is an assumption of any paternalistic 
action. This should be carefully distinguished from 
disrespect and indignity. It seems to be possible to be 
paternalistic without showing any disrespect to or demean 
the one who is the object of such an action. It is not 
demeaning to oneself to avoid drinking alcohol, but it is 
based on the knowledge that my judgement under its 
influence will be inferior to my judgement when sober. In 
the same way the crew of Odysseus' ship is not in any way 
showing him disrespect when not obeying his orders while 
the Sirens sing. They are doing what they know is in his 
interest and what he really wants.^
It is sometimes argued that paternalism is nowadays 
a pejorative term and always used as a criticism of 
whatever it is applied to. Now if this is taken to mean 
that paternalism is always or necessarily unjustified, 
this is false. This probably comes with the idea that 
paternalism is somehow necessarily demeaning for the one 
who suffers it. I do not doubt that this is a widespread 
idea. I sometimes get the feeling that it is treated as a 
self-evident truth that every human being is the best 
judge about anything concerning his own interest and
2. D. N. Husak uses his notion of "paternalism towards oneself" to argue that the relation of superiority- inferiority is not a necessary feature of paternalism and he takes this to indicate that paternalism is not opposed to autonomy. I think he is right about the relation between autonomy and paternalism and self-paternalism, but, as should be clear from what I have said, I think he is wrong about superiority and paternalism. It seems to me that he confuses superiority with disrespect and indignity.
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hence that, somehow, paternalism is an insult to his
dignity and always unjustified. Hence, it might be
claimed it is always applied as a term of criticism and a 
pejorative term. But this is false. Some of the examples 
I cited at the beginning seem to me to be 
uncontroversially justified, especially when a parent 
prevents his child from eating sweets. If we say that it 
is paternalistic when a child is refused a sweet, it 
seems to me that we are not criticizing it. We are only 
expressing the fact that the parent is denying his 
child's choice and preventing it from doing something 
which ultimately is not in its own interest. The same 
applies to the action of the crew of Odysseus' ship. 
There simply is no sense in which it is disrespectful or 
demeaning not to set Odysseus free or denying a child a 
sweet. Hence it seems to be false to say that it is a 
part of the meaning of the term 'paternalism' that it is 
pejorative.
There can be one-party and two-party cases of
paternalism.3 This should not be confused with
paternalism towards oneself discussed above. The defining 
characteristic of one party case is that the action
3. Feinberg, J. : The Moral Limits of The Criminal LawVolume 3: Harm to Self. New York, Oxford UniversityPress, 1986, p. 9-10. See also G. Dworkin: "Paternalism", in Laslett, P. and Fishkin, J. (eds.): Philosophy.Politics and Society. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979, p. 81-82 where he distinguishes between 'pure' and ' impure'cases of paternalism. Feinberg wants to use 'direct' and'indirect' paternalism. This distinction does not exactly coincide with the distinction between one-party and two- party cases of paternalism, even though in practice most,maybe all, two-party cases will be treated as indirectpaternalism and one-party cases as direct paternalism. This refinement does not matter for my argument.
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prevented, interfered with or prohibited only concerns 
yourself. A ban on suicides, for example, or self-
mutilation or the use of drugs is a one-party case. The
action banned is only performed by you on yourself. A 
two-party case occurs when the action interfered with, 
prevented or banned is requested, wanted or asked by 
another party. Even though the ban is for the good of the 
requester it does not ban the request but the action of 
the one who carries out the request. This is what happens 
when the sale of drugs is banned or when it is banned to 
lend money at, let us say, the rate of 50% p.a. Such a
ban is for the good of the drug user or the borrower but
limits the liberty of the drug seller and the money 
lender. Two-party cases add complications to the 
discussion of paternalism, but they should not influence 
the case for or against paternalism. I will have one- 
party cases in mind when discussing it, unless I say 
otherwise.
Earlier when I described the first examples of 
paternalism I said they seemed to have two things in 
common. One was that they seemed to show paternalism to 
need one agent to interfere or prevent another agent's 
action. I argued that this is not a necessary feature of 
paternalism. The second thing was that this interference 
was done for the good of the agent himself, it was in his 
own interest. We need to examine the notion of good, or 
interest briefly at this point.
The notion of interest or good in this context can 
be divided into two. On the one hand interest includes
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benefits. The provision of health care is an instance of 
benefit provided by the state in Western states nowadays: 
it is meant to enable the members of a society to enjoy 
the benefit of health and lead a life not marred by too 
much pain. On the other hand when referring to the 
interests of a person we can be talking about harms and 
the question would be how we should prevent a harm from 
befalling him. This prevention would be intended to 
protect his good. This seems to be the more frequent case 
occurring in discussions of paternalism. But harms can be 
of two kinds. First, harms can be a setback to a person's 
interest wrongfully inflicted. This basically is harm not 
consented to. If I decide to take part in an experiment 
with drugs, for example, am informed about the possible 
consequences of taking it and the danger I am putting 
myself in, then I consent to taking the drug by 
indicating in some conventionally accepted way that I 
will take part. If something goes wrong and I am injured, 
then I am not harmed in the sense of a setback to 
interests unconsented to. But I am harmed in a second 
sense. Harm in this second sense is injury. In this sense 
you are harmed independently of whether you consented to 
the action that harms you. Let us say that you take up 
smoking without realizing how harmful it can be. Before 
you become addicted somebody points out to you the dire 
consequences that can accrue to you if you smoke 
regularly for a long time. Until this was pointed out to 
you, smoking will have harmed you in both the senses 
described. But if you decide to go on with smoking after
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you have been informed, then you can only be harmed in 
the second sense. Both these senses of harm can be at 
work in arguments about paternalism.
It is important to remember that paternalism does 
not apply to all interferences with somebody's action. It 
only applies to those interferences aimed at the good of 
the person interfered with. The denial of his choice, 
which is an inevitable part of paternalism, is based on 
what his interférer takes to be better knowledge of the 
interferee's good. The good can either be some benefit or 
a prevention of harm. Obviously these assumptions can be 
mistaken and what was believed to be for the good 
actually turns out to be bad or even a disaster. If the 
state decides, as it did in the U. S. in the twenties, to 
prohibit the sale of alcohol to its inhabitants, this can 
be done on the ground that it is in the best interest of 
the inhabitants not to consume alcohol at all, that they 
ought to be teetotallers. The banning of the sale would 
be believed to be the best way of achieving total 
abstinence from alcohol by the population. This is a two 
party-case of paternalism. But as it turned out in the U. 
S., the prohibition was a disaster and apparently did not 
have the effects desired. This should not really have 
surprised anyone, because such a ban cannot have been 
based on any thorough understanding of human nature nor 
on deep understanding of the type of society in which it 
was enforced. Similar experiences in other countries did 
produce similar results, even though they were not as 
spectacular failures as in America, The explanation of
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this disaster seems to me to be not the fact that the 
prohibition law was paternalistic but that it was based 
on poor knowledge and understanding. So there is a 
difference between an action or law being paternalistic 
and this action achieving its professed aim. An action 
can be paternalistic, even though it does not actually 
promote ny good, if my good was intended.
It is important to remember that the operative 
notion of harm in this context is injury. The reason for 
this is that the good of agents is objective as I have 
argued for before. This means that it is perfectly 
possible to be harmed without realizing it. The 
consequence of this is that wrongful harm in the sense of 
harm unconsented to plays a less important role. What is 
important is to find out what is the nature of the values 
involved and what actions can possibly be harmful.
The good of persons in question as I conceive of it 
is welfare in a very general sense. This really amounts 
to happiness, if happiness is not understood as a 
blissful state of mind but as goodness of life consequent 
upon our decisions and conduct in the course of our 
lives. This good is not limited to pleasure and the 
absence of pain but it includes health and wealth, for 
instance, and self-determination because self- 
determination is a value of which we can have more or 
less. One of the values aimed at in a paternalistic 
intervention can be self-determination incoherent though 
this may sound.
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There is a distinction drawn between hard and soft 
paternalism.4 To throw light on this distinction it is 
well to remember one of the examples above of a 
paternalistic action. The example was of preventing 
someone from going on to an unsafe bridge. What was left 
unsaid in that example was what we would do, if the 
person going out on to the bridge insisted on going after 
having been informed of the danger. This illustrates the 
difference between soft and hard paternalism. Soft 
paternalism holds that it is justifiable to prevent 
someone from performing an action, possibly harmful to 
himself, so long as it is reasonably clear that the 
agent's action is not fully voluntary. If he does not 
know that the bridge is dangerous, it is fully justified 
to stop him and inform him. His action cannot be fully 
voluntary in so far as he is not fully informed about 
what he is doing. It is reasonable to suppose that he 
does not want to put his life in danger by going out on 
to an unsafe bridge but in all probability he wants to 
cross the bridge. If this is true, his action is not 
voluntary.
But let us suppose that the man listens to what we 
have to say, understands it and yet he insists on going 
out on to the bridge. Soft paternalism holds that it is 
only justified to prevent his action in so far as he is 
not fully informed and his action not fully voluntary. So 
a soft paternalist would believe himself in the right in 
stopping the man from going on to the bridge. But he
4. Feinberg, J. : op. cit. pp. 12-16
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would refuse to hold him back after imparting his 
information and making sure that the agent had understood 
what was being said. He would believe that it was 
nobody's business to interfere with a voluntary action. A 
hard paternalist, on the other hand, would not accept 
this as a constraint on his interference. He would hold 
that he was fully justified in preventing someone from 
doing something that was harmful to himself. The hard 
paternalist would not believe that this applied to any 
action harmful to the agent himself, but only those 
actions that would result in more injury and damage than 
the prevention itself. In assessing the consequences of 
the intervention the hard paternalist would have to take 
into account the pain and discomfort caused to the agent 
interfered with. This is really just a part of saying 
that the intervention should be in the interest of the 
agent interfered with.
There is a connection between soft paternalism and 
the notion of harm as described above which deserves to 
be pointed out. The soft paternalist attempts to prevent 
harm in the sense of setback to interests unconsented to,
i. e. wrongful harm. But he does not concern himself with 
self-inflicted damage or injury which is fully voluntary. 
That is out of bounds, so to speak. Soft paternalism 
shirks interfering with voluntary actions of rational 
beings. This avoidance shows it for what it is: it is
anti-paternalism. This should not be a surprise to anyone 
because it is admitted by those advocating soft- 
paternalism and take it to be one of the virtues of soft
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paternalism.^ It is obvious that soft paternalism covers 
some very important considerations concerning paternalism 
but when it comes to the crunch, it shies away from 
preventing damage to an adult for his own good against 
his wishes. But this is where we enter the area of 
paternalism proper. Successful soft paternalism draws a 
boundary around the personal sphere arguing that no 
invasion into that area is justified. Hard paternalism or 
paternalism proper holds that such invasions or 
interferences for the person's own good are sometimes 
justified.
It seems to me that the most powerful reason for 
accepting soft paternalism, or more accurately anti­
paternalism, rather than paternalism proper is the belief 
that all paternalistic interferences are coercive. Many 
infer from this that paternalism is morally repellent 
though this is unwarranted unless you add more 
assumptions. But are all paternalistic interventions 
coercive? There is reason to believe that they are not. 
Let us consider an example.
"Mr. N, a member of a religious sect that does 
not believe in blood transfusion, is involved in a 
serious automobile accident and loses a large amount 
of blood. On arriving at the hospital, he is still 
conscious and informs the doctor of his views on 
blood transfusion. Immediately thereafter he faints 
from loss of blood. The doctor believes that if Mr.
5. Feinberg, J . : op. cit. p. p. 15
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N is not given a transfusion he will die. Thereupon, 
while Mr. N is still unconscious, the doctor 
arranges for and carries out the blood
transfusion."^
It is quite clear from this example that the action 
of the doctor is paternalistic and yet at the same time 
it is not coercive in any obvious sense. There is no 
attempt to control the behaviour of the patient or to 
interfere with his liberty. Another example showing the 
same characteristics is of a mother on her deathbed 
asking for her son. The doctor knows that the son has 
just been killed attempting to escape from prison. But he 
tells the mother that he is doing well. The doctor
certainly lied to the mother but he did not coerce her in 
any way or control her behaviour but his action was
paternalistic towards her.
This does not show that no paternalistic action 
involves coercion. But it shows that some do not. So 
coercion is not a necessary feature of paternalism and at 
least in that respect it need not be morally repellent. 
When thinking about paternalism, especially legal 
paternalism, it is plausible to assume that coercion is a 
necessary feature of paternalism. Enforcing paternalistic 
laws, like banning riding a motorcycle without a
protective helmet, seems necessarily to involve coercion.
6. Gert, B. and Culver M. "Paternalistic Behavior" in Cohen, M., Nagel, T. and Scanlon T.: Medicine and Moral Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981,p.202
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Many cases of paternalism that soft paternalism endorses, 
like stopping somebody crossing an unsafe bridge, seem to 
involve coercion. But it is possible to have paternalism 
without this feature so it cannot be a necessary part of 
it. So when objecting to coercion you need not 
necessarily be objecting to paternalism.
For a paternalistic act to occur it must be possible 
to identify one's good independently of the good of 
others. If this is not possible, paternalism becomes 
impossible. In a society like any Western society, and 
Western is meant to include Japan and Australia as well 
as Western Europe and U.S.A., in the last two or three 
decades, it has been possible to identify somebody's 
interest or good independently of the interest of others. 
In these societies paternalism has been possible. But it 
is easy to imagine a society where everyone's interests 
become so intertwined that it is hardly possible to 
separate them. In a society at war, for example, where 
the contribution of everybody is valuable and non­
contribution might be harmful to the effort of the whole 
society, then the identification of individual interests 
as independent of the interests of others becomes 
difficult. The problem is that anything affecting one's 
own interests affects those of others as well. This also 
seems to apply to small, cohesive societies living in 
difficult physical surroundings like Inuit societies. In 
such societies no action seems to be entirely for my own 
good because all my actions affect or may affect the good 
of others. So it seems that no purely paternalistic
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action is possible in such a society. This does not mean 
that somebody else cannot decide something for me 
irrespective of my own wishes but he cannot do it for my 
own good because my own good is so closely connected with 
the good of others. These considerations only show how 
paternalism is relative to normal conditions in society.
I have argued for at least three necessary 
conditions that any action must fulfill to be 
paternalistic. 1. When A is paternalistic towards B, he 
decides what to do for B's good which B would otherwise 
not have done. In the case.of the doctor above he decides 
what to do for B's good contradicting B's expressed wish. 
This is a case of noncoercive paternalism, as I argued, 
but it is paternalism and it would count as manipulation.
2. A intends his decision to affect, directly or 
indirectly, B’s good. It is a fact that some, maybe many, 
paternalistic actions are not successful. This does not 
change the fact that they are paternalistic. 3. A is 
willing to discount B's belief that A is not promoting 
his good. This is what is meant by accepting superiority 
as a feature of paternalism.^
These three conditions are necessary for any action 
to be described as paternalistic. I do not want to claim
7. Archard, D. argues for a tripartite definition of paternalism in his "Paternalism Defined", Analysis. Vol. 50, No. 1, January 1990, p. 36-42 similar to what I have offered. But it is a necessary part of his definition that B's choice is denied and his opportunities diminished. As will become clear, this cannot be a necessary feature of a paternalistic interference. Banning duelling, for instance, actually increases the opportunities of those who are subject to the ban. I offer my conditions as necessary but not as a full flown definition in view of the discussion above.
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that they are sufficient and, hence, a full blown
definition. But it deserves to be pointed out that any
action described as paternalistic has to be caused by 
those beliefs described in the three conditions mentioned 
above to be properly paternalistic.
5.2. The Justification of Paternalism
In the first part of this chapter I have argued for 
a particular set of necessary conditions for paternalism. 
This is meant to cover all cases of paternalism. These 
cases can either be justified or unjustified depending on 
the case being discussed. There do seem to be
unproblematic cases of both kinds. In this part of the 
chapter I want to discuss how paternalism can be
justified and what the distinguishing line between
justified and unjustified instances of paternalism is.
There is a a very old ban on duelling in this and 
other European countries at least. Such a ban seems to be 
an instance of a paternalistic law because it can be 
justified by the good of those who participate in 
duelling. This law may have had and may have now other 
justifications than the interests of the duellers
themselves and hence have a mixed justification. But that 
need not concern us here. Let us assume four things. 
First, that everyone in a particular society where
duelling is being banned prefers "most of all not to be
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confronted with dueling situations". Second, everyone 
prefers to preserve his honour in the conventional way if 
and when a duelling occasion arises. Third, a legal ban 
on duelling would prevent any such occasion to rise. 
Fourth, all the persons concerned have no other relevant 
desires concerning the merits of duelling regulations. 
From these assumptions, it is claimed, it follows that "a 
legal ban against dueling would be nonpaternalistic, 
since nobody's freedom is being restricted against his 
will. "  ^ If this is correct, then conditions like these 
change a law from a paternalistic one into an 
unpaternalistic one.
What happens here? First, it is clear that everyone 
wants the ban and, second, the ban successfully achieves 
its aim of preventing any duelling occasion from arising. 
Given these assumptions the question of paternalism does 
not arise, except for one thing. It is the second 
assumption which might possibly raise the question of 
paternalism. It is that everyone would defend fiis honour 
in the traditional way if the occasion arose. But this 
desire does not have the same priority as the desire to 
be rid of the practice of duelling. So even though these 
desires seem to be contradictory they are not because the 
second has priority over the first one if they come into 
conflict. If we look at the definition of paternalism, a 
law banning duelling given these assumptions, cannot, it 
seems, be paternalistic. Such law does not supplant
8. Arneson, R. J. : "Mill versus Paternalism", in Ethics. Vol. 90, Nr. 4, 1980, p. 4719. Arneson, R. J.: op. cit. p. 471
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anybody's choice, it does not discount anybody's belief 
about his own good, but it does affect the good of the 
members of this imagined society. But that has no 
consequence whatsoever for the paternalistic nature of 
such laws, be they of such a nature. I think the reason 
given for most, if not all, laws is that they promote the 
general interest. In this respect the ban on duelling is 
no different from any other law.
It was claimed above that the ban on duelling was 
nonpaternalistic because "nobody's freedom is being
restricted against his will. " Or to be more accurate
against his most important desires because it can be 
argued that the ban could be against one of his less 
important desires. But the important thing to notice
about this example is that the assumptions are extremely 
strong. As soon as we move to more plausible assumptions, 
such as that most people might prefer a ban on duelling, 
the problem of paternalism returns. What about those who 
would not? And what if the opinions of some of those who 
prefer the ban were based on irrational grounds? Should 
we accept such preferences? Does the irrationality affect 
the paternalism-nonpaternalism issue? These questions are 
a hint of some of the problems that would have to be
faced in a thorough discussion of these issues. These 
assumptions about the desires of the agents involved can 
be used as justifications of paternalism and in that way 
the justification can influence whether an act is 
paternalistic or not.
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There is one justification open to someone who 
wanted to accept paternalism about duelling given the 
assumption that most people preferred to avoid the danger 
of the practice. It is true that the ban on duelling 
limits liberty in the society in which the ban holds but 
such a ban can also increase opportunity for these same 
members. Duelling could be a threat encouraging men to 
use their time and energy to keep up their skills and 
strength in fighting with a sword or pistol or whatever 
weapon the tradition endorses. Even though one accepted a 
high regard for valour and physical strength, one could 
understand and desire other valuable things. These other 
things might include love of family, wealth and health. 
The social practice of duelling as a way to settle 
quarrels or differences of opinion or conflicting claims 
to the same goods, could be a drain on one's time and 
energy. In a society where duelling is practised you must 
develop your skills or endanger your life and property, 
unless you are prepared to give in to many or most 
demands. So when this practice is banned you have many 
more opportunities to pursue the other things you find 
valuable. So this limit on your liberty can easily 
increase your opportunities. This would justify 
paternalism, assuming that most people want to avoid 
duelling.
This justification cannot be generalized to any 
practice in a society which someone might find dangerous 
or undesirable or even to practices many or most might 
find dangerous or undesirable. But it can certainly be
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applied to some other things. The same considerations can 
apply to wearing protective motorcycle helmets but they 
cannot be applied to religious worship, it seems. Wearing 
a protective helmet can save your life and saving life 
certainly creates more opportunities than dying which 
closes all opportunities. In banning a particular 
religion there is no obvious sense in which this ban can 
open up opportunities for those suffering the ban.
The basic assumption in discussing paternalism and 
its justification is that a conflict can arise between 
one's values. As I hope is clear from the discussion 
above about paternalistic acts their object is to promote 
the good of the person concerned. Paternalism aims at the 
person's happiness or well-being. If well-being were the 
only value or the highest value of all in a person's 
good, this would be unproblematic. But there are other 
values which have the same claim on our attention and 
effort. One of them is self-determination. In some 
matters at least we find it desirable that the person 
himself decides what he should do rather than someone 
else. It is fairly clear that some such decisions have 
worse consequences than decisions by another person 
better able to judge the situation. When such situations 
arise the values of self-determination and well-being 
conflict. When there is a conflict there is often also a 
need to decide which value is more important. It is not 
always possible to find a satisfactory way to settle such 
conflicts.
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It is not only the fact that these two values can 
conflict which makes a justification of paternalistic 
actions possible. If we have reason to believe that the 
agent himself can assess his whole situation and come to 
a conclusion about whether he ought to seek the advice or 
help of somebody else then there is no reason to 
interfere with his action and the question of paternalism 
does not arise. So in addition to a conflict of values 
there must be reason to believe about an agent that his 
decision in some particular action of his is encumbered^^ 
for the possibility of justifying paternalism to come 
about. In saying that a decision is encumbered we are 
saying that there is reason to believe that the agent 
does not consider his interest as well as he would have 
done if his decision had been unencumbered.
It is important to distinguish between two things in 
this context to avoid confusion. One is privacy, the
personal sphere or actions concerning oneself, the other 
is one's best judgement of one's own interest or one's 
own good. It is perfectly possible to accept that the
personal sphere ought to be up to each individual himself 
but at the same time deny that everyone is the best judge 
of his own interest under all circumstances. It is a 
plausible consequence of this denial that it ought not to 
be the case that everyone is the ultimate authority on
his own interest. So when there is reason to believe that
a decision is encumbered and the agent's judgement not as
10. This is the word J. D. Hodson uses in his article "The Principle of Paternalism" in American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 14, Nr. 1, January 1977, p. 65
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good as it might be, this does not necessarily imply 
anything about the personal sphere. It might be better 
all things considered to leave the decision to the agent. 
But it is a possible justification of a paternalistic 
action.
When we say that a decision is encumbered this means 
that we are comparing two courses of action and one of 
them is better than the other and the agent has chosen 
the worse one. In such a situation the question can be 
about the benefit to the agent. Problems about the 
benefit to the agent are sometimes grouped under the 
label of perfectionism^^ rather than paternalism and the 
latter limited to preventing the harm that might befall 
the agent if he pursued the course of action he decides 
on himself. This distinction is not important for my 
discussion. The justification of paternalistic actions 
becomes possible when there is reason to believe that the 
decision was encumbered and the action might be harmful 
to the agent.
The encumbrances can be of different kinds. They 
could be irrationality, recklessness, negligence, 
incapacity, youth, senility, emotional stress, difficult, 
coercive circumstances and so on. If we had reason to 
believe that any of these encumbrances were operative on 
the judgement of the agent we could be justified in 
preventing him from doing what is harmful to him. But to
11. Joel Feinberg talks about legal perfectionism when discussing this beneficial function of the law in The Moral Limits of The Criminal Law Volume 4 : HarmlessWrongdoing. New York, Oxford University Press, 1990, ch. 33, pp. 277-317
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be justified it is necessary to compare the harm that 
follows the proposed or decided course of action and the 
cost that might accompany the interference. One important 
part of assessing the possible harm of the interference 
is the resentment the agent is likely to feel because of 
the interference. But there are others like the effect on 
the agent's self-esteem, the probability of the 
interference achieving the goal it set out to achieve. 
These separate things influence the justification of the 
paternalistic act. The nature of the encumbrances will, 
for example, influence the evaluation of the 
paternalistic act achieving its aim. If we are dealing 
with a mentally retarded person, it is less likely that a 
paternalistic interference will cause severe resentment 
and more likely that it will achieve its aim, especially 
because the responses of the mentally retarded are often 
easier to predict than the responses of fully mature 
adults.
When contemplating a paternalistic interference 
there seem to be three possible factors on which the 
justification depends: 1) the comparative value of the
intervention and the action prevented; 2) the encumbrance 
decreasing the rationality; 3) the consent of the agent. 
If the aim of the paternalistic intervention is of 
relatively low value, let us say securing good manners, 
then the value of the intervention is in all probability 
outweighed by the value of having the agent himself 
deciding on the course of action. There are different 
kinds of encumbrances and they affect the agent and his
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judgement in various ways. There are obvious differences, 
for example, between somebody who is mentally ill and 
another agent who is reckless. The reckless agent does 
not care about the consequences of his action. In so far 
as those consequences hurt others we do not think of an 
intervention as paternalistic, but in so far as they hurt 
the agent himself an intervention preventing such harm 
would be paternalistic. Someone who is mentally ill very 
often cannot decide rationally what is in his interest 
and what to do in a particular situation. Often he cannot 
appreciate what he is actually doing nor the consequences 
of his action. This does not necessarily mean that it is 
simpler to intervene in his behaviour.
The third factor is the possibility of consent. In 
many, perhaps most, cases of paternalistic intervention 
there is no possibility of consent prior to the 
intervention. So the possibility and probability of 
subsequent consent becomes crucial to the justification 
of a paternalistic act. Odysseus gave prior consent to 
his being tied to the mast. So his crew were justified in 
keeping him stuck there. If they had untied him, then 
that would have been an unjustified paternalistic act. It 
would have been unjustified and paternalistic because it 
would have discounted Odysseus ' voluntary and rational 
decision, gone against his explicit consent and harmed 
his interest. But prior consent to a paternalistic action 
is the exception from the rule which is that prior or
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contemporary consent is virtually impossible. So 
subsequent consent often seems the only possibility.^^
There are two things that need to be discussed about 
consent in the context of paternalism. The first is what 
sense to make of consent in general and subsequent 
consent in particular. Two, I will outline an argument 
why consent has no place in a philosophical theory of 
paternalism like the one I have argued for.
Consent can be either actual or possible and it can 
be prior or subsequent. This means that there are four 
categories to consider. The first is actual prior
consent. The second is possible prior consent. The third 
is actual subsequent consent. The fourth is possible
subsequent consent.
It is certainly open to us to use any of these four 
notions of consent as a constraint on the justifiability 
of paternalism. The strongest notion is actual prior
consent. This is what happened in the example of 
Odysseus. Prior to the interference of the crew he 
consented to their action. I take it that this is 
extremely rare and if it were a necessary condition of a 
justifiable paternalistic intervention, then they would 
be practically ruled out. But the problem with actual
12. This account of the role of consent is contradicted in "Justifying Paternalism" by Gert, B. and Culver, C. M. in Ethics, vol. 89, 1979, p. 200 they say: "Thedefinition also makes clear that one feature used injustifying a violation of a moral rule is not open to Awhen acting paternalistically, namely, the consent of S toward whom A is violating the rule. For if A has S's consent, A's behavior is no longer paternalistic." Theexample of Odysseus shows how it is possible to have consent and yet be paternalistic.
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prior consent is that it does not really make sense to 
require it. If the prior consent had not been expressed 
because of some irrelevant difficulties, then this would 
be crucial about the justification of a paternalistic 
action. Now we might introduce a requirement on all these 
categories that they required relevantly full 
information. So if an actual prior consent was not 
forthcoming for some irrelevant reason we would have to 
assess whether it would have been forthcoming in the 
absence of this irrelevant reason. This has the effect of 
weakening the constraints in all these categories on 
paternalistic actions.
The notion of subsequent consent is not very clear. 
Is there, for example, a time limit to it? Can a 
meaningful consent be given to any act after the event? 
Can you consent to a paternalistic intervention long 
after the event? The basic problem with the notion of 
subsequent consent is what difference it makes to the 
original action. It is difficult to see that it makes any 
difference at all. If a man rapes a woman, for example, 
and a week later the woman comes to the conclusion that 
she ought to have consented to it, this does not in any 
way change the nature of the original act. And in this 
context it seems awkward, to say the least, to speak 
about subsequent consent; even paradoxical. The reason is 
that the notion of consent does not seem to be related in 
the same way to all acts. Some acts are evil because 
they are not consented to. The example of rape is typical 
in this respect. Sexual intercourse consented to is just
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sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse unconsented to is 
rape. That is why subsequent consent is so inappropriate 
for such an action. It simply has no place in that 
context. But if it is a question of an act that secured 
benefits or prevented harms consent has no effect on the 
nature of the action and the action does not change in 
nature depending on the consent.
The approach of the soft paternalist to the question 
of consent is that prior voluntary consent is the only 
acceptable possibility. But lacking that the limit to 
paternalistic actions would be provided by the 
possibility of the removal of the encumbrances on 
voluntary consent. If somebody intended to kill himself, 
for example, we would be justified in stopping him to 
ensure that he understood what he was doing and if he did 
not, to make him wait until he calmed down and regained 
his senses and his balanced judgement. But if he still 
wanted to do away with himself after reflecting calmly on 
his proposed course of action, then the soft paternalist 
would not feel justified in stopping him. The reason is 
that if the agent decides after calm reflection to go on 
with his action, then paternalistic intervention is not 
admissible according to the soft-paternalist. He rejects 
the notion of subsequent consent and argues that all 
consent must be voluntary actual consent. So subsequent 
consent carries no weight for the soft paternalist and is 
a counterfeit notion of consent as Feinberg argues.
13. Feinberg, J . : The Moral Limits of The Criminal LawVolume 3; Harm to Self, New York, Oxford University
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This does not deter some who are willing to consider 
themselves soft-paternalists from using the notion
of subsequent c o n s e n t . This notion is then supposed to 
apply to all cases of prima facie justifiable 
paternalism. If the notion of subsequent consent has a 
role to play, the possibilities for paternalism increase.
I said above that there were two things that needed 
discussion in connection with consent. I have finished 
the first which is to see what sense one can make of the 
notion of consent in this context. Now I turn to the 
second part to find out if the notion has any part to 
play in a philosophical theory of paternalism.
The first thing to notice about these considerations 
concerning subsequent consent is that the notion itself 
seems peculiarly inappropriate. What is in question is 
whether an agent can reasonably come to appreciate after 
an intervention that it was the best thing to do, even if 
his own choice was supplanted by the interférer's. In 
this context it is more appropriate to speak about 
endorsement or ratification than subsequent consent. 
These concepts do not have the contradictory ring about 
them that subsequent consent has and they do seem to 
catch everything that is important about subsequent 
consent. But this is only a terminological point.
Press, 1986, pp. 182-183. Feinberg uses the example of rape to argue that subsequent consent is contradictory.14. See Carter, R. ; "Justifying Paternalism" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. VII, Nr. 1, March 1977, pp. 133-145 where the author argues that subsequent consent is a perfectly legitimate part of justifying paternalistic actions.
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I have already explained that I understand a 
person's good as objective. This means that it is not 
constituted by his expressed preferences and it is 
possible to be harmed without realizing it. I understand 
happiness and welfare very generally. A part of this 
happiness is obviously to enjoy reasonable health and not 
be deprived of the necessities of life. But more 
importantly for my purposes self-determination is a part 
of welfare. Self-determination is a value and we can have 
more or less of it and in general the more the better. It 
may have to be balanced against other things obviously, 
but that is no problem. This is what we would expect 
about every value at some stage or another. So if it can 
be argued that a paternalistic intervention increases the 
agent's welfare in relevantly important ways and the 
disvalue of overriding the will of the agent is not too 
great, then it is justified to do so. If we have reason 
to believe that the agent's will was encumbered, then 
this decreases the value of the will. The value of the 
intervention outweighs the value of the will more easily 
in that case. This is all we need to have a justification
of a paternalistic action.
Consent of whatever type cannot be a deciding factor
on this account. If we are contemplating a paternalistic
intervention, then consent does not seem to have a large 
role to play in our theoretical considerations. The 
relevant considerations are only the values that ought to 
be increased against the possible disvalue and the 
rationality of the decision. If the action is justified.
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then the value aimed at outweighs the value of the course 
of action prevented. This is the conclusion of D. H. 
Regan when he discusses the example of Odysseus and his 
crew:
"If what I have just said is correct, the
command is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
justify the crew's decision to keep Odysseus aboard. 
What justifies their decision in the standard 
version of the tale is the fact that swimming to the 
Sirens is understood to be an irrational choice,
with fatal consequences, made under preternatural 
compulsion.
It is important to emphasize to prevent 
misunderstanding that I do not want to deny that consent 
can and should have an important role to play in the 
actual carrying out of paternalism. For an official to 
have the consent of the subject can be crucial in 
justifying the action. The only thing I want to say is 
that in theoretical deliberations on paternalism we ought 
to think of the values concerned. One of the most 
important ones is autonomy. This ought to bring in all
the relevant considerations about the agent and his own
role.
The conclusion to this is that there are only two 
relevant considerations in determining justification of a
15. Regan's article "Freedom, Identity and Commitment" in Sartorius, R. (ed.): Paternalism, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1983, p. 128
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paternalistic action. The first is the value of the 
interference, the second is the rationality of the choice 
or decision supplanted.
5_^ 1. Examples of Paternalism
There are other cases of apparently justified 
paternalism which soft paternalism has difficulty in 
dealing with. It seems to be true that most reasonable 
people would be willing to accept limits on access to 
narcotics. Limits on access to narcotics can be justified 
by reference to harm to others. But there seem to be
clear cases where the only justification to be had for a 
ban on free access to narcotics is paternalistic, i.e. it 
can only be justified in terms of the good of the agent.
I want to describe three more cases where the soft- 
paternalist seems to have difficulty or at least a case 
can be made for a hard-paternalistic justification of a 
ban on certain practices or of forcing agents to adopt 
certain practices. I do not know whether there is a ban 
on brainwashing, but if there were it seems to be
possible to make a case in paternalistic terms in a
similar fashion to the ban on free access to narcotics. 
Any consent to undergo brainwashing is problematic
because the decision is irrevocable. After undergoing 
brainwashing you cannot reflectively assess the original 
decision. The same applies to the addict. He cannot 
reflect on his condition rationally because the addiction 
distorts his judgement to such an extent that he is not
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his own master. Even though some narcotics do not cause 
addiction after a single injection, it is safe to assume 
that one injection of heroin, at least, causes 
a d d i c t i o n . in that sense the decision to try it is 
irrevocable. The ban on unlimited access to narcotics 
prevents you from implementing a decision to try. The 
irrevocability of such an implementation seems to be a 
good reason for the ban. The soft paternalist has to hold 
that even if the decision is irrevocable, the agent 
should be allowed to implement it if it is quite clear 
that his decision is voluntary, i.e. is not based on any 
mistakes about facts or his own values. The soft 
paternalist would believe that a test for voluntariness 
ought to be strict in this instance because of the 
irrevocability, but presuming that the agent had passed 
it, it is not justified to stop him. But why ought we to 
feel justified in allowing the agent to harm himself in 
such a drastic fashion? And why ought the agent to feel 
justified in doing so? The hard paternalist is not 
obviously wrong to want to stop the agent from harming 
himself nor is the soft paternalist obviously right.
There are two more examples I want to discuss. One 
example is of the obligation to wear seatbelts while 
driving a car. I think this obligation is enforced by law 
in many, maybe most. Western countries. The argument
16. Strangely enough, morphine, which one would assume, caused addiction just as strongly and readily as heroin, is not assumed to do so when administered to hospital patients suffering from severe post-operative pain. The danger of addiction is said to be a "totally unjustified fear". See D. Doyle: "Pain Control" in The Practitioner.22 March 1990, Vol. 234, p. 285
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usually given for this law is that it makes it more 
likely that drivers and passengers in a car will survive 
if they have an accident. Obviously much depends on 
whether the factual assumption is true, but I think it is 
reasonable to believe it to be true. The soft-paternalist 
would be willing to educate drivers in the dangers they 
face on the roads and to make sure that they understand 
these dangers. But going further than that is not 
justifiable according to him if the grounds for doing so 
are the agent's own good. So he would have no way of 
stopping a driver who was not willing to wear his 
seatbelt and realized all the dangers and the increased 
likelihood of surviving them if the seatbelt was worn. 
The hard or real paternalist would have no serious qualms 
forcing him to wear his seatbelt as the legislators have 
done.
The other example is of forcing motorcyclists to 
wear protective helmets by law. The reason for forcing 
them to do that is that the helmets increase the 
probability of surviving serious accidents. There is good 
reason to believe that safety helmets make all the 
difference when a serious accident occurs.Death in 
such accidents results in a large majority of cases from 
head injuries. Protective helmets prevent head injuries. 
So helmets make it more likely that motorcyclists survive 
serious accidents. It is obviously in the interests of 
the motorcyclists themselves to wear them. That is the
17. Feinberg, J, : The Moral Limits of The Criminal LawVolume 3: Harm to Self. New York, Oxford UniversityPress, 1986, p. 135
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hard-paternalist ' s reason for forcing them to wear the 
things. But, as before, the soft-paternalist would not be 
willing to go further than ensuring that all 
motorcyclists are knowledgeable of the facts both 
cognitively and emotionally. But should it be left 
ultimately up to the motorcyclist to wear a safety helmet 
or not? Or is it justifiable to force him to do so?
In these last two examples there is a real question 
about whether the paternalistic intervention is a wrong 
suffered by the agents. It is at least questionable 
whether the paternalist is justified in forcing the 
driver to wear a seatbelt and the motorcyclist to wear a 
protective helmet. Any agent wanting to drive a car or a 
motorcycle might reasonably ask why it is not and should 
not be up to him to decide whether he wore a helmet or a 
seatbelt. The risk in these activities is not much 
greater than in some other activities we are unwilling to 
limit in any way, like mountain climbing. So he might 
appeal to the law to protect him from such interferences 
which the agent who wanted to inject himself with heroin 
cannot apparently do. The argument the hard-paternalist 
could use at this point is that these two types of limits 
to liberty are trivial in any normal life. It simply does 
not matter all that much to any reasonable man whether he 
uses a seatbelt or a protective helmet. In comparison to 
the good such practices can secure in the event of an 
accident the triviality becomes even more prominent. So 
considerations of the value of the consequences seem to 
determine that this is justifiable and also
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considerations based on rationality. A rational agent 
would choose the better alternative of the two or more 
available to him. An additional reason for accepting a 
ban on not wearing protective helmets is that in the 
majority of cases where the driver survives the accident 
when not wearing a helmet he regrets his omission. When 
he wore his helmet he tends to be glad that he did.
This is an argument one needs to be careful about. 
It is not implied by it that the more trivial the action 
forced upon the unwilling agent the more justifiable it 
is other things being equal. There is a limit to such 
justifiability. Whether I wear a brown jacket or black is 
something which I ought to decide. It simply does not 
make sense to try to justify forcing me to wear a brown 
rather than a black jacket. My good is not involved in 
the decision to wear a brown jacket rather than a black 
one. So forcing on me either of these possibilities 
cannot be justified in any way, paternalistic or any 
other. If it were not a question of forcing or coercing 
but of deciding for me something which might affect, 
directly or indirectly, my good, then it might be 
justified because coercion is possibly more harmful than 
merely a decision for me. The manner of the paternalistic 
intervention is clearly important. But up to a point it 
seems to hold that the more trivial a pursuit is, the 
more justified it is paternalistically to intervene, 
assuming that the intervention secures an important good. 
Beyond the point where the intervention possibly affects 
my good, there is no justification for intervening.
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But the opposite does not hold. It is not true that 
the more important or central to one's life an action is 
which is being interfered with, the less justification 
there is for intervening even assuming that the good 
secured is critical. In some cases one might even think 
that because the decision the agent is about to take is 
so central to his life, it is possibly justified to 
interfere. But I believe such cases to be rare and the 
intervention always questionable. If a friend was about 
to marry a woman you knew to be unsuitable for him and 
that an unhappy marriage was likely to depress him 
severely, then you might think it justified to interfere. 
But precisely because a decision as important as this one 
is so central to the agent's life, then this is also a 
reason against interfering. Let us assume that your 
friend can easily become depressed and if he gets 
seriously depressed, he might become suicidal. This had 
happened in the past and all the indications are that it 
might happen again. Let us also suppose that you know, 
that the wife to be of your friend had lied to him about 
her past. You know, for example, that she was for a time 
a prostitute. You know also that your friend is sensitive 
to the past of his wife to be. What are you to do? If you 
decide to tell your friend that his wife to be was a 
prostitute at one time, then in all probability you have 
prevented him from getting married and you have behaved 
paternalistically towards him. He did not ask for any 
such information and he might even be unwilling to 
listen. If you do not do anything before he marries, your
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friend might discover after the marriage that his wife 
had a disreputable past. This could trigger his 
depression and make him suicidal.
This would obviously be a difficult decision and 
there is no clear answer to what is the right thing to 
do. To that extent a paternalistic intervention in 
circumstances of this type is always questionable and I 
do not think it possible to formulate any general rule 
about such interventions in such circumstances. But it is 
clear that prima facie at least a paternalistic
intervention is not ruled out and might just as well be 
the right thing to do as leaving things alone. Precisely 
because there is so much at stake you might be justified 
in intervening.
So the weight of the values of the proposed action 
and the value of the course of events following the
intervention have to be assessed and judged. There is no 
simple relation between the two. Adding the value or 
disvalue of the intervention itself makes it even more 
complicated. No general conclusions should be drawn from 
the fact that wearing seatbelts and protective helmets 
can be trivial compared to other things in one's life.
The first thing to notice about all of these 
examples except one is the absence of encumbrances on the 
decision being prevented. In the case of education there 
is youth or immaturity which is the encumbrance and the 
avoidance of education is the evil being prevented by
forcing the child to go through education.
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It is quite clear that it is possible that a 
conflict between self-determination and well-being can 
occur. When someone decides to try a narcotic like heroin 
it is obvious that this decision will harm him. In such 
cases there is a conflict between self-determination and 
happiness or well-being and it is precisely in these 
cases that the possibility of a justified paternalistic 
intervention is present. If one takes the view that self- 
determination always overrides well-being there is no 
problem of paternalism. But there is no obvious reason to 
ascribe such importance to self-determination.
One reason for thinking paternalism problematic is 
that paternalism is widely believed to be a pejorative 
term. I have discussed this earlier in 5.1. and rejected 
it. But there might be one reason for this belief that I 
have not discussed. We might accept that a paternalistic 
action always broke some moral rule.^® Hence, we might 
conclude that paternalism was pejorative. The main 
question in this context is whether a paternalistic act 
always violates a moral rule.
It is quite clear that many paternalistic acts 
violate a moral rule. It is also clear that many 
justifiable paternalistic acts can violate a moral rule. 
So the distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable 
paternalistic acts does not seem to coincide with the
18. See Gert, B. and Culver, C. M. : "PaternalisticBehavior" in Cohen, M., Nagel, T. and Scanlon, T. :Medicine and Moral Philosophy. Princeton, PrincetonUniversity Press, 1981, p. 205; and Gert, B. and Culver, C. M. : "The Justification of Paternalism" in Ethics.Vol. 89, 1979-80, p. 199
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distinction between those acts that violate a moral rule 
and those that do not. When drivers are obliged to wear 
seatbelts or motorcyclists are forced to put on 
protective helmets, then it is arguable, at least, that 
they are being deprived of a part of their freedom.
Depriving someone of his freedom is violating a moral 
rule. Banning unlimited access to narcotics or 
prohibiting brainwashing are not clear cases of any 
violations of moral rules, unless one assumes that prior 
to any paternalistic act there is a right to any action 
one voluntarily wants to perform.
It should be noted that the right to non­
interference cannot justify permission in these areas. 
Supposing that one's having a right to non-interference 
depends on a belief that in some areas at least self-
determination is more appropriate than accepting the 
decision of someone else, perhaps because each
individual is the best judge in these areas. But this is 
exactly the problem. Whatever view we take of the nature 
of the right to non-interference we might believe that 
paternalism could be justified. The reason for saying
that these are not clear cases of violations of moral 
rules is that there is no obvious argument for saying 
that self-determination has priority in these cases 
because of the irrevocable injury involved. The only 
sense to be made of the claim that these cases involve 
violations of moral rules is to assume that there is a
rule saying that agents have rights of self-determination 
to any action whatsoever.
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In the example discussed earlier of a doctor 
injecting blood into a patient who had made it clear 
prior to the operation that he did not want any new blood 
into his body I concluded that this did not constitute an 
instance of coercion. Hence coercion is. not a necessary 
feature of paternalism. But the action of the doctor 
seems to be a violation of a moral rule. The patient had 
expressly forbidden the doctor to inject new blood into 
his body. The doctor's action is paternalistic because it 
is against the wishes of the patient and aimed at his 
good. It might possibly be said that, had the doctor not 
known the patient's will, his action would not have been 
a violation of a moral rule. But when the patient had 
expressly forbidden it, I cannot see it as a non- 
violation. This obviously depends on how the moral rule 
in question is expressed. It might go something like 
this: rational beings have unqualified sovereignty over
their bodies when in full possession of their faculties. 
This sovereignty in those areas he has expressed his will 
about extend over those periods in time that he is 
unconscious and not in full possession of his faculties. 
The doctor's action, then, must be a violation of a moral 
rule.
Curiously Gert and Culver argue that the doctor's 
action in this case is not a violation of any moral rule 
but they think that his action requires the doctor to 
break a moral rule later on when the patient wakes up,^^
19. Gert, B. and Culver, C. M. : "PaternalisticBehavior", op. cit. p. 2 07
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Then he either must lie to the patient or cause severe 
pain to him because of his action. Therefore they think 
that any paternalistic action involves violation of moral 
rules. But I think that if there is any violation of a 
moral rule in this case it is because the doctor's action 
is against the expressed wish of the patient. This is 
clearly a manipulation and a violation of the patient's 
autonomy. They seem to believe that there is no violation 
involved in the action of the doctor because it is not 
coercive. But this is false. A violation of a moral rule 
can occur without any coercion.
It is obviously important in this context to have at 
least some idea about what a moral rule is and hence what 
amounts to a violation of it. In this respect Gert and 
Culver are not of great help. They say in one place: "It
is not necessary that one explicitly hold some theory 
about what counts as a violation of a moral rule. All 
that is required is that one believes A is doing one of 
the following: killing; causing pain (physical or
mental); disabling; depriving of freedom, opportunity or 
pleasure; deceiving; breaking a promise; or cheating. All 
of these are universally regarded as requiring moral 
justification and hence are regarded by us as violations 
of moral r u l e s . "^ 0 The first question about this is how 
do we know that these are instances of violations of 
moral rules? Their answer is that because these are 
regarded as requiring moral justification they are
20. Gert, B . and Culver, C. M. : "The Justification ofPaternalism", op. cit. p. 200
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violations. The assumption must be that all and only 
those actions regarded as requiring moral justification 
are violations of moral rules. But this must be false. 
The class of actions requiring moral justification is 
much larger than the class of actions that are violations 
of moral rules. Supererogatory actions, where one does 
more than is morally required, seem to need moral 
justification. But they are not violations of any moral 
rule. The problem is with what we are saying when talking 
about an action requiring moral justification. When 
justifying an action morally we are giving our moral 
reason for it. But this we can do with any action and it 
does not seem to be limited to those actions that can be 
treated as violations of moral rules. So it seems to me 
that it is not a feature of paternalistic actions or
their justifications that they are necessarily violations 
of moral rules. But they certainly need moral
justification.
One suggestion about justification is that it must 
be universal.This is Gert and Culver's idea. In their 
discussion universal means two things. On the one hand it 
means that if all rational beings could agree to a
certain action it is right and hence justifiable. On the 
other hand it means that if a particular agent in
particular circumstances is to be justified in doing X, 
then everyone in relatively identical circumstances must 
be justified in doing X. When they say that for any
21. Gert, B. and Culver, C. M. : "The Justification ofPaternalism", p. 200-206
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justification to be valid it must be possible to make it 
public, this only applies, it seems, to the first of 
these two meanings, i.e. to make it public is to put it 
to other rational beings. This is what they say: "...he
must be willing to claim that all rational persons could 
agree with his judgement that in these circumstances Mr. 
K. should be deprived of his freedom for a limited period 
of t i m e . "22 As should be clear, universality in this 
sense is perfectly possible without universality in the 
second meaning obtaining. This means that all rational 
beings could agree to this particular deprivation of 
freedom without implying anything about all other beings 
in relatively identical circumstances.
Gert and Culver say also:
"What is then needed is to determine whether to 
publicly advocate this kind of violation. This is 
done by deciding whether the evil prevented 
(relieved) or avoided by universally allowing this 
kind of violation outweighs the evil that would be 
caused by universally allowing it. If all rational 
persons would agree that the evil prevented by 
universally allowing the violation would be greater 
than the evil caused by universally allowing it, the 
violation is strongly justified; if none would, it 
is unjustified. If there is disagreement, we call it
22. Gert, B. and Culver, C. M. : "The Justification ofPaternalism", op. cit. p. 201
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a weakly justified violation, and whether it should 
be allowed is a matter for decision."
In this quote both the senses of universality are at 
work. In this context 'allowing the violation' means 
'allowing paternalistic intervention'. The relations 
between the two senses of universality can be put 
schematically like this:
1. all agree all are allowed
2. all agree one is allowed
3. all agree none is allowed
4. some agree all are allowed
5. some agree one is allowed
6. some agree none is allowed
In this schema when I say 'all agree' this is short 
for all rational beings or persons. When I say 'all are 
allowed' this means that all persons in relevantly 
identical circumstances are allowed to intervene 
paternalistically. When it says 'none is allowed' this 
means that the paternalistic intervention is prohibited, 
i.e. the person about to be interfered with should be 
free to do what he wants. I have left out in the left 
column the possibility when no one agrees because this is 
the extreme possibility of everybody having his own 
opinion and not agreeing with anyone else.
23. Gert, B. and Culver, C. M. : "The Justification ofPaternalism", op. cit. p. 203
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The first thing which is obvious about this schema 
is that none of these six possibilities described is 
incoherent. None of them seems to contain a 
contradiction. So we might opt for any of them, if we 
found some plausible argument for accepting it. Gert and 
Culver think that the first possibility, nr. 1, 
represents strong justification for a paternalistic 
action, that is when all agree that all are allowed. When 
they say that a paternalistic action is unjustified, 'if 
none would' the unstated word is apparently 'agree'. So 
it is unjustified when none agrees that everybody is 
allowed. This is one of the possibilities that I dropped 
because it seems to mean that everybody has an opinion 
and it is different from everybody else's. This does not 
seem to me to make sense. What they are probably after is 
that there might be some who disagreed very strongly but 
strength is something which is left out of the schema. Or 
they might be saying that even though some agreed most 
would disagree. Let us accept this interpretation for 
'none agrees'.
But notice that what they are saying is that this 
represents an unjustified act:
7. none agrees all are allowed
This is a much weaker unjustifiability than is to be 
found in the 3rd possibility where all agree that none is 
allowed, i.e. all agree that it is prohibited. This seems 
to me to be the strongest sense in which a paternalistic
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action is prohibited or unjustified. The 6th possibility 
only means that there is disagreement about the 
prohibition which implies that there are some who agree. 
But the fact is that it is prohibited and there is 
disagreement about it.
The main question to be asked about this schema is 
how strong should the universality requirement be on a 
justified paternalistic action. It seems to me that 
possibility 2 is all that is required. This needs some 
comment. If we understood the first part literally it 
would mean that no paternalistic action would be
justified unless all agreed. This is clearly far too
strong. If just one disagreed because of misunderstanding 
or bigotry of some sort or another, then this would 
disqualify a paternalistic action from being strongly 
justified. So the interpretation of this would have to be 
all who are fully rational and either reasonably informed 
or fully informed. This shows the difference between the 
two parts of these interpretative possibilities. The 
first part is really an epistemic statement, the second 
is an ontological one. It seems to me that a 
paternalistic action might correctly be allowed, even 
though only some, or even just one, recognized it as
such. But I think it is all right to have a stricter
requirement on the agreement because of the dangers 
inherent in paternalistic actions. That is why I propose 
the second possibility as a description of a strongly 
justified paternalistic action.
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But why should we accept that only one was necessary
for a paternalistic action to be justified? I do not want
to exclude the possibility that sometimes, maybe most of 
the time, we would have to weigh the consequences of 
allowing all to interfere paternalistically. But it seems 
to me that there might be cases where it could be 
justified to allow a person to interfere 
paternalistically without weighing the universal 
consequences. One reason for accepting the possibility 
that there is only one who is allowed in some situation 
to act paternalistically is that there is no algorithm 
for applying moral rules. The application itself cannot
be guided by rules. So it seems to be possible that there
is only one who is allowed. Another reason for saying 
this is that one factor we have to take into account is 
the actual values of the person being interfered with. A 
third reason for accepting this is that we would not be 
violating the universality requirement. What we would 
have in such a case would be a specific principle about 
the justifiability of a paternalistic interference. A 
specific principle can be universal. Generality is 
contrary to specificity, not to universality in the 
ontological s e n s e . 24 These three reasons seem to support 
the claim that only one is necessary for a paternalistic 
action to be justified.
One objection to this might be that it is just a 
part of meaning that an action is allowed that anyone in
24. Hare, R. M.: Moral Thinking. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 41
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relevantly identical circumstances ought to be allowed as 
well. But I do not think it is warranted to take this as 
a part of the meaning of the term. But it certainly seems 
to me correct to say that if there is a moral reason for 
allowing this, then this reason is a reason for any moral 
agent in relevantly similar circumstances. This seems to 
me to depend on the nature of rationality and moral 
objectivity. It is also true that even if applying rules 
is not universalizable even though the rules themselves 
are universalizable, this does not affect the nature of 
the rules. They can be as general as we like. In giving 
reasons for a decision for a paternalistic intervention 
the reason would obviously have to appeal to some general 
ideas to be convincing. But this does not exclude the 
possibility of the action being only appropriate in this 
instance.
All things considered it seems to me that for a 
paternalistic action to be strongly justified all who are 
rational and reasonably informed must agree that at least 
one is allowed to act in that way.
5.4. Rational Desire
At this point I want to emphasize that I do not 
propose to reject Gert and Curver's theory of the 
justification of paternalism altogether. It seems to me 
to have some parts that are correct, but there are these 
two I have discussed which seem to me either wrong, that 
paternalistic acts always break moral rules, or unclear.
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the condition of universality. They hold that there are 
three things relevant in specifying a justification of a 
paternalistic action. The first is the moral rules 
violated, I have rejected this. The second is the evil 
prevented or benefit caused and the possible evil caused 
by the interference. I have already indicated that this 
is part of assessing the justifiability of a 
paternalistic act. The condition of universality is a 
part of such an assessment. The third is the rational 
desire of the person affected by the paternalistic 
interference. These last two are parts of any 
justification of paternalism, it seems to me.
This third part needs some elaboration. What is 
rationality and what is a rational desire? I have already 
argued for a way of understanding reason, value and 
rational desire in 2.3. Let us look at two examples. The 
first is the example of blood transfusion to the 
unconscious patient I have mentioned before. The doctor 
injected blood into the patient even though he had 
expressly forbidden it. It seems clear that when the
patient wakes up and the doctor tells him the truth that
it will cause pain to the patient. But this pain is 
consequent upon the patient's belief about the blood of 
others and upon his expressed prohibition of injecting 
blood into his body. He believes that another's blood is 
an impure substance and that getting it into his body
will damage him beyond redemption or whatever. The
salient fact about this belief is that it is false. There 
does not seem to be any natural sense in which it can be
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explained how transfused blood can be impure. I do not 
know whether a reasonable theological explanation can be 
given of these beliefs, but I seriously doubt it. So the 
request not to be injected with blood is, in this respect 
at least, irrational. So the question arises whether 
rationality can justify the doctor in his paternalistic 
action.
Let us look at another example. A patient is in a 
critical condition after a serious accident. He was 
driving in a car with his family and everybody in the car 
but him died in the accident. Now he regains 
consciousness and asks how the others fared. It is clear 
to the doctor that the patient's life depends on the 
reply he gets. If he gets the unvarnished truth, he could 
easily deteriorate and die. If the doctor lies and says 
they are fine, the patient might recover and ultimately 
resume living his life again. What should the doctor do? 
I believe most people would say that the doctor ought to 
lie to the patient accepting that this is a paternalistic 
act and he might ultimately have to face up to what he 
has done, if the patient recovers.
I take it that the paternalism in the first example 
is problematic. It is problematic at least in the sense 
that there is disagreement about what the doctor ought to 
do. In the second example I would not expect there to be 
serious disagreement. This is especially in view of the 
fact that I do not suppose that the deception of the 
patient would go on indefinitely. It seems to me that the 
difference between the responses to these two examples
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would be explained by the fact that we assume that the 
patient in the second example wants to live and that this 
is a rational desire. So the doctor in lying to his 
patient is assisting him to achieve his own goals through 
a paternalistic action. But in the first example the 
doctor would be going against the expressed desires of 
the patient and would not be assisting him to accomplish 
his own ends even though it was for his own good. The 
reason most frequently given for this is, I believe, that 
the doctor would be imposing his values on the patient in 
the first example but not in the second. This is 
considered unjustified interference.
In the second example the instrumental view of 
reason is at work. According to this view every person 
has some given basic desires and ends and the role of 
reason is to discover, assess and come to conclusions 
about the best ways to reach these ends. Reason is not 
believed to be capable of evaluating the ends themselves, 
only the means. The affective side of rational beings 
supplies the ends. This seems to me to be one of the 
motivations behind the view that the reflective consent 
of an agent should not be overridden by a paternalistic 
intervention. In some sense the ends are thought to be up 
to each and every individual.
But as I have argued earlier in 2.3. this conception 
of reason is inadequate. It is inadequate because 
basically it makes good sense to discuss and criticize 
the aims people accept. Some aims seem to be trivial in a 
perfectly ordinary sense and an action or even a life
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having a different end from the trivial one is more 
valuable. The value in question seems to be independent 
of the desires fulfilled and seems also to be independent 
of whether somebody actually aims at these ends. The 
values also seem to depend on beliefs just like the 
belief about the value of impure blood. Sometimes these 
beliefs can be false. One conclusion one might want to 
draw is that in those cases where values are in some 
sense irrational, there is reason to interfere 
paternalistically and thereby impose values on the 
irrational agent.
We should be careful about this. I want to make one 
thing clear. It is that it is not the imposition of 
values on somebody which is objectionable. When somebody 
is punished for a crime certain values are being imposed 
on him. But they are being imposed in the name of the 
interest of others so to speak. One of the aims of
punishment is to attempt to deter the offender from 
committing a crime again and to deter others as well. 
This is justified on the grounds that the interests of 
others demand that people are deterred from violence. For 
this to work the actual offender is being forced to 
accept the restraint of the interests of others.
Deterrence would not work if he did not accept ultimately 
that he had to take the interest of others as prior to
some of his own tendencies. This is a limited sense of
value but it seems to be value all the same. So the 
imposition of values is not objectionable as such, only 
if it is done for my own good.
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Why are the lives and interests of others so much 
more important than my own life and interest that I am 
justified in harming my own life and interests but not 
those of others? One way of arguing for this is to find a 
more general reason or rule. How would that reason look? 
It would go something like this: People are not permitted 
to harm people. This rule is perfectly general in the 
sense that it covers both myself and others. If it is 
correct, then it seems to follow from it that I am not 
permitted to harm myself any more than I am allowed to 
harm others. There seem to me two reasons for accepting 
this rule. One, the fact that a life or interest is the
life of another does not seem to be essential to the ban
on harming. There is nothing apparently inappropriate in 
formulating the rule in this more general way. Second, if 
it is true that the correct way of thinking about 
rationality is as agent-neutral, then this general way of 
formulating the rule seems to follow from it. So I think 
there is no apparent mistake in putting the rule like 
this. From this I think we can infer that my own interest 
are just as important as the interests of others. It 
seems that I should be just as ready to accept 
paternalistic interventions as interventions based on the 
interests of others. Why it does not work out quite like
this I will try to argue in the next chapter. But I hope
these reflections have at least made it plausible that 
such a general rule is not inappropriate and not 
implausible.
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The notion of rationality covers ends as well as 
means. When an agent has a mistaken belief about 
something influencing his values and decisions then it is 
possible to say that the value and decision is 
irrational. This gives the notion of irrationality a very 
wide range and it is certainly not justifiable to infer 
that a paternalistic intervention is all right if the 
decision of the agent is based on a false belief. In this 
wide sense 'irrational* gets to some extent a similar 
meaning to 'unreasonable*. But to be unreasonable is not 
the same as being irrational even in this extended sense. 
Being unreasonable is taking a month's wages at the 
beginning of a month and spending them all wining and 
dining. (This may sound more difficult than it actually 
is.) Or going out on to an unsafe bridge after being told 
of the danger. These two courses of actions or traits of 
character would be unreasonable. It seems to me that none 
of them needs depend on a mistaken judgement although 
they would probably all be signs of a character fault: 
self-indulgence, perversion, volatility. One way of 
looking at this is to say that labelling these actions as 
unreasonable is just saying that on our scale of 
worthwhileness they are pretty low down. But this would 
presumably not give anyone a reason for intervening with 
such an action.
Yet it is rational for an agent who has these 
character traits to try to change them. And it is 
perfectly possible that such an agent might be better off 
protected against his own choices. But when it is stated
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that it is rational for him to change his character it is 
implied that the character he has is faulty in some 
respect. I think it would be generally agreed that 
perversity, volatility and self-indulgence are faults of 
character. They are faults because they can easily harm 
you. This fact ought to give any rational agent a reason 
to attempt to correct the faults. One might want to infer 
from this that if this is true, then a paternalistic 
intervention could be justifiable. But the problem with 
faults of character like these is that the agent himself 
very often does not see these traits as faults. They are 
ingrained parts of himself and they do not give him 
reason to think that he ought to change his ways. This is 
often the biggest part of the problem.
When deciding whether a paternalistic interference 
is justified or not we look at the evil prevented by the 
interference and compare it with the cost that 
accompanies the intervention. In a case of character 
faults the cost of preventing an action could easily 
outweigh the evil of leaving the agent to his own 
devices. One of the considerations would have to be that 
it is often very difficult to get an agent to look at his
traits as a fault. Just because of that it might very
well be that in most cases the agents should be well left 
alone, even though one accepted the analysis above. But
we should also note that in assessing the justification 
of a paternalistic action it is easier to discount the 
beliefs of the agent because they are false and
unreasonably biased due to the character traits.
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There is one more consideration which needs to be 
looked at. There are some goods which are such that it 
seems reasonable to suppose that any agent would want 
them. These are goods or valuable things like health, 
education, minimum wealth and even life itself. Given the 
arrangement of modern societies, it seems reasonable to 
believe that any rational agent would want these things. 
It applies at least to education, wealth and health that 
some minimum amount seems to be necessary in modern 
societies for a decent life. Life itself does not allow 
any gradualness. Either you have it or you don't. But any 
rational agent under normal circumstances would want life 
rather than not. This is obviously not to deny that there 
might be circumstances where it is reasonable for a 
rational agent not to want life. When I say that it is 
reasonable to suppose that any rational agent would want 
these goods, I do not think that this is only a plausible 
supposition. It seems to me that this is what a rational 
agent would and ought to want, if he were fully informed.
The question about these goods is whether they 
justify paternalistic actions any more than other 
interests of the agent? It applies to health that it 
seems to be necessary for anything else we want to do and 
in this respect it is like life. So any rational agent 
ought to want his own health and his own life. In the 
absence of knowledge about the wishes of the agent, one 
would be justified in securing the agent's health and 
life. But what about the cases when the interférer knows 
that the agent wants to do away with his life or damage
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his health? Is he justified in intervening? If we look at 
the case of the doctor who gave his patient blood who had 
expressly forbidden it he seems to be doing his duty. His 
duty is to preserve life subject to the limits of when it 
is probable that the patient's life will be excruciating 
misery rather than reasonably free of pain. So when 
somebody believes falsely that blood injected into him is 
impure, then it seems that the doctor would be failing in 
his duty if he did not preserve the patient's life.
This is so because the doctor has a specific duty in 
virtue of his training and position. What about others 
who are not bound by their professional duty to preserve 
life or health? Are they justified in going against the 
specific consent of an agent who prefers to die rather 
than have blood injected to him? Is the law, for example, 
justified in obliging a wife or husband of such an agent 
to take any reasonable action to preserve his or her life 
and in fault of that to prosecute him or her? The answer 
to this seems to me to hang on the importance we give to 
self-determination. I will deal with this in the next 
chapter.
5.5. Conclusion
I have characterized paternalism as an action aimed 
at. the good of the agent but going against his desires at 
the time of the interference. The paternalistic 
interference can either be aimed at some benefit for the 
agent interfered with or preventing harm befalling him.
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The notion of self-paternalism seems to make good sense. 
The justification of paternalism is based on the 
comparative values of the course of action prevented, of 
the intervention and the course of events promoted. The 
justification is also subject to a condition ' of 
universality and the rationality of the agent. The basic 
assumption in any possible case of paternalism is that 
there is a conflict between the value of self- 
determination and well-being.
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Chapter 6
In this chapter I intend to examine the notion of 
autonomy. I will discuss Feinberg's theory of autonomy in 
some detail and express doubts about it. This requires 
discussion of his four meanings of autonomy and how they 
lead to different conceptions of autonomy. After that I 
look at the nature and value of autonomy and, lastly, I 
try to say something about the relation between autonomy 
and paternalism.
6.1. Autonomy and Self-Determination
Before discussing the notion of autonomy I think I 
better counter an objection to the argument so far. It is 
that the consequentialist framework argued for in 2.4. 
and the objective, agent-neutral conception of the good 
simply rule out any place for autonomy. So autonomy is 
not a problem for a moral theory making these 
assumptions. The only relevant question is what has the 
best consequences. The obligation is to maximize the 
good. This implies that whenever autonomy and happiness 
come into conflict we ought to opt for happiness because 
choosing autonomy would lead to diminished good. The 
problem with paternalism is precisely that being allowed 
to decide his action will bring harm or even disaster on
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the agent himself. So paternalistic interference with the 
agent's action seems to follow from the assumptions.
This is too swift. As I have already pointed out 
both autonomy and happiness are parts of welfare and are 
valued in common-sense morality. I take it that they are 
also values in our considered moral intuitions. But 
having them both seems to be unstable and even 
incoherent. But there are at least three replies to this 
worry. The first goes something like this. The agent 
always has the duty to perform the action that has the 
best overall consequences. A strong aversion to harming 
seems clearly to be a part of this duty. It also seems to 
be a part of this duty to be inclined to prevent oneself 
and others from harming themselves. But the inclination 
to prevent others from harming themselves is subject to 
the constraint of the harm that might come with the 
interference. A part of this harm might be the resentment 
of the agent interfered with. The best motivation of a 
moral agent is an important part of his theory: 
motivation ought to aim at maximizing the good. This 
motivation, if not tempered with something like autonomy, 
could create the temptation to interfere with the action 
of others for one's own gain. So the best motivation of 
rational agents might be an inclination to respect 
autonomy, even though in some situations such an 
inclination did not produce the best possible 
consequences. But in the long run such a constraint would 
produce better overall consequences than no constraint if 
we view it in the light of realistic human psychology.
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A second response to this problem could be this. 
There are presumptions and aversions that govern our 
actions. Even though these presumptions conflict with a 
consequentialist calculation in a particular case and 
going against a presumption seems to be better than
acting according to it, the best thing to do might be to 
go on accepting the presumption. The argument is that 
consequentialist reasoning determines what presumptions 
and aversions or rules to accept and in turn these rules 
take priority over consequentialist calculations in 
particular cases. So if there is reason to accept a 
presumption in favour of autonomy, then this should be 
followed even when following it might have worse
consequences than intervening with the agent's action. 
This does not mean that autonoiry would take priority over 
welfare come what may. If the consequences of not
intervening were really bad, it would be justified to 
break the rule.
The third reply says that it is better overall to
leave every agent to lead his own life as best he can.
Most agents develop fairly quickly a good sense of what
is in their own interest and what is not. So in general 
we can accept that every agent is the best judge of his 
own interest. Accompanying this must be a restraint on 
others not to interfere with those actions of the agent 
that primarily concern him. So autonomy ought to be 
respected, unless the consequences are very severe.
These three responses should be sufficient to
suggest that the consequentialist framework I have
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accepted does not preclude the problem of autonorry from 
arising. To this extent at least the argument in this 
essay is not incoherent.
Autonomy is used in various contexts. The first 
thing to be said about it is what I will not talk about. 
We can talk about metaphysical autonomy. This notion 
comes into play when we discuss the compatibility or
incompatibility between freedom and determinism, whether 
it is possible to say that we decide our actions if at 
any given moment in time a particular causal situation
can only have one conclusion or one outcome. Autonomy in 
this context refers to our ability to decide actions 
independently of causal connections. This is not the 
autonomy I shall be speaking about. We can also talk
about epistemological autonomy. Autonomy in this context 
is to what extent we have chosen ourselves the principles 
on which our knowledge rests. This is not the autonomy I 
will be discussing. Autonomy can have other senses beside 
these and I will discuss some of them below, but these
two senses will not be relevant.
Autonomy is the major idea used against the
justifiability of paternalism. Accepting autonomy as a
legitimate notion of morality with its role to play
implies that there are certain limits on paternalism, 
even that it is unjustifiable altogether. That is how
some theoreticians believe autonomy blocks paternalism 
generally. In what follows I will argue that autonomy 
places no blanket ban on paternalistic interferences and
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seems to be compatible with it in some instances at
least.
It seems that the simple basic notion in autonomy is 
that something is up to me. To say that something is up 
to me means that I decide it, I control it. There are 
some obvious instances of this in any normal life:
whether I should wear a brown or a black jacket. Another 
is whether I should fall asleep on my left or my right 
side. It just makes no sense to say that anyone but I
should decide this. The idea that somebody else might do
so does not seem incoherent, though. If I were kept under 
a close enough supervision the supervisor could take 
these decisions for me. And if he had the means, he could 
enforce these decisions. But this idea does not really 
make sense, not because it is incoherent, but because it 
seems to be very difficult to discover a point to it. 
What could possibly be the point of making me fall asleep 
on my left side rather than my right side or wear a brown 
jacket rather than a black one? This obviously applies 
only under normal circumstances. As soon as we start 
talking about abnormal circumstances things change. If my 
serious backache would only heal when I slept on the left 
side, then it might make sense to have someone forcing me 
to sleep on my left side if I proved unwilling to do so 
nyself. If my life depended on wearing a brown jacket 
rather than a black one at a particular time, then it 
might make sense to have someone compelling me to wear 
it. But under normal circumstances this does not apply. 
So it is the point of the action that seems to determine
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whether there could be a sense in making an agent do 
something against his will.
There is reason to point out that this notion of 
autonomy as I have described it up to now is very 
limited. Autonomy seems to say that something is up to me 
only if it does not affect my interest or good. Even 
though we add that this applies in normal life and in 
normal life there are at least some things which do not 
affect my interest, then this does not help very much and 
the notion seems to be of limited value. But given that 
this notion of autonomy makes sense, this seems to me to 
be the essential idea which is worked on with much 
subtlety in the writings on autonomy. The slim features 
of this concept may not look very promising and as it is 
it will certainly not satisfy many philosophers. But 
there is no reason to prejudge the concept as described 
but to look and see if and how it can be extended to 
incorporate the concerns of those philosophers interested 
in having it do important work.
The basic question about autonomy as described here, 
it seems, is where the boundaries of autonomy lie. If 
autonomy is limited to those areas that do not concern 
one's good or interest, then it is very limited indeed 
and it could not serve as a constraint on paternalistic 
interventions. The reason is that paternalism is by 
definition an interference for the agent's own good. If 
autonomy is limited to those areas where no interests 
come into play then it cannot possibly limit paternalism. 
It was clear from the example above that as soon as one's
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good came into play interference was not pointless. So in 
those areas important to normal, rational agents such an 
interference seems to make sense.
I said above that the basic notion of autonomy 
seemed to be that something was up to me. It seems that 
threats to this control can come from two sides. They can 
come from other agents who try to take control of my 
actions. This can happen through slavery, for example, or 
when somebody attempts to get me addicted to drugs. On 
the other hand my control of my decisions and actions can 
be undermined by my desires which can overwhelm me and 
make me do things which I do not want to do. It can also 
be that I do not find the desires that I have desirable 
but am, for some reason, unable to change them. This idea 
of control over myself leads us to see that autonomy in 
this sense is not simple and requires complex abilities 
to be operative in the agent. Corresponding to the two 
threats to autonomy it seems possible to discern two main 
ingredients in it. The first is the ability to withstand 
overwhelming emotions. This ability can be described as 
the ability to see and act on good reasons. The second is 
being free from domination. To be a slave is always being 
subject to the will of another. The first can be called 
internal autonomy, the second external autonomy.
Before going further I think it is worthwhile to 
look at a theory of autonorry which makes autonomy more 
complex than I have done. Feinberg distinguishes between
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four meanings of autonomy.^ The first meaning is the 
capacity to govern oneself. This capacity is a natural 
ability and as such it allows of degrees. Some agents are 
better at governing themselves than others. There is 
another notion closely connected to this one. It is the 
legal notion of competence which is an all or nothing 
notion. Either you are legally competent or you are not. 
Both these notions are relevant to our understanding of 
autonomy. I will discuss them both in the next part of 
this chapter.
The second concept is the actual condition of self- 
government. This means that someone who has the ability 
to decide for himself what to do actually does so. 
Someone who has the capacity to govern himself may not in 
fact govern himself. He may be a slave or he may be an 
unwilling subject of a tyrant. It is only when he 
actually governs himself that he is autonomous. Autonomy 
in this sense divides into twelve parts in Feinberg's 
analysis arousing the suspicion that he is not discussing 
a single concept but many. ^ There can be many ways of 
preventing me from attaining autonomy in this sense. A 
serious illness forcing me into coma, poverty or being 
overpowered by brute force all prevent me from attaining 
autonomy. Both the notions of autonoiry seem to be at work 
in these examples. Among the examples Feinberg takes of 
virtues based on this concept of autonomy are self-
1. Feinberg, J.; The Moral Limits of Criminal Law. Volume Three: Harm to Self, New York, Oxford University Press,1986, pp. 27-512. See op. cit.: pp. 31-44
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possession, distinct self-identity, authenticity, self­
legislation. Obviously these would need explication to 
make clear what is being talked about if we wanted to see 
how closely they resembled actual self-government and how 
far they differed. But I think they make the drift of 
Feinberg's discussion clear.
The third idea of autonomy Feinberg discusses is 
autonomy as an ideal of character. An autonomous agent is 
admirable because he has fashioned his own character. But 
it is notable that a character is not admirable only 
because an agent has shaped it consistently with his own 
principles. A self-made character can be a bad one, he 
can be selfish, cold and ruthless. So the admirability 
does not only depend on the fact that it is self-made. It 
depends also on the fact that it is good or noble. An 
agent who is a cold blooded murderer can claim that he 
has chosen his principles and to be to that extent 
autonomous. But he is in no way admirable. Autonoiry does 
not exclude the possibility of an agent living in a 
society with others. This seems actually to be a minimum 
condition on autonomy for it to be admirable. It just 
does not seem to be possible for autonomous agents to be 
completely independent of each other and to flourish. But 
this does not in any way detract from the value of 
autonomy. Feinberg admits all these complications for 
this concept of autonomy but it has an important role to 
play.
The fourth concept of autonomy is a right to self- 
determination, a right to sovereignty. This is conceived
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along the lines of national sovereignty in which a state 
controls a particular area where people live and no other 
state has a right to interfere. The idea is that a person 
is sovereign in the same sense as a state is sovereign. 
It is not quite clear what sovereignty in a state amounts 
to but Feinberg characterizes is thus: "A sovereign state 
is territory under a kind of unconditional and absolute 
jurisdiction."3 One important question about sovereignty 
is where it comes from. There does not seem to be any 
obviously correct answer but one candidate is the nation. 
Then we need to know what a nation is to which there does 
not seem to be very clear answers. But in practice there 
are clear instances of nations like the nation of Finns 
and their state Finland. So we do not need to worry too 
much about the exact nature of nations. But the most 
important feature of this concept of autonomy is the 
absolute and unconditional nature of it.^ This fourth 
meaning of autonomy seems to be external autonomy as I 
described it above.
These four meanings of autonoiry are not mutually 
exclusive and I hope to show that they can be categorized 
as either internal autonoiry or external autonomy. I said 
above that I will delay discussing the first meaning 
Feinberg describes until the next part of this chapter. 
What Feinberg is hoping to do in discussing autonomy is 
to discover a notion which justifies a ban on 
paternalistic interferences. He believes the notion of
3. Feinberg, J.: op. cit. p. 494. Feinberg discusses this notion of autonomy in detail in chapter 19 in op. cit. pp. 52-97
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personal sovereignty supplies a ban on paternalism which 
goes further than ensuring that an action is voluntary.
The second notion of autonomy was the actual
condition of self-governing as I described it above. The 
central idea was that the agent actually did take his own 
decisions and shape his life according to his own values. 
This is dependent on luck to a great extent: serious
illness can prevent an agent from achieving his autonomy 
and so can dire poverty. But given that the agent is able
to do as he chooses in the sense that there are no
internal or external barriers to his acting on his choice 
and he does what he chooses, then he is autonomous.
This meaning of autonomy is rather curious, if I 
understand it correctly. There is no requirement of 
goodness or nobility built into it. The only requirement 
for being autonomous is that the agent decides himself
what he does and that there are no barriers against him 
acting on his choice and he actually does what he 
decides. This category sits uneasily with the distinction 
I made between internal and external autonomy. It seems 
that external autonoiry and internal autonomy in some 
minimum sense of ability to see good reasons are 
conditions for actual autonoiry to obtain. But there is no 
link between autonomy in this second of Feinberg's 
meanings and the ability to see good reasons and act on 
them. What is required is only the ability to decide and 
to act whatever the reasons.
I take it to be obvious that this cannot be all of 
autonomy and that it is not Feinberg's intention to imply
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this. But in so far as this is autonomy, it seems to be
compatible with paternalism. If paternalism limits itself
to removing barriers to actual autonomy as described
above, then it does not violate autonomy. Wearing;
seatbelts in cars or protective helmets on motorcycles 
can help us to act on our own choice. So this meaning of 
autonomy will not do the work Feinberg wants it to.
Autonomy in the third sense as described above was 
the ideal of autonomy, autonomy as an admirable 
character. It is notable that Feinberg does not make any 
extensive attempt to describe or explain autonomy as an 
ideal. As I noted above autonomy is compatible with 
serious flaws of character. This just tells us that 
autonomy cannot be the whole of the admirable 
characteristics of character; it requires other things 
along with it. But it seems reasonable to accept that 
autonomy is one part of an ideal character. But autonomy 
both needs to be a part of character to the right degree, 
neither more nor less, and it needs to be connected to 
the right traits of character.
But what is this ideal of autonomy which is worth 
aspiring to? Because it is an ideal it is desirable and 
it would be valuable to bring it about.
"The autonomous man is the one who, in 
Rousseau's phrase, "is obedient to a law that he 
prescribes to himself", whose life has a consistency 
that derives from a coherent set of beliefs, values, 
and principles, by which his actions are governed.
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Moreover, these are not supplied to him ready-made 
as are those of the heteronomous man: they are his 
because the outcome of a still-continuing process of 
criticism and re-evaluation."^
There are at least three things in this 
characterization of the autonomous man. The first is that 
he obeys his own law. The second is that the actions and 
beliefs of an autonomous man are consistent and coherent. 
The third is that his principles are his because they are 
the outcome of a continuous process of criticism.
The autonomous man does not reach his ideal through 
abstract theoretical deliberation but through experience 
from which he learns how he responds himself to different 
situations, needs and ideas. Even though the ideal is 
independent of any particular agent, every agent must 
find his own way of reaching the ideal. There are no 
fixed paths towards it which he can find and then 
automatically follow. But neither should we say that the 
autonomous agent must take a decision before every action 
however small and insignificant like an existentialist 
gone mad. It is both that an autonomous agent can be a 
member of a continuous tradition and accept its 
standards, even unref lectively, given only that he is 
ready and willing to examine critically the tradition if 
and when the occasion arises, and also that he can
5. Benn, S. I. : "Freedom, Autonomy and The Concept ofPerson", in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Vol. Ixxvi, 1975/76, p. 124. See also S. I. Benn ' s book ^ Theory of Freedom. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, chapters 9, 10 and 11, pp. 170-212
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internalize his principles. So he has no need to reflect 
and deliberate before every single decision; successfully 
internalized principles can guide his actions without 
prior reflection. Nor does the autonomous agent pick and 
choose his principles like we choose ties and socks to
buy. Principles are not of the same type as socks and
ties. We come by them through the learning and 
experiencing of our own tradition in thinking about the 
world around us, about ourselves and our society. They 
mould our beliefs and our thoughts but it is possible to 
discover these principles and to think about them
critically. We sometimes discover that our principles 
according to which we have lived are incoherent. These 
discoveries can be difficult and painful, but the 
response to such discoveries cannot be fully determined 
by the norms accepted by the society. In such 
circumstances the agent must reflect and deliberate on 
his action and be ready to come to a conclusion
independently of the accepted traditions in his society, 
if that is what he thinks is the correct conclusion.
The autonomous agent is distinguished from the 
heteronomous agent. The heteronomous agent obviously can 
experience the same kind of difficulties as the 
autonomous agent, but his distinguishing feature is that 
he is always looking to the group he belongs to for 
guidance in finding his answers rather than trying to 
formulate some himself according to those criteria he is 
willing to accept.
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The three main characteristics of the autonomous 
agent should be a little clearer by now. His beliefs, 
principles and values should be consistent or he ought to 
attempt to make them consistent. The major way towards 
the end of consistent and coherent beliefs is the 
continuing process of criticism and re-evaluation. This 
seems to be the best means to secure this goal. The third 
part of the ideal of autonomy was that our law should be 
our own. In what sense should our law be our own? This 
sense cannot be that everyone must make or create his own 
law. This would be moral anarchy and I do not think that 
is a reasonable option. Anyway it is clear that Benn, the 
author quoted above, is not advocating moral anarchy 
because he is quite clear that his autonomous moral agent 
should be a member of a tradition and traditions do not 
allow the possibility that everyone has their own law 
different from anyone else's. The sense in which the law 
or principle is his own is that the agent accepts after 
rational reflection the law or principles he has 
discovered in his own moral tradition or outside it as a 
valuable part of his moral universe.
It is no part of this sense that the agent must have 
a particular starting point from which he can view all 
possible moral principles. It is not possible for a moral 
agent to reflect on or revise all his moral principles at 
once. To be able to revise and reflect on moral 
principles he must have some already. He can reflect on a 
principle when his experience has shown him that there
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might be incoherence among the principles he adheres to 
and follows in his practice.
I do not want to claim that I have answered all 
relevant questions about the distinction between an 
autonomous and heteronomous agent or about the relation 
between an autonomous agent and his tradition. The 
problems center around the obedience to one's own law and 
what that comes to. Another question is whether the 
distinction between autonomy and heteronomy is completely 
clear. But whatever the answer to these questions turns 
out to be, it is clear that the autonomy in question is 
internal autonomy.
Does this account of autonomy exclude reliance on 
authority? It seems to exclude some types of unreflective 
reliance on authority. But what about reliance which says 
that something is right because A says so and A has good 
reason to know? Now on one understanding the account 
above would exclude this because it would be required 
that the agent himself had to know either directly or 
through some reasoning that this something was right. But 
I do not think this is a reasonable requirement on 
autonomy as such or that this is the only understanding 
of autonomy as described. The reasons for this will 
become clear. But the principles the agent abides by are 
never all rationally reflected on. Some principles are, 
therefore, accepted by relying on authority, the 
authority of our own tradition or by relying on a 
religious or moral authority. This seems to me to require 
that autonomy and reliance on authority be compatible.
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Autonomy in this sense forbids all things that
prevent critical reflection on moral principles. 
Political tyranny, for example, would be unjustified. We 
should notice, though, that political tyranny only goes 
against the acting on such critical reflection and being 
free from interference or if such reflection were made 
public. Political tyranny need not be against individual 
cases of critical reflection itself in so far as no one 
else is made aware of this critical reflection apart from 
the agent. But political tyranny would be against any 
culture of critical reflection and in so far as the 
fostering of such a culture is necessary for critical 
reflection to flourish then political tyranny is 
unjustified in terms of this conception of autonomy. The 
two parts of autonomy, internal and external, are both 
necessary. Having one without the other is not having
autonomy in the full sense. Political tyranny, therefore, 
cannot be compatible with autonomy in the full sense of 
the term, as I explained it earlier.
This leaves only the last conception of autonomy, 
autonomy as a right to sovereignty. This notion is taken 
from the political vocabulary about states and nations as 
indicated above. The most important feature of it is that 
a state has an absolute and unconditional jurisdiction 
over its own territory. When this is transferred to 
persons it comes down to unconditional sovereignty over 
the personal or private domain. This means that I alone 
have the right to take those decisions that concern the
private domain only. This is essentially external
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autonomy. This does not rule out that I may under some 
conceivable circumstances stop taking such decisions. I 
may be overpowered by a tyrant. But it does rule out that 
this can be done justifiably, unless I voluntarily decide 
to give up this right myself. This possibility is not 
problematic neither when this relinquishment is temporary 
nor when it is permanent. If it is permanent it covers 
cases like voluntary slavery. This might seem problematic 
on similar assumptions to Mill's that "The principle of 
freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be 
free"G if it be allowed that this absolute ban by Mill is 
on the state enforcement of such contracts rather than on 
voluntary slavery. But this principle of Mill's seems 
problematic. And if we take the analogy with states
seriously then this possibility does not seem to be
incoherent. A state, like Newfoundland let us say, can
decide in the appropriate way to become a part of another 
state like Canada. In doing that the state forfeits its 
sovereignty but it does not appear to be incoherent or 
problematic for any conceptual reasons to do so. But this 
seems to be implied by Mill's objection to voluntary 
slavery interpreted as above. This possibility of
permanently giving up sovereignty does not seem to pose 
any problems for this conception of autonomy.
As already mentioned this is Feinberg's favoured 
meaning of autonomy. Why should we prefer this conception 
of autonomy to the others discussed before? For one thing
6. Mill, J. S. : On Liberty, in Three Essavs. Oxford,Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 126
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it seems to be stronger and to block most, maybe all, 
paternalistic interferences. But is that an advantage? I 
am not sure. There seem to be three main reasons for 
accepting this kind of autonomy as argued by Feinberg.^ 
First, it accords well with some of the moral idioms we 
use: this is no one else's business, I live my life as I 
please, this is entirely up to me. Attitudes like these 
seem to be well entrenched in modern consciousness of our 
status and relation to others. Second, if an agent 
seriously believes that an action is in his own interest 
and someone else disagrees and is right, the agent can 
either be mistaken about a matter of fact or about the 
nature of his self-interest and its reasonableness. If 
the mistake is of the first type, then he can be put 
right and the agent himself ought to welcome it. If it is 
of the second type, the matter is more difficult. But it 
is certainly not insurmountable to find out if someone's 
view of his own interest is rational or not or if what he 
thinks is reasonable really is reasonable or not. A man 
who believes that his own best interests are to be able 
to smoke as many cigarettes a day as he possibly can, has 
a curious view of his own interests. Even though we 
accept that few people welcome the overriding of their 
desires, there is no way to infer from that that all 
values are equally reasonable or rational. This would 
simply be false. The third reason for this conception of 
autonomy is that agents must be allowed to make mistakes. 
It is necessary for them to be able to make mistakes:
7.. Feinberg, J. : op. cit. p. 61-62
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"There must be a right to err, to be mistaken, to decide 
foolishly, to take big risks, if there is to be any 
meaningful s e l f - r u l e ; . T h e  idea is that the right to 
err is a necessary part of the right to sovereignty.
This conception of autonomy seems generally to block 
paternalistic interferences and if it proves to be 
justified it will do the work that the other conceptions 
failed to do. Further work on this notion of autonomy 
would include attempting to demarcate the private domain 
and it seems that those who want to use this notion would 
like it to exclude the obligation to wear seatbelts or 
protective helmets among other things. This seems a 
reasonable conclusion in the light of this autonomy. It 
would also make a ban on the selling of narcotics 
problematic and a ban on brainwashing. If the agent 
really wants to inject narcotics into his body and this 
does not affect adversely anyone else's interest and the 
agent knows what he is doing, then it really ought to be 
up to him. The same goes for brainwashing. There ought to 
be no stopping an agent wanting to undergo brainwashing 
to do so, if he knows what he is doing. But this kind of 
autonomy is limited to those who are adult and of sound 
mind. So it does not stop making children going through 
education because they are children. But it would stop a 
well-meaning paternalist from forcing an adult to acquire 
some education. This type of autonomy seems to get the 
results that many people believe are obvious truths about 
ourselves and our private domain.
8. Feinberg, J. : op. cit. p. 62
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I do not think the three reasons for this notion of 
autonomy amount to very much. It is certainly true that 
it accords well with certain idioms of our moral 
vocabulary. The moral attitudes these idioms express are 
widespread nowadays. But this does not mean that they are 
well founded. It is certainly not an obvious truth to be 
gleaned from our use of moral language, that people ought 
to be left to do themselves to death if they so desire, 
important though moral language is. An argument is 
required to make this thought plausible. The second 
reason was that when judgements of self-interest depended 
on the views of the agent and his values, then everything 
became more difficult than when we were dealing with 
matters of fact. As I pointed out above, I do not think 
this will prove insurmountable. There is a limit to what 
can be counted as reasonable and this puts a limit on 
what we are willing to accept as rational or reasonable 
self-interest. I do not want to claim that this clears 
away all resistance to unlimited paternalistic 
interferences. It does not. But it throws some doubt on 
the claim that somehow values cannot be mistaken in a 
similar fashion to matters of fact.
The third argument for autonomy as sovereignty was 
that there was a right to err that was a part of the 
right to sovereignty. I think it should be accepted that 
the right to err is a part of the right to sovereignty. 
It is an important part of autonomy to have the 
opportunity to make mistakes. It is in most cases a good 
way for the agent to find out whether a certain course of
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action is right or wrong. But the problem with this right 
as formulated by Feinberg is that it does not matter at 
all how serious the mistake is. It seems to me that it is 
reasonable to guard against some serious mistakes by 
ruling them out on the ground that they are against the 
agent's interests. This seems to be a reasonable policy 
in terms of self-paternalism and also for paternalism 
proper.
The last reason against accepting the analogy to 
national sovereignty as a good way of conceiving of 
autonomy is that it does not cover the whole territory. I 
said before that autonomy can be divided into external 
and internal autonomy. I have not said anything yet about 
how these two parts of autonomy are related. But it seems 
a reasonable requirement on any attempt to explain 
autonomy that it cover all the things we would expect to 
be covered. The notion of sovereignty as described here 
only covers external autonomy. It protects the personal 
domain enabling agents to act on their rational 
decisions.
It seems possible to explain autonomy as sovereignty 
in terms of presumptions and aversions. This would 
obviously not amount to an absolute and unconditional 
right but in practice in most cases it would be 
substantially the same thing. Probably the best argument 
for a presumption against interference is Mill's moral 
muscles argument, as Feinberg calls it.^ Mill puts the 
basic idea thus: "The mental and moral, like the muscular
9. Feinberg, J. : op. cit. p. 384, a note to p. 58
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powers, are improved only by being used."^^ To be able to 
use our moral powers we must make choices and act on them 
which in turn requires a domain in which to act. This 
domain is not only to act on rational and reasonable 
choices but also to make mistakes. Interference with our 
choices hampers our development of our distinctive 
talents. Hence, paternalistic interference should be 
ruled out. This argument makes sense of autonomy in both 
the senses I have mentioned, the ability to discern good 
reasons and to act on them and non-interference in the 
private domain. This ability is not something innate 
which is operative in every individual irrespective of 
his surroundings. It only comes to be a discriminative 
power when properly applied in various contexts and 
allowed to be acted on. This requires a private domain in 
which the individual can apply his talents and act on his 
decisions without hindrance.
This account of autonomy seems to be acceptable 
unless we find some reasons against it. It seems to me 
that there are at least two reasons for doubting it.
The first is that autonomy on this argument does not 
amount to an absolute and unconditional right to do 
whatever the agent likes. As should be clear by now I do 
not think that interferences on the ground of the agent's 
interests or for his own good are ruled out although we 
can accept a presumption against them. The moral muscles 
argument by itself does not guarantee an unconditional 
right, only a presumption against interference.
10. Mill, J. S. : On Liberty in op. cit. p. 72
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The second is that autonomy understood as an 
unconditional right to sovereignty in the personal domain 
has the consequence that when the right and the good of 
the agent come into conflict the right always has 
priority over the good. This does not mean that we must 
believe that the right of the agent and his good are 
constantly in conflict; only that when they do the right 
has priority. Because of the nature of the right the 
option is not open to us to weigh the harm the agent is 
likely to do to himself against the right and the 
probable resentment the interference might cause. But the 
moral muscles argument does not rule this possibility 
out. It tells us that the harm must be severe to justify 
a paternalistic interference.
My conclusion to this first part of this chapter is 
that there is reason to doubt Feinberg's account of 
autonomy. His preferred notion of autonomy as sovereignty 
has serious drawbacks. His major claim that autonomy 
rules out paternalistic interference altogether does not 
seem to be true. In certain instances they seem to be 
compatible. This has the consequence that we must decide 
for each case or for each type of cases under 
consideration whether a paternalistic interference is 
justified or not. This ultimately comes down to accepting 
that in general autonomy is the best guarantee for the 
good of the agent. But in those cases where we have 
reason to believe that a paternalistic interference might 
secure his interest better than leaving it all to himself 
autonomy does not have automatic priority over the good
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of the agent. This strategy is all that is needed for 
what I have been arguing.
6.2. Capacity and Incapacity
I said above that Feinberg distinguished four 
meanings of autonomy. One of them I have not discussed. 
It is autonomy as capacity. I have already indicated that 
there is reason to doubt Feinberg's account of autonomy 
but I think it can be profitable to take a look at 
autonomy as capacity to gain a clearer understanding of 
the nature of autonomy.
The capacity in question is a natural ability to 
understand, to have beliefs about ends and means and 
other things necessary for a normal life. This is the 
capacity and it obviously depends on the understanding of 
the capacity how we understand incapacity. Those who are 
excluded from this category of autonomy as capacity are 
those who are mentally ill, those who are mentally 
subnormal, patients who live in a vegetable coma, 
infants, seniles and generally those who are permanently 
incapacitated.
Incapacity is caused by impaired or undeveloped 
faculties. Because the faculties are undeveloped it is 
not possible for the agent to appraise the features of 
his circumstances that are salient to the desirability of 
his action. A young child cannot appreciate the dangers 
in its surroundings and if left to its own devices, it 
would sooner or later come to grief. That is why adults
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take it to be their obligation to guide the child 
paternalistically avoiding the dangers in the 
surroundings and on the way teaching it what to avoid and 
what to look for and desire. Even though a child cannot 
articulate it learns as time passes what is in its best 
interests.
The question is how should we understand this 
capacity? There seem to be two concepts at work in our 
understanding. The first is a capacity allowing degrees 
like IQ. There are those at the lower end like those who 
are severely retarded and are like children and do not 
for example understand dangers around them or promises or 
obligations. Next above them are the mildly retarded who 
have better understanding of the harm that might befall 
them, if they crossed the street, for example, or cut a 
slice of bread. Then we could go up the scale until we 
have those at the top who are super-intelligent, have the 
best capacity to discover the important things in the 
world around them and make those choices that best 
fulfill their desires. The other concept of capacity at 
work is an either-or concept. That concept works like 
legal competence: you either are legally competent to
marry a couple, for example, or you are not. There is no 
other possibility. You either are legally competent to 
vote in an election or you are not. This concept is at 
work when we say that most people are entitled to enter 
contracts, choose a career or do whatever else they think 
fit with their own lives.
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There are clear implications for paternalism flowing 
from either of these concepts. If we accept the first one 
it seems to follow that those at the top end of the 
capacity scale ought to decide for those at lower levels 
what is in their own best interests because they are
obviously the best judges. Incapacity would be relative 
to the level of capacity of those above you. Large scale 
paternalism only limited by what would be practicable 
would follow.
The second concept of capacity is different. It
clearly has no obvious unacceptable paternalistic 
implications. One might think it came to something like 
the view of autonomy described earlier: autonomy as
sovereignty. It certainly seems to block paternalistic 
interventions because if an agent has the capacity in 
question we are not apparently allowed to interfere 
paternalistically. If he has not, then such an
interference seems to be in order. But this would be too
swift and not, I think, quite correct as I hope will 
become clear. The threshold concept of capacity, as we 
can call it, or a nonrelative kind of mental impairment, 
as Daniel Wikler calls it,^^ does not do all the work 
that sovereignty does. But to see this we must look a bit 
closer at what the threshold concept amounts to.
There seem to be tasks that face most human beings 
in their lives that are such that they require only a
11. Wikler, D. : "Paternalism And The Mildly Retarded" in Sartorius, R. (ed.): Paternalism. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1983, p. 87. In this article Wikler formulates the distinction between these two concepts of capacity which I use.
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certain amount of intelligence and every increase above 
that level does not put the agent concerned in a better 
position to perform that task. So anyone who falls below 
this threshold and has difficulties in performing those 
tasks will need protection. The type of task in question 
is like a decision to marry, if we can call that a task, 
or decisions to invest on the stock market. It may be 
true for both of these tasks that above average 
intelligence or mental capacity will secure a better 
partner or profits for the one who has such intelligence. 
But the ability to avoid risk is much simpler and does 
seem to require only a certain level of understanding of 
the danger involved in a contract. Dangers in marriage 
are much more subtle and complicated than in financial 
dealings, but I think it is not absurd to suggest that 
they have this feature in common with the financial 
dealings.
It is important to realize that this threshold is 
not arbitrary. It is not chosen by me or anyone else but 
seems to develop in a society and be fixed by it. Even 
though it is not arbitrary it is conventional and it is 
certainly true to say that it might be fixed differently 
from the place where it is fixed now. But this is no easy 
or simple thing to do. The level is fixed for those of 
average intelligence so that they can deal with those 
problems that most people have to deal with in their 
lives. Whether it is filling out a form for the Inland 
Revenue or driving a car or buying groceries none of 
these tasks would be better performed by people of
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superior intelligence than those of average intelligence. 
But for those below average, and average here is 
understood not as a point but a range, all these tasks 
could pose insurmountable problems. The reason that the 
level falls in this place is utility. This is the place 
where it is most useful for most people to have the 
threshold. It might certainly fall in a different place 
but that would involve costs that are unreasonable. If it 
were lower, some of the institutions relying on the 
threshold would lose their utility to normal rational 
agents. If it were higher, a large part of the population 
would have to rely on opinion and advice from those who 
understood the tasks and were able to perform them. Many 
people would be put in the present position of the 
mentally retarded. This means also that the social 
practices and institutions in question would lose their 
utility.
The tasks confronting any normal rational agent in 
his life in modern society are various and they are of 
different types. It is often remarked that modern society 
has become more reflective than societies have been 
before. This presumably means that it is no longer 
sufficient to follow accepted practices and traditions 
unref lectively to live a good life in a modern society. 
It has been an integral part of the Western intellectual 
tradition to encourage rational, critical reflection. 
There are other different traditions where critical 
thinking is discouraged. It is not traditions as such 
that somehow demand unreflective consent, acquiescence or
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conformity. If a tradition is of the type that requires 
unreflective conformity, then this will affect those who 
are brought up and educated within it. But this does not 
seem to be true of the Western tradition and present 
Western society, although it may be true of societies of 
other cultures and Western society in earlier times. This 
increased reflectivity requires more knowledge of various 
things than before and it requires more reflection on 
one's decisions and actions and on what is right and 
wrong, good and bad.
I do not want to argue whether this is a bad thing 
or good thing. But if it is true it seems to have one 
consequence. More knowledge and more thought are 
apparently required than before. I do not think that 
man's capacity for thought has increased or become 
better, but many things have happened which make it 
easier to assess claims to knowledge and good thinking 
than before. The instruments we have for evaluating 
knowledge and truth have become more sophisticated but 
this in turn makes more demands on our capacity. If our 
capacity for thinking and coming to correct decisions has 
not increased, then it seems plausible to say that it is 
more difficult now than before to reflect and decide. On 
many important issues we seem to be in a similar 
situation to American senators who do not have the time 
to acquaint themselves thoroughly with every issue they 
have to vote on and sometimes have no idea which way to 
vote. What they do is to follow the lead of those they 
trust and vote like them. On many important issues we
297
seem to be doomed to a fate of following the lead of 
those in the know. Many people cannot be bothered to 
think about surrogacy, for example, and they are 
perfectly content to leave the issues to the decision of 
the experts. It does seem that no other option is open to 
anyone nowadays than accept the expert opinions of others 
about some issues because it is not possible to be well 
acquainted with every issue one must decide even within 
the personal domain.
One obvious objection to all this is that it has no 
relevance to paternalism because paternalism only 
concerns those things which are directly relevant to 
ourselves and our good. We are surely able to be masters 
of our own lives and our own fate in so far as it 
concerns ourselves. This ability under normal 
circumstances should ensure that we are not in the 
position of the American senator. We do know our best 
interest.
But this is exactly what does not seem to be the
case all of the time. Even within the private or personal 
domain we do not seem to be in full possession of all the 
relevant knowledge and not to be in the best position to 
judge our own interest some of the time. Let us take the 
example of buying our food. Some of the food we buy we do 
not have the faintest idea what contains. It just happens 
that we ourselves or someone else in the family likes it
and therefore we buy it. Satisfying our desires in the
best interest of ourselves depends on a lot of people
doing their job properly and informing us about what they
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do. Consumer laws often oblige producers to supply 
information on the packets of the product on the 
ingredients and the processes used in making it. They 
also forbid certain practices. If everyone were the best 
judge of his own interest, no such interference would be 
justified nor would it be justified to oblige the 
producer to supply the information about the ingredients. 
But it certainly is justified to require him to do so and 
to ban dangerous substances in our food. This is 
plausible on plain utilitarian grounds. It saves us time 
not having to check everything and to be able to rely on 
at least a reasonable degree of non-dangerousness. If the 
buyer does not want to know, he can avoid reading the 
information. If he wants to have the option of buying 
anything he likes, this is not open to him. We do not 
think it is justified for him to have the option of 
buying anything he wants.
One point often made in this context is that banning 
dangerous substances or requiring producers to inform the 
buyer can be justified on the grounds of harm to others. 
In selling something you are potentially harming another 
person. So even though it is not justified to limit the 
right to buy anything one wants, it is perfectly 
justified to ban selling anything one wants to sell. 
Selling is in the public domain and subject to the 
constraint of harm to others. This seems to me to be 
true. It comes to the same thing as the argument from 
utility mentioned above. So even though a paternalistic
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argument is possible, there is another argument both 
possible and plausible.
There is a feature of freedom which ought to be 
considered in this context because it may throw some 
light on this notion of autonomy as capacity. Freedom is 
many faceted and you can be free in one respect but 
unfree in another. It is not simply a matter of either 
being free or unfree. One can have economic freedom, 
complete or limited. One can have social freedom and one 
can have political freedom. These different kinds of 
freedom seem to be conceptually independent of each 
other. Some people have argued that economic freedom is a 
condition of all other freedom. But this seems to be 
false. There is at least nothing contradictory about 
having less or little economic freedom but full political 
freedom. I do not want to hold, that such a state of 
affairs would actually be very stable in a society but 
there does not seem to be anything incoherent about it. I 
do not need to deny that different freedoms are 
interrelated. But it is certainly possible to have 
political freedom and yet at the same time have a highly 
regulated economy. It may be difficult politically to 
have a fully planned econorty^  without political freedom 
being in danger. But the danger is not because of any 
conceptual incoherence about such a state of affairs.
Autonomy in the sense of capacity seems to be 
similar to freedom in this respect. It is certainly 
possible to be autonomous in one area of activity but not 
in another. The reason is that autonomy in this sense
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does depend on natural ability and it is a fact that 
natural ability is not equally distributed and multi­
faceted. So one and the same person can be autonomous in 
one area and not in another depending on his abilities. 
There is nothing problematic about saying that A has a 
natural ability to play football but no gift for foreign 
languages. But we might reply that it was not natural 
ability as such which was in question but natural ability 
to come to reasonable conclusions about one's own 
interest and shape one's own life. But this more limited 
ability is still multifarious enough to allow a 
distinction like the one I made above between different 
kinds of freedom. This seems to imply that we can have a 
capacity to decide on one type of tasks concerning 
ourselves but not on another. If autonomy is natural 
ability then the same ought to apply.
If this were true of autonomy it would go against 
well entrenched views of autonomy that have been put 
forward. I shall discuss the nature of autonomy in the 
next section of the chapter. But one thing should be made 
clear at this stage. These two notions of ability or 
capacity that I have described do not necessarily exclude 
each other. If we accepted the threshold conception, then 
we do not need to reject the graded ability conceptions. 
It is better to conceive of the threshold as a point on 
the scale of the graded ability. If a person reached that 
point then it is supposed to be capable of deciding on 
his own what to do with his life, but if he were below 
the point then he would need protection and assistance.
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As before this point would be socially fixed. There does 
not seem to be anything incoherent in treating these two 
conceptions in this way. These two conceptions do not 
seem to exclude each other,
6.3. The Nature and Value of Autonomy
I think it should be obvious by now that the notion 
of autonomy is not simple nor does it seem to be very
clear. I suggested earlier on that it could be divided
into two parts: internal and external autonomy. The
discussion of Feinberg's theory has not led to any 
conclusion about autonomy. His four meanings of autonomy 
have not forced any theory of autonomy on us. It is high 
time to have a closer look at the value and nature of 
autonomy.
I have drawn a distinction between a person's
interest and his wants or desires. The interest is 
objective and it can be damaged without the person's
being aware of it and the interest is there whether you
attend to it or not. A person's interest is not 
necessarily unconscious but it can be. Wants or desires 
are different in that they are in general conscious and 
they usually do not change or are frustrated without the 
person realizing this. I do not propose to discuss in
detail how this distinction should be drawn. If iry money 
is stolen, then my interest is harmed. This can either 
happen without my knowledge or not. My desire for a glass
of water can be thwarted by the tap turning dry but
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generally I would be aware of a thwarting of my thirst. I 
know the distinction is contentious but I hope it is 
fairly clear in outline.
On which side of this distinction would autonomy 
lie? It seems that autonomy should be a part of each 
person's interests or good. The reason is that autonomy 
can be violated without the person himself knowing or 
realizing that his autonomy was being violated. I 
mentioned earlier a patient who had expressly forbidden 
the injection of blood into his body even though his life 
was in danger. The doctor ignored his wishes and injected 
blood into his body when he had become unconscious and 
thereby saved his life. In doing so the doctor was 
violating the patient's autonomy. It seems clear that 
autonomy ought to be put on the objective side of the 
distinction between wants and interests. So autonomy is 
part of the objective welfare of rational agents.
As is clear from the example of the patient and the 
doctor autonomy can be contrary to other parts of the 
welfare of agents. Violating the patient's autonomy in 
this case saved his life and saving your life is probably 
the clearest instance one can get of something being in 
one's interest. But it is not only that autonomy can be 
contrary to an agent's interests. Other parts of an 
agent's interests seem necessarily to be contrary to 
autonomy. It can be argued that dependency is a part of 
an agent's interests and in some instances it can be one 
of the most important parts of an agent's interests. 
Dependency, it can be argued, is in direct contradiction
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to autonomy. If the agent's welfare includes two parts 
that are in direct contradiction to each other, then it 
might be advisable to revise our notion of welfare.
It seems to me that the notion of autonomy involved 
in the contradiction with dependency and the notion being 
violated by the doctor's decision do not necessarily 
coincide. To see that we need to have a closer look at 
autonomy.
I have already said that autonomy comes in two 
parts: external autonomy and internal autonomy. Internal 
autonomy is the ability to see good reasons and to act on 
them. To be externally autonomous is being free to 
pursue your projects in the personal domain. This 
characterisation of autonomy is not obviously true and 
needs argument. I shall try to give some reasons for 
considering it in this way.
What is 'the ability to see good reasons and act on 
them'? The first thing to be said about this is that the 
analogy to perceptual abilities should not be construed 
too literally. In 2.1. I rejected the suggestion that our 
ability to discern moral qualities was essentially 
perceptual. The same considerations seem to apply to this 
interpretation of autonomy. Disregarding the literal 
interpretation of 'see' I do not think there is any 
objection to use the word. The other important part of 
the description of internal autonomy was: 'good reasons'.
What constitutes good reasons? There can be good reasons
12. This formulation of the distinction was suggested to me by John Skorupski.
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for beliefs as well as actions. As I have described the 
internal autonomy the emphasis should be on good reasons 
for action. But I do not want to indicate that there is 
some fundamental difference between good reasons for 
actions and good reasons for belief. As far as I can see 
there is not.
Good reasons for actions are reasons that have good 
consequences. The consequences that are good are those 
consequences that affect sentient beings beneficially. In 
the case of rational beings with complex value structures 
it is not easy to describe what these good consequences 
are. But a good reason would be a reason affecting 
important values favourably, increasing happiness or 
autonomy to name two important examples. Further 
characterisation of good reasons is not necessary in this 
context, I believe.
But this ability to see good reasons is not a 
natural ability that every man is endowed with fully 
fledged, so to speak. To have this ability is an 
achievement like knowledge or expertise is an 
achievement. It is clear that all rational beings do not 
have this ability at the same level or the same amount of 
it. All people are not interested in good reasons and the 
natural ability that the achievement depends on is not 
equally distributed any more than other natural 
abilities. So we would expect some people to be better at 
seeing good reasons than others.
But if we are not to take the perceptual analogy too 
seriously, how should we think of this ability which
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constitutes internal autonomy? I think the ability should 
be thought of as the capacity to understand and use 
certain moral and evaluative concepts to think critically 
about reasons and conduct. This critical thinking enables 
us to make our beliefs coherent, if we are successful, 
and coherent beliefs make up our claims to moral 
knowledge. The ideal is to have a coherent set of beliefs 
in reflective equilibrium. But this is an ideal which is 
difficult and probably never fully realized by finite 
beings.
One idea in autonomy is that our laws are our own as 
I mentioned before. It is not only that laws become our 
own when we think about them. They become our own when we 
act on them as well. Acting on our beliefs and principles 
is probably primary for beliefs becoming our own in the 
sense that our development of critical thinking comes 
later than action and enables us to evaluate our beliefs. 
These two parts of internal autonomy, i.e. the ability to 
see good reasons and to act, are both necessary for 
someone to be autonomous.
It should not be inferred from this that a well 
developed critical faculty is the only necessary thing 
for achieving autonomy. A certain minimum is certainly 
necessary. But kindness of heart and a benevolent 
disposition towards other people would enable most people 
to see good reasons and act on them in any ordinary life. 
Critical reflection is not the only relevant factor 
enabling us to see good reasons. Knowledge is another and 
kindness of heart a third.
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What is the relation between the two parts of 
autonomy? As I described above internal autonomy comes in 
grades but external autonomy does not seem to be gradual. 
If internal autonomy is below a certain level external 
autonomy does not become operative. Those creatures at 
the subautonomous level require protection and 
paternalistic guidance. This applies to children, 
mentally retarded, seniles and also to animals, it seems. 
The main reason for this seems to be that they are unable 
to express and articulate their wants and thoughts 
coherently, if at all, and some of them are not able to 
lead their lives coherently. But at some point, perhaps 
socially fixed, external autonomy is triggered. In 
general it seems that the more you have of internal 
autonomy the more valuable external autonomy becomes. But 
it does not seem to be true that the more you have of 
internal autonomy the more you have of external autonomy.
It is possible to argue that the more internal 
autonomy one has the more external autonomy follows. Then 
we assume that external autonomy is identical with 
liberty or opportunities to do what we want. It seems to 
make sense to say this about external autonomy in the 
sense of liberty. Increased internal autonomy might 
enable us to spot more opportunities than we would 
otherwise do. "But autonomy cannot be identical to 
liberty for, when we deceive a patient, we are also 
interfering with her autonomy. Deception is not a way of
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restricting l i b e r t y . B u t  this is only plausible for 
internal autonomy, not for external autonomy which is 
negative freedom. A person who is put into prison, not 
being told that one of the doors out is unlocked, is free 
to go but he is not able to do what he wants because he 
does not know. Deception and manipulation are ways of 
interfering with internal autonomy but not with liberty. 
They do not affect external autonomy.
We should notice one consequence of formulating 
autonomy in the way I have done. Let us look back at the 
example of the Jehova's Witness who did not want any 
blood injected into his body. The doctor's action is 
clearly a violation of his autonomy. But because it is 
the ability to see good reasons, not just any reasons, 
autonomy is not just "the ability of patients to decide 
on courses of t r e a t m e n t o n  any grounds whatsoever. If 
they are plainly irrational grounds as in this example, 
the patient is externally autonomous and he has internal 
autonomy but it is limited by this irrational belief. 
Internal autonomy seems to require rationality.
Now it is high time to look at the two examples I 
mentioned above of autonomy and its status. One was of 
the doctor and his patient who did not want blood. The 
other was of autonomy being a part of objective interests 
that included other parts that seemed to be contrary to 
it. I do not think it can be doubted on the conception I 
have described here that the doctor violated the
13. Dworkin, G. : The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 1414. Dworkin, G. : op. cit. p. 14
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patient ' s autonomy because it seems to be true that he 
manipulated the patient. But dependency does not seem to 
me to clash with autonomy as I have described it. If the 
agent's best beliefs tell him that he should be dependent 
on somebody else in some parts of his life or that he has
to, then I cannot see how this can be contrary to his
autonomy. It is only if we think that self-sufficiency 
amounts to autonomy, that these two things become
contrary to each other. But this is no part of my
conception of autonomy.
Dependency can come about in different ways. Some 
older husbands are so dependent on their wives that they 
cannot pour themselves a cup of coffee without 
assistance. And some modern wives are so dependent on 
their husbands that they cannot cook a proper meal. This 
may not be a result of any conscious choice but has come 
about in the course of the marriage. The husband or the 
wife who is relied on may take this as a way of 
expressing his/her love rather than as an oppressing 
chore. The one who is dependent can make this up in other 
fields of knowledge or skill.
A dependency of a different sort develops when 
someone is an invalid or breaks down mentally in 
depression. Depression can obviously damage internal 
autonomy, make you unable to recognize good reasons and 
act on them, and create a need for protection. In this 
case there is a clash between autonomy and dependence. 
But I do not think this causes any problem for what I 
have said about autonomy.
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There are other values which might be taken to be
contrary to autonomy. One is loyalty, another is reliance
on authority. One might even think that obeying the law 
is problematic for an autonomous person. These claims 
seem to be false. Loyalty can be a desirable and rational 
bond between people. Loyalty is trust and support of one 
person for another or one sentient being to another. It 
does not seem to be exclusive to persons. It is no part
of loyalty to deny any faults or wrongdoings of the one
you are loyal to but you feel that you owe him support
and trust, even love. Loyalty is not like an overwhelming
desire which you cannot resist. If it were, then loyalty 
would be contrary to autonomy. Nor is it blind.
Obeying the law does not clash with autonomy. If we 
took autonomy to require explicit consent to anything we 
obeyed, then it would be heteronomous to obey the law. 
But it is not a reasonable requirement on anyone 
explicitly to have to consent to every law for it to be 
valid any more than it is reasonable to require a 
decision before every action of an agent. Laws require 
legitimacy and it is also true that every agent can break
the law if he wishes on pain of punishment. So obeying
the law does not contradict the notion of control which 
is central in autonomy nor the notion of knowledge.
But what if the idea is not about positive law but 
moral law and somehow the agent had to consent to every 
moral law to be self-legislative? "...the argument for 
the necessity of consent is based on the idea of natural 
rights; in other words, it presupposes an objective moral
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law. It cannot therefore be used to support an assertion 
of moral self-legislation, which is in effect an 
assertion of the subjectivity of moral law."^^
But what about the relation between the autonomous 
agent and authority. This is often supposed to be 
problematic. The claim is that the autonomy of moral 
judgement can be expressed by saying that "the moral 
agent has a special freedom in the area of moral 
t h i n k i n g . " I G  Hence no moral authority is possible. 
Another version of the same claim is to say that to 
accept moral authority is to give up autonomy.
There are various possible arguments for the claim 
that in moral thinking we have special freedom.But I 
take it to be clear from what I said earlier in chapters 
1 and 2 about objectivity and about knowledge and 
expertise that this is an argument I want to reject. It 
seems to me to depend on a false dichotomy between 
science and morality. It is always possible in science to 
reject a view of the facts, especially when they are 
complex. One might even want to reject the fact that the 
earth is round and decide to rely on some silly 
hypotheses explaining away the roundness. This would be 
an instance of the rejection of the norms and canons of 
scientific rationality. The same is possible in morality. 
I might accept that I took away your wallet without your 
consent, that I really stole your wallet but yet reject
15.Downie, R. S. and Telfer, E. : "Autonomy " in Philosophy. Vol. XLVI, No. 178, October 1971, p. 29816. Downie, R. S. and Telfer, E. : op. cit. 29517. Downie, R. S. and Telfer, E. : op. cit. p. 2 96-2 99 where the authors consider three and reject them all.
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that stealing was wrong. This would be just as silly as 
rejecting the roundness of the earth but I am certainly 
free to reject in both cases.
It seems to me that one formulation of the notion of 
autonomy contributes to the plausibility of this claim 
about special freedom in moral matters. The notion of 
autonomy is often formulated as the fact that in the 
personal domain it is entirely up to me what I decide to 
do. This is true, it seems to me, and I have accepted 
that control of actions and refraining from action is a 
central part of autonomy. But it seems that this 
formulation is often taken to imply that the personal 
domain is value-neutral, that what I do in the personal 
domain is neither right nor wrong. This seems to me to be 
false.
I mentioned stealing above. Stealing necessarily 
involves another agent: you cannot steal from yourself. 
It may be thought that it applies generally that you 
cannot do any wrong to yourself. Prudential reasoning 
reigned supreme in the personal domain without any 
constraints. It is certainly true that prudential 
reasoning applies in the personal domain if it applies 
anywhere. But this does not mean that one cannot do any 
wrong to oneself. The relation of harming for example 
applies both in many person cases and in one person 
cases: it is possible to harm oneself. This becomes clear 
when we look at killing. There is a moral ban on 
intentionally killing another person unless circumstances 
are exceptional like war. But is there a similar ban on
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killing yourself? Is killing yourself just as morally 
blameworthy as killing somebody else? It seems to me that 
you have some leeway with yourself and your own life 
which you do not have with other lives and other agents. 
But this does not mean that moral notions are 
inapplicable at all in the personal domain. Killing 
yourself can be a wrong. So the personal domain is not 
morally neutral. "...private and public morality are 
therefore not two moralities, but two aspects of a single 
fundamental moral principle.
One inference from this could be that there is no 
essential moral difference between the personal sphere 
and the public sphere. It also seems to be true that 
there does not seem to be any fundamental difference 
between science and morality. The status of authority in 
science is not problematic. Hence the status of authority 
in morality ought not to be problematic. It seems to be 
clear that autonomy does not rule out authority. But how 
should we describe the relation? Is it possible to be 
related to authority in a way which violates your 
autonomy?
We can rely on authority in the sense of "x is right 
because A says so and he has good reason to know." This 
does not seem to be problematic for autonomy in the sense 
I am thinking about. This implies that we have checked 
that A ‘s judgements have proved reliable in the past and 
that he is likely to handle the task at hand
18. Downie, R. S. and Telfer, E. : Respect for Persons. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1969, p. 93
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appropriately. It is just rational to accept that others 
can be more knowledgeable in some, maybe most matters, 
than we are. This includes morality. It can be a good 
reason for accepting a belief as well founded that it 
comes from someone who is in a position to know.
I said earlier on that in a sense acting on good 
reasons seems to be primary to seeing good reasons. This 
seems to be one structure in internal autonomy. It seems 
clear that we have been acting on what we unreflectively 
take to be good reasons for many years before we start 
reflecting on these reasons. When we start making our 
moral views coherent through criticism we are attempting 
to see whether they really are good reasons. Full 
internal autonomy always comes late in the day, so to 
speak, in the sense of rational autonomy. But it is 
possible to see whether someone is autonomous from what 
he says and what he is prepared to defend when 
challenged, even though he has no formulated idea of 
moral autonomy. Moral autonomy can be latent in habits of 
acting and thinking.
There is another reason for wanting to accept moral 
expertise and moral authority. At any stage in time 
morality can generally be divided into two. One part is 
formulated in rules and well established principles 
accepted by those who live by them. The other part is 
where no principles have been formulated and no well 
established rules are accepted by all. This latter part 
covers nowadays things like surrogacy, abortion, nuclear 
war. It is to be expected that moral experts are more
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knowledgeable about morality in general than laymen but 
in particular they should be able to articulate the 
problems, arguments and proposed solutions in the area 
where there are not well established rules and 
principles. Those who are not interested in such debates 
might be well advised to accept suggestions from those 
experts in those debated areas. The status and activity 
of moral experts as moral authorities is no threat to 
autonomy.
Knowledge and control over one's own desires and 
actions are essential to autonomy. In so far as increased 
knowledge enhances autonomy, moral experts ought to be 
good friends of moral autonomy. Moral experts articulate 
moral views and arguments. If they are up to the task 
they do so in a civilized and reasonable way. The moral 
experts will be examples to others about what are 
reasonable moral beliefs. They will also present 
alternatives to accepted practices which can be 
considered, reasoned about and accepted or rejected, as 
the case may be. So the moral experts should help people 
to see more alternatives and opportunities than they 
would otherwise have. But at the same time they uphold 
moral standards. The exploration of alternatives does not 
mean that all new opportunities will or must be accepted. 
They might be rejected as inferior. Moral experts can be 
very important for fostering a culture conducive to 
rational autonomy.
315
L . A t smei j sm
In discussing paternalism one must make certain 
assumptions about those who are subject to paternalistic 
interventions. First, we can often assume that those 
subject to paternalism are incapacitated, either 
temporarily or permanently. This applies to those who are 
drunk or under the influence of narcotics and those who 
are mentally retarded, seniles and children. Second, we 
can assume that the agent is making a mistake about a 
fact and would welcome being in possession of the truth. 
Third, we can sometimes assume the agent has an 
unreasonable view of his own good. If someone made it his 
life's ambition to stand still on one foot or to smoke as 
many cigarettes as possible then we would infer that his 
view of his own good was curious, even unreasonable.
This third assumption introduces the latent elitism 
in what I have argued. If it is possible to reflect on 
and evaluate ends just like means then it seems to follow 
that some values and ends are better than others and some 
people are better judges of ends and values than others. 
Now, this means that it is impossible to argue that all 
people are owed equal respect on the basis of equally 
good ends and that these ends are equally good because 
they are not open to deliberation,^^ This theory is 
false, if my account has been true. The account of
19. Skorupski, J. : "Liberal Elitism", photocopy, pp. 1-4 and 27-30
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autonomy I have discussed supports this because internal 
autonomy comes in degrees and as soon as external 
autonomy comes into play the agent is not to be 
interfered with. The acceptance of this difference of 
ends does not mean that we have to give up the notion of 
the equality of respect. Something like it is behind the 
notion of external autonomy. But we must find a new basis 
for it.
I said above that the connection between internal 
and external autonomy seemed to be that the more you have 
of internal autonomy the more valuable external autonomy 
becomes. External autonomy implies that a principle of 
non-interference applies to the agent and his actions 
should not be interfered with unless something serious 
would follow them. Then the weighing of the consequences 
comes into play and considerations about rationality of 
the decision. It seems to me that for the simple reason
that autonomy is valued highly by most people nowadays
the consequences must be very serious for a paternalistic 
intervention to be justified. If autonomy was generally 
less valued it would be easier to justify a paternalistic 
interference.
There is a question about the status of those who 
are subautonomous so to speak. I take it that in general 
the principle of non-interference does not apply to them
and it would depend on the judgement of someone other
than themselves whether they should be guided or not. 
What relation obtains between their interests and the 
autonomy of those who reach the threshold is not clear to
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me. Would it be permissible to sacrifice the autonomy of 
one for the interest of five or ten of those who are 
subautonomous? I do not have an answer to this question.
I mentioned equal respect above. Equal respect can 
be thought of as a reason for a principle of non­
interference or a side constraint. Side constraints put a 
limit on what can be done to a person and they reflect 
the separateness of lives and that persons ought always 
to be treated as ends and not merely as me a n s . 0^ These 
can also be considered as the grounds for autonomy.
Non-interference of moral agents can be thought of 
in at least two ways. On the one hand it can be thought 
of as absolute constraints and under practically no 
circumstances are they to be violated. This is Nozick’s 
view. Nozick's exception from the non-violation principle 
is moral catastrophes. But otherwise he believes that 
individuals are inviolable and hence these constraints 
ought never to be overridden. This is a very strong view. 
On the other hand it can be argued for on maximizing 
principles. Then the view is that you ought to minimize 
the violations of non-interference and maximize autonomy.
I do not propose to go thoroughly into this issue. 
But I want to mention three reasons for preferring the 
maximizing view. The first is that sociality is a value 
and it is a great part of most people's lives. Love and 
friendship are among the things we treasure most in our 
lives. An integral part of them is that other people's
20. Nozick, R. : Anarchy. State, and Utopia. Oxford,Basil Blackwell, 1974, pp. 29-34
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interests become a central part of our lives. These 
values require us to prefer other persons' projects to 
our own in some circumstances as an expression of our 
love or friendship. It is also implausible that we are 
not required to put aside our own projects to prevent a 
great harm if it is within our powers to do so. But this 
seems to be required by the strict understanding of side 
constraints along Nozick's lines.This is no reason for 
maximizing autonomy, only a reason against this very 
strict inviolability.
The second is that in a world without a fully 
determinate moral code moral conflicts are unavoidable. 
If a man in an aeroplane with 200 passengers says he has 
a bomb and that he will blow it unless certain conditions 
are met and you are in a position to prevent this by 
killing him, then it seems to be justified for you to 
kill him. We assume that all the passengers will die if
21. D.O. Brink says in Moral Realism and The Foundation of Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 289, that "Nozick claims that recognition of theseparateness of persons implies that no one...can ever berequired to set aside her projects in order to benefitothers or prevent harm to them." Brink refers to pp. 30-33 of Nozick's book, op. cit. But it is clear from what Nozick says that he is not claiming this. He is claiming that separateness of lives outlaws physical aggression, bans the use of one person by another and that personal sacrifice cannot be justified by reference to a social entity. This is not claiming that one can never be required to set aside one's projects for the benefit of others. The underlying idea in Nozick, it seems to me, is that such setting aside cannot be a moral obligation. It is this idea which seems to imply the radical separateness, a separateness all the way down, that Brink says Nozick claims. Nozick does not claim this idea, at least not in the referred pages, although he allows for moral obligation to others in case of moral catastrophes. But it is this idea which is made implausible by the value of sociality and our obligation to others in hours of great need.
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the bomb goes off. It is plainly better that one is 
killed rather than 200. This seems to show that side 
constraints do not hold in such a situation and we should 
take the maximizing view.
The third reason is that it seems to be justified to 
limit autonomy under certain circumstances to enhance it 
in the future. I mentioned earlier an example of a ban on 
duelling. It seems to be true of this that it leads to 
better chances for the individuals subject to the ban to 
develop their other interests. It might be objected that 
the duelling example is not strictly speaking an example 
of a restriction on autonomy. But it is easy to construct 
one along similar lines. Let us think of a politician in 
an election who decides not to tell the public that he is 
going to raise taxes after the election if he is elected, 
and he has good reason to believe that the course which 
his opponents propose to follow will lead to disaster. 
Let us also suppose that raising taxes will avoid 
disaster and that his telling the electorate before the 
election will damage his chances of getting elected. He 
is elected. After the election he decides to raise taxes. 
If we agree that these assumptions are true, then he 
seems to have a justification for not telling the public 
the truth about his intention beforehand but this also 
seems to be a betrayal of the autonomy of the electorate. 
They ought to know the truth before making up their 
minds. But this might also in the long run minimize the
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loss of autonomy.22 These three reasons seem to lend some 
plausibility to the claim that we ought to maximize
autonomy rather than take the side constraint view of
Nozick.
I said that those who could be described as 
subautonomous are persons to whom the principle of non­
intervention is not applicable. It can be argued that it 
is in their interest to develop their abilities and 
internal autonomy to reach the level of external
autonomy. Autonomy is certainly a key to many of the most
important goods of a rational being's life. But what do 
we say to someone who accepts that he ought to be 
autonomous but at the same time chooses not to?22 can we 
say that he is wrong?
I think at least two claims can be made about this 
man. The first that he might be preferring other values 
like loyalty or dependency of some sort to developing his 
autonomy or his rational faculties. This man is not 
losing his autonomy by his choice but preferring a 
different balance in his life between competing goods to
22. I realize that these three points raise many questions that need to be answered. Perhaps the most serious questions surround the notion of agent-neutrality and autonomy and the maximizing view. I propose an answer along similar lines to R. Bindley in his book Autonomy. London, Macmillan, 1986, pp. 82-91 where he accepts interpersonal neutralism but rejects temporal neutralism. There is also more discussion about agent relativity and agent neutrality to be had in S. Scheffler (ed.) Conseauentialism and Its Critics. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988.23. Dworkin, G. ; op. cit. p. 3 9 where Dworkin considers this to be a paradox for theories of autonomy that rely on the agent's will or decision. This does not seem to me to be a paradox for a theory similar to the one I have been arguing for.
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somebody else who prefers his autonomy. The second is 
that if he is seriously proposing that he become like a 
child or a mentally retarded person, then it is not 
difficult to show that it is in his interest to retain 
his autonomy. He is a better man if he is autonomous and 
it is also better for him. He can live a better life. We 
could also say that he has the duty to be autonomous and 
develop his talents.
I take it to be true that it is good for a rational 
agent to be autonomous, This might be taken to mean that 
Platonic Forms of an ideal person could be discovered and 
it would be in virtue of those Forms that we truly say 
that it is better for him. But the notion of objective 
interests should not be understood to imply this. What it 
implies is that if a non-autonomous agent were subjected 
to the experiences of autonomy he would desire it. So 
objective interests do not totally exclude desires but 
allow them in at another level than ordinary desire 
theories.
What should we say about the examples of protective 
helmets and seatbelts in the light of what the 
description of autonomy I have given? It seems clear that 
the obligation to wear both is an intrusion of autonomy 
because it is not up to us to decide this. The most 
plausible answer, it seems, is that these decisions are 
not very important and they do not raise a serious issue 
for autonomy. So even if we are forced to wear helmets 
and seatbelts, this is not a great loss of autonomy. 
Other interests which are possibly enhanced by this
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obligation can outweigh that loss. Autonomy does not 
automatically outweigh other values and interests.
The ban on brainwashing is an instance of 
paternalism which can be justified in terms of autonomy. 
This ban can indeed possibly maximize autonomy. The same 
applies to a ban on manipulation and subliminal 
advertising. So paternalism and autonomy are not
contradictories. Paternalism can enhance and promote 
autonomy.
6.5. Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that Feinberg's theory 
of autonomy and his four meanings of autonomy is not 
satisfactory. But his theory needs detailed discussion 
because it touches on most of the important issues 
concerning autonomy. Autonorry should be divided into two 
parts: internal and external autonomy. External autonomy 
is being free from the interference of others. Internal 
autonomy is the ability to see and act on good reasons. 
Autonomy does not completely outlaw paternalistic 
interferences because it is only one value among others 
and paternalism can be used to maximize autonomy.
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çonclygjçng
In this essay I have attempted to argue that 
objective consequentialism gives the best account of the 
good and moral qualities in general. This seems to make 
moral knowledge and moral expertise possible. Paternalism 
seems to present some special problems but in general 
they seem best dealt with in terms of the consequences of 
paternalistic actions compared to the alternative course 
of self-determination. The autonomy of persons puts a 
constraint on any paternalistic action but it does not 
seem to rule it out altogether. This is the general 
structure of the essay and its conclusions.
I think it is worthwhile to go over some of the 
major points again and add some further considerations on 
paternalism, objectivity and authority.
Some people have been sceptical of objectivity in 
morality because they believed it led inevitably to 
intolerance. The idea seems to be that because there 
might be correct answers to moral problems, then it would 
be justified to force those right answers on those who 
disagreed. The government in any state could claim that 
it was forcing a conception of the good on its subjects 
because it was the right one. This would be moral 
authoritarianism and moral tyranny and would obviously be 
unacceptable to any reasonable person.
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"The fact that many people fear that if they 
concede any sort of moral objectivity out loud then 
they will find some government shoving its notion 
of moral objectivity down their throats is without 
question one of the reasons why so many people 
subscribe to amoral subjectivism to which they give 
no real assent.
Various reactions are possible to this. One is to go 
for subjectivism in morality accepting that subjectivism 
implies that there are no right answers in morality. This 
would certainly exclude any possibility of moral 
expertise or moral authority. But the point is that on 
this assumption it would not be possible to argue that it 
was wrong for a government to force its conception of 
good on its subjects because it would be meaningless to 
say it is wrong. There simply is no moral wrongness or 
rightness. Hence the government could not be wrong. In 
fact this type of subjectivism seems to leave nothing but 
naked power to any government or authority to force 
through some preferred end. So I think that subjectivism 
is an inappropriate response to this question.
Some subjectivists claim that their theory is the 
only one which can possibly accept fallibilism about 
moral views and tolerance. To claim this two things must 
be true, it seems. First, that mistakes are possible 
about moral matters. Second, that tolerance is right and
1. Putnam, H. : Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 149
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appropriate but intolerance not. Neither of these things 
can be true on the subjectivist account. No mistakes are 
possible about morality and it cannot be true that 
intolerance is bad or wrong. According to the 
subjectivist there is no truth of the matter and morality 
is up to each individual. So he can lay no claim to the 
virtue of tolerance or the humility of accepting that he 
might be mistaken about a moral issue.
So subjectivism has little to offer in this respect. 
But if we accept objectivity in moral affairs, does this 
have any of the serious consequences that have been 
claimed to follow? It seems to me that none of the
consequences follow that have been believed to follow. 
First, accepting moral objectivity makes moral mistakes 
possible. The idea in the objection to objectivity 
leading to intolerance seems to be that an agent who
believes x to be morally right must believe that somebody 
else who disagrees is wrong. It also seems to be implied 
in this that the agent ought to be willing in the normal 
circumstances to act on his belief. It is claimed that 
intolerance follows from this. But this is false for
three reasons. The first is that an agent who accepts 
that what he believes can be objectively right can also 
recognize that he could be wrong. Even on the best 
evidence there is no guarantee that his views are the
true ones. The second is that even though it might be 
true that what A believes is wrong it does not follow 
that making A do what is right is right. He might resent 
it so fiercely that there was no value in making him do
326
what was right. So an agent who accepts objectivity can 
understand and accept the value of tolerance. A third 
reason is that on the objective conception of morality 
rational appreciation of morality becomes possible. So it 
is always a possibility that an agent who was wrong could 
be rationally persuaded about what is right and true. It 
is also true that there is no reason to be dogmatic 
though you believe you are right. It is a mark of 
rationality to be willing to subject your beliefs to the 
test of discussion and persuasion with an open mind.
There is one more reason for any moral realist to be 
reluctant to use paternalism or to be intolerant about 
others' conduct. It is that there does not seem to be any 
unified ordering of the objective goods of rational
agents possible. This does not mean that there is a
complete anarchy of objective goods. But there is a
possible spectrum for agents to choose without crossing 
the limit into the unreasonable or the irrational. So 
there is no hierarchy of values which can be used to 
justify opposition to or oppression of deviance.
It should come as no surprise that moral
subjectivists want to avoid a barren theory like the one 
I described above. I discussed first in this thesis two 
attempts by prominent contemporary philosophers to use 
subjectivist assumptions to build up a full blown moral 
theory. R.M. Hare believes he can use the analysis of 
moral language as a basis for a moral theory. Hence, the 
importance of his analysis of 'good* and his distinction 
between the evaluative and descriptive meaning of moral
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terms. I think there are reasons to reject this analysis. 
This does not mean that one should reject all the other 
parts of Hare's theory. I am willing to accept that moral 
principles are universalizable and overriding even though 
they are not always acted on.
Simon Blackburn argues that he can accept moral 
language at face value and base it on a subjectivist 
metaethical theory given the condition that the 
distinction between first- and second-order theories or 
ethical and metaethical theories is very sharp and cannot 
be crossed. No theory can cross the line without damage. 
He thinks that any second-order theory can go with any 
first order theory. I think this dividing line cannot be 
sustained. It also seems true that if Blackburn's theory 
is successful we would have difficulty believing it. So I 
think these two theories can be rejected.
Realist theories are of different types. I 
considered four types of realist theories. Moral 
qualities have been thought of as analogous to perceptual 
qualities. This seems to me ultimately to fail. They have 
been thought of as analogous to primary qualities. I want 
to reject this analogy although I think moral qualities 
can play many of the roles primary qualities play. They 
have also been considered as the entities corresponding 
to the most reasonable hypothesis explaining agents' 
conduct. This is something that has to be taken into 
consideration but this position has its weaknesses. 
Lastly moral qualities have been believed to be real and 
particular. This amounts to denying that moral principles
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can be general. This seems to me to be wrong. Any moral 
principle would be such that it allowed generalization.
Moral qualities are objective. There is rightness 
and wrongness independently of our judgements, knowledge 
and our minds. Actions and agents are bearers of moral 
qualities. It can be argued that all sentient beings are 
bearers of some moral qualities, even that nature itself 
has some moral qualities. It seems that given some
plausible assumptions about rationality, persons and 
objectivity, we can conclude that consequentialism is the 
best account of the nature of moral qualities.
In addition value seems best accounted for in
objective terms, not in terms of desires. Accompanying 
this we should distinguish between wants and desires on 
one hand and interests on the other. Moral values like
happiness or autonomy are objective and independent of
our desires. These moral values ought to be maximized by 
any rational, moral agent. Objective values are not 
Platonic forms discoverable by reason and completely cut 
off from desire. The objectivity of values should be 
interpreted as values that would be desired were the 
agents exposed to them subject to the condition laid down 
in the introduction.
Because there is truth to be had in moral matters, 
then moral knowledge becomes possible. Moral knowledge 
should be accounted for in similar terms as other 
knowledge. Knowledge is not foundational in the sense 
that there are some incorrigible beliefs that all other 
beliefs are based on. It is always possible that we are
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mistaken in our beliefs. The claims to knowledge must be 
evaluated in terms of the coherence of their 
justification. Although all justification seems 
ultimately to be circular not all justification is 
viciously circular. Moral knowledge is subject to the 
same considerations as other knowledge.
If moral knowledge is possible it seems that moral 
expertise will follow. Moral expertise has had few 
followers and most of those who have discussed it have 
tried to resist it. The most remarkable feature of the 
arguments against moral expertise is that they do not 
seem to show any feature of moral knowledge or moral 
expertise which makes it seriously problematic. The point 
of these moral experts is that they are the authorities 
on moral matters. It is not reasonable to expect them to 
agree on everything any more than other experts. But they 
enrich moral life by pointing out alternatives and 
articulating opinions and theories about the part of 
morality which is new and has not been formulated into 
principles. But moral experts are not ultimate 
authorities able to adjudicate on all moral matters. 
There are no such authorities.
It needs to be pointed out that in this essay I use 
the notion of authority with the case of expertise 
primarily in mind. It can be argued that the case of 
expertise is not central to the notion of authority.^ 
Proper authority in a de facto sense exists when an agent
2. Benn, S. I. : "Authority", in Edwards, P (ed.): TheEncyclopedia of Philosophy. New York, MacmillanPublishing, 1967, Vol. 1, p. 216
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recognizes that another is entitled to command him. 
Authority based on knowledge says that you accept a
verdict of an expert because he knows what he is talking 
about. Questions arise for this kind of authority for an 
autonomous persons but I think it is possible to argue 
that if in general the acceptance of such an authority 
has good consequences then it ought to be obeyed. This
means that the agent must be prepared at any time to
assess the consequences himself and come to a conclusion 
about the goodness of the consequences. At the minimum it 
must always be possible for him to do so. So it seems 
that the same or similar considerations apply to
authority proper and to authority as I have discussed it.
Now, if it is true that persons have interests or 
objective ends and that it is possible to have moral 
experts who are good at spotting those ends does this not 
lead to the tyranny of the moral experts? This does not 
seem to be the case. If we look at the case of 
paternalism, i.e. making somebody do what is in his own 
interest, then we have a test case of this possibility. 
There are two other possible cases that might be looked 
at. One is that people should be prevented from harming 
others. I assume that this case is not problematic and it 
is justifiable to do so. The other is to make them do 
what is in others' interests rather than preventing harm 
to them. The crucial difference between this case and 
paternalism is that what the agents could be made to do 
would not be in their own interests but in somebody 
else's. This possibility raises pressing problems about
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agent-neutrality of moral goodness which I have only 
discussed very superficially. So paternalism presents a 
case where we can check the plausibility of the claim 
about the tyranny of moral experts.
Paternalism is to be made to act in one's own 
interest. It does matter how this takes place. There are 
various possibilities. Coercion is one, coercive threats 
is another, manipulation is a third. All these would 
count as paternalistic ways of causing one to work in 
one’s own interest. But rational persuasion would not, if 
we can take that as an instance of making somebody do 
what is in his own interest. This is different from the 
question of understanding whether a paternalistic act is 
justified. This requires taking the consequences of the 
proposed intervention and weighing them against the value 
of the consequences of allowing the agent to decide 
himself. The rationality of the decisions has weight as 
well. If in general it can be argued that an intervention 
has a far higher value than allowing the agent to decide 
himself what to do the intervention seems to be 
justified. But the harm from the decision must be severe 
and it must also be considered that there is always a 
danger involved in paternalism.
Autonomy is one among the objective goods of any 
agent. Autonomy includes control of the agent over 
himself and knowledge by the agent about what concerns 
him. It is obviously problematic for paternalism whether 
it is compatible with autonomy. But there seem to be four 
reasons for accepting.them to be compatible. The first is
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that autonomy is only one among many various goods of the 
agent and it is clearly important for a happy and 
worthwhile life. But it has no automatic priority over 
all other goods. The second is that the consequences of 
allowing the agent to proceed on the basis of his 
decision can be so severe that they outweigh the good of 
autonomy. Third, any paternalistic action must be in the 
agent's interest. This means that not any presumed good 
can be imposed on the agent. It must be in his interest. 
Four, maximizing autonomy seems to be possible.
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